State Ex Rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson

STATE EX REL. the WISCONSIN SENATE and President,

its Risser; Senator Fred A. Wisconsin Assembly Speaker, its Representative Loftus, A. Thomas and the Joint Committee on Legislative Organization,

Petitioners, v. THOMPSON,

Tommy G. Governor of the State of Wisconsin; Klauser, R. James Secretary, Department Administration, Respondents.

Supreme Court Argued No. 87-1750-OA. October 1987. Decided June 1988.

(Also 385.) reported in 424 N.W.2d by Eugenia petitioners there were briefs For Brady Jeffrey Williamson, Carter, J. Kassel and C. G. argument Sinykin, by Madison oral & LaFollette Brady C. Williamson. argued respondents

For the the cause was attorney general, Marion, assistant with Edward S. Hanaway, attorney Donald J. whom on general. briefs was were William Amicus curiae briefs filed J. Decade, for the Wisconsin’s Environmental Davis Doran, Madison; Kenneth William M. Smoler and League Albert, S.C., for of Women Smoler & Prosser, Wisconsin, Inc., Madison; Jr., David Voters of Appleton; Sample Meredith, for Bruce William S. Council, Madison Education Association Wisconsin Stitt, Donald K. Madison. and Senator HEFFERNAN, This is CHIEF JUSTICE. supple- original declaratory judgment action for rights injunctive relief. We declare the mental petitioners parties are and declare that not prayed to the for relief. entitled petitioners are the Wisconsin Senate its president, Risser, A. who is also a Senator Frederick taxpayer; resident and the Wisconsin As- Wisconsin sembly speaker, Representative Thomas A. and its taxpayer; Loftus, who is also Wisconsin resident and a 432 Legislative Organization, and the Joint Committee on petitioners 13.80, which created sec. Stats. The a seek declaration from this court that Governor Tommy Thompson exceeded his constitutional authority phrases, digits, letters, when he vetoed fragments budget and word in the 1987-89 biennial bill.1 declaratory judgment challenges

This action validity of the 290 vetoes the petitioners 1The also a seek declaration that message does not have unilateral to order in his veto Secretary Department place that the of the of Administration appropriated programs funds from the vetoed and functions into general lapse unallotted reserves for later into the fund. We do not "impoundment” this present reach so-called It issue. does not justiciable controversy ripe judicial because issue is not for determination, Bunderson, 400, 410, Loy see v. Wis. 2d (1982), light governor’s repeated N.W.2d 175 disclaimers in the brief submitted on his behalf that these directions were not mandatory controlling Secretary. intended to be on the Fur thermore, parties stipulated Secretary have that the Department governor’s of Administration considers the message merely "non-binding” gubernatorial be source only Secretary may intent and one of the factors the take into making continuing account when allocation on a decisions basis throughout year 16.50, pursuant parties to sec. Stats. The also stipulated itself, that other than the there are no separate, expressions budgetary identifiable from intent legislature or the Joint Committee on that are Finance inconsis governor. conclude, tent with these directives from the We therefore, claiming that the concession that he was not any authority impound appropriated parties’ funds and the stipulations unnecessary make it for this court to resolve this issue in this case. challenged

2The 37 vetoes action are: A-l, A-6, A-16, A-23, C-9, C-26, A-44, G-6, C-27, Item Item C-29, D-2, D-10, D-21, D-30, D-38, D-27, D-35, D-36, D-40, Item acting 27, Act on 1987 Wisconsin in exercised primary budget petitioners’ The omnibus bill. biennial governor’s vetoes were invalid that the contention is authority governor under art. has no because to veto individu- of the Wisconsin Constitution sec. 10 digits letters, words, no to and has al governor, on the amounts. The reduce and hand, that under constitution maintains other v. set forth in State ex rel. Kleczka the standards (1978), 679, its 264 539 Conta, 82 2d N.W.2d Wis. part any progenitors, he can veto including numbers, if that words, letters, or even bill, long appropriation, a in an results in reduction "complete, entire, is remains after the veto a as what law.” and workable granted petitioners to leave com-

This court permitted original action.3 court also mence this governor any he affirmative defenses brief interposed the to raise. The has wished following court exer- affirmative defenses this four E-24, D-69, D-72, D-73, E-16, E-22, E-23, E-28,

D-44, D-46, Item E-66, E-42, E-43, E-49, E-52, E-56, E-69, and E-83. juris requires prompt publici 3This matter by this court first instance. authoritative determination 428, also, Heil, (1934); 230 284 N.W. 42 see In re Petition Wis. Jurisdiction, Original 229 643 Wis. N.W. Exercise of (1930). Nonetheless, repeat expressed by the the admonition we Supreme upon Florida Court when it was called to determine validity of six exercised that state’s of items vetoes bill: acceptance interpret "... it would be a serious mistake our general willingness jurisdiction thrust cause as a political into referee on a biennial basis the court arena and legislative assertions of of the executive and branches Firestone, appropriations Brownson v. So. relation to act.” (Fla. 1980). 2d its cising original jurisdiction in this case: Petitioners’ lack to capacity sue; petitioners’ lack of standing; the claim that principles constitutional of separation powers would be by permitting violated the legisla- tive branch of to government sue the executive branch branch; before the a judicial and lack of justiciable controversy. to

If this court were all accept any or of these defenses, affirmative challenged par- tial vetoes in this action would be insulated immunized from this court’s possible review and Although recognize invalidation.4 we the seriousness complexity of these defenses, affirmative we decline, nevertheless and find it unnecessary in this case, questions apparent resolve authority of those purporting represent legislature i.e., — Senate and Assembly respective and their leadership as well as the Joint Committee Legislative on Organi- zation, bring and maintain this declaratory judg- —to ment action. This apparent authority springs from resolution adopted the Joint on by Legisla- Committee Organization September tive authorizing on Speaker Assembly the Senate President to represent legislature, retain counsel the joint itself, any committee in appropriate parties other litigation. this We in past have in- refused to termeddle in what we consider to be intra- purely Stitt, concerns. State ex La rel. Follette v. legislative case, specifically challenged 4Of 37 vetoes this D-36, D-35, only items E-23 and E-83 were submitted to legislature possible pursuant for override to art. sec. 10. An by additional 21 of the 290 vetoes exercised possible were also submitted to the for None override. legislature. 25 these vetoes was overridden (1983). 358, 364, In this 338 N.W.2d 114 Wis. 2d go action. We that committee case, will not behind we brought passing, however, that this action was note Loftus their and Thomas Risser Frederick taxpayers capacities well as in their as individual Additionally, capacities. conclude we official taxpayers have as residents and individuals requirements two those standing bring for met declaratory judgment See, action. Milwaukee Brewers 56, 65, DH&SS, 2d 130 Wis. Club v. Baseball (1986).Furthermore, not consider we need N.W.2d petition allegation specific any the absence individually class, Loftus, or as either that Risser or Thompson pecuniary loss, to be fatal. v. suffered have County, 673, 679, 221 N.W.2d 845 64 2dWis. Kenosha (1974); Realty Sewerage also, Commis S.T. Co. v. see (1961). City 22, 112 177 Cf. sion, 15, 2d N.W.2d 15 Wis. Menasha, Appleton 2d 419 142 Wis. v. Town of of (1988). 249 N.W.2d develop and Moreover, it this court’s function to Mosley, clarify 102 Wis. 2d the law. State v. See (1981) McConnohie, and v. 665, 307 200 State N.W.2d (1983). Marbury 362, 334 903 Since 113 N.W.2d Wis. 2d Cranch) (1 (1803), it has Madison, 5 U.S. been v. peculiarly province recognized of that it is say judiciary interpret and what the constitution to duty to to is. deem it be this court’s resolve law We disputes regarding functions of the constitutional government; may not we different branches of state parties simply duty are or both avoid this because one government. v. Barnes of See coordinate branches 1984). (D.C. responsibil Kline, is the 759 F.2d Cir. It notwithstanding ity judiciary act, the fact political that that the considerations case involves practical judgment may political final have conse- quences. Dye Hall, v. State rel. So. See ex 2d 346 (Miss. 1987). declaratory judg- We that conclude this presents justiciable controversy. Loy ment action v. supra. Bunderson,

Accordingly, parties stipulated because the necessary have to all the facts determine issues petition agreed raised in have this that none is in dispute, reach we the merits. governor properly

We conclude exercised pursuant authority his sec. 10 art. respect the Wisconsin with Constitution to the 37 specifically challenged identified vetoes in this case. presaged by We consider this result has been our prior regarding scope decisions opinion, authority. Thus, in we break ground except now, no new as we on the facts before obligation clarify may, us, have that the appro- the exercise priation his over digits, bills, words, veto individual letters may appropriations striking digits, and also reduce long complete, after as what remains veto is a entire, and workable State law. ex rel. Kleczka v. accept, supra. Conta, We also and for the first time in give explicit judicial recognition long- to, this case standing practical interpretation and administrative legislatures, governors or modus vivendi between consequences partial any that the of must veto be a germane topic subject law that is to or matter of provisions. the vetoed we

Because conclude the result in this case augured by prior begin decisions, has been our our we prior discussion awith brief review of those cases discussing authority in this state. general 1930, the electorate election

In the adoption to approved the of an amendment this state That Constitution. 10 of Wisconsin art. sec. following language to the added the amendment Constitution: Wisconsin approved in may be whole

"Appropriation bills part approved governor, and part by law, part be objected shall shall become provided for other in the same manner as returned bills.” only amendment, had

Prior to this By authority reject entire bill. this amend- joined V., 10, 38 other Wisconsin ment art. sec. (now 43), gover- totalling provide their which states although generically, sometimes with what nors authority inaccurately, as an "item” veto over known (1986) appropriation Print, U.S. bills. See Committee Congress, Representatives, Session, 99th 2nd House of Application Experience State and Its "Item Veto: (Hereafter cited as the Federal Situation.” Committee Print). adopted was provide flexibility with some state to legislature’s including dealing practice with the legislation subjects in one different early E. Frances McGovern bill. As Governor complained practice had of this and noted authority required him to lack of a approve such bills toto "omnibus” though might objected he to certain even have sub- jects legislation therein. A. contained See Negative-the Harrington, Propriety of the Gov- "The Authority,” Marq. L. Rev. ernor’s Partial Veto (1977). (Hereafter, Harrington.) The first case consider this new constitutional ex rel. State Wisconsin v. was Telephone Co. provision 302, (1935). Henry, Wis. N.W. 486 In that case, depression-era telephone company brought original an in this challenging action court Governor Phillip parts LaFollette’s vetoes of of an appropriation aimed at providing bill funds which were necessary for immediate emergency relief. Governor LaFollette parts bill vetoed which did not specific contain Those appropriations. vetoes were challenged on the ground that were they unconstitutional because the governor did not have the authority approve the and disapprove proviso or a condition inseparably connected the appropriation. Addition- it ally, argued was the governor did not have the authority disapprove parts of an containing appropriation. not

In rejecting arguments, these this court in Henry set the indelibly scope broad gover- the Wisconsin V., nor’s veto authority under art. sec. 10. The Henry court specifically drew a distinction between the "item” veto authority granted in governors other and the states "broader” term "part” granted of this state. In Henry, court stated:

"[I]f, conferring power, in amendment of sec. art. Wisconsin constitu- tion, it give was intended to the executive such only respect part to an item of an bill, item in an appropriation why then was not some such term 'part as either 'item’ or of an item’ amendment, embodied was theretofore done in provisions similar constitutional so states, many using plain other instead of unambiguous 'part’ 'part term of the bill qualifying or to,’ any words without objected the meaning scope of limiting the well-known at 313. 'part?’” 218 Wis. word Further, dictionary’s adopted this court "part”: the word definition of stated broadly equal unequal, into which portions, or '"One divided, divided; regarded or as some- is anything mass, whole; number, quantity, thing a less than a like, going up, to with regarded as make or another, number, larger quantity, or a others mass, etc., not; actually separate or a

whether member, fraction, fragment, or constitu- piece, Id. ent.’” although signal a that court also sent clear

This may not have been expansive of framers of sec. art. V by intended constitution, nevertheless, that result: was the that art. may

"It be sec. Wisconsin well constitution, empower not intended was bill, vetoing parts governor, in of an legisla- single piece to dissever or dismember a of severable, merely or so as to leave tion which is not complete fitting are a provisions which not separate legislature. for subject enactment intended, Although may not there have been nothing provision in that which warrants the governor’s power inference or conclusion that not intended to be as coexten- of veto was join legislature’s power as the and enact sive pieces legislation separable in an ....” at 314-315. bill Id.

Hence, on the very question, from the first case recognized this court has that what was struck item; governor "separable” did not have be instead, recognized this court has that what assembled, legislature has can disassem- "part” by "part.” ble that, further Henry court noted unlike states, nothing

other in this pro- state’s constitution passing hibits the from containing Thus, one Henry, more than subject.5 the court state, determined in this in the function,” exercise his "quasi-legislative has a coextensive veto in order "check or prevent evil consequences improper joinder ...” bill. Id. at 315. in an appropriation In challenge the rejecting to Governor LaFol- Henry, partial lette’s vetoes in this court developed the defining following governor’s partial standard the (1) veto the must authority: appropriation bill be an (2) bill; however, part the objects need (3) but, not an appropriation; approved involve portion complete, must constitute a entire and work- also, Id. 313-314. See able law. at Harrington, 60 Rev., L. Marq. supra, at 879. case governor’s partial

The next to deal with the Dammann, was State Finnegan ex rel. v. power veto (1936). 143, 220 264 Wis. N.W. 622 In that case this court governor’s partial held that veto may bill, be exercised with only respect appropriation an not a revenue bill. principle The was reiterated that partial applies parts veto even to those of an appropriation dealing bill not with appropriations; however, emphasized upon it was that the bill which the veto was exercised contain an must IV, only 5The such sec. limitation is found art. Wis. Const., respect private with local bills. affecting merely than corners rather its four within appropriation. Id. at contains law which another significant Finnegan it because case is The 147-149. expansive recognized again broad this court’s governor’s scope interpretation of appropria- respect parts authority of an with tion bill. Zimmerman, case, v. rel. Martin next State ex (1940), reemphasized the N.W. Wis. sweep

uniquely broad governor granted V., 10. In in art. sec. the Wisconsin governor’s upholding of whole case, appropria- paragraphs of an sections, subsections presented question bill, that the this court stated tion parts, approved whole, taken as a "whether was complete More- provide Id. at 450. law.” workable emphasized the test Martin, over, this court parts remain- focuses on ing his veto. exercise of after court wrote: This in the instant case is made

"No contention 563, S., approved by Bill parts that the No. of law of body complete not leave a governor do separate enactment for a proper subject matter 533, it that ch. think clear legislature. the We 563, S., Bill No. all of which contains Laws by the disapproved excepting parts the thereof an effective and enforceable governor, constitutes by separate enactment fitting subjects for a law on supplied.) 233 Wis. at (Emphasis legislature.” 449. recogni- significance court’s is the Martin

Also of purpose V, 10. to art. sec. of the amendment tion Echoing McGovern of Governor earlier remarks legislature’s regarding enactment of the evils of the Martin bills,6 court in appropriation this "omnibus” purpose of art. sec. was: stated "_to prevent, possible, adoption if of omni bills, logrolling, practice appropriation bus act, together subjects in one inconsistent jumbling passage uniting by in order to force a minorities particular provi different interests when the with merits, pass separate could not on their with sions legislation gen objectionable attached to riders eral bills in order to force the stop to veto the and thus entire bill government approve the wheels of or obnoxious in the Very acts. definite evils were inherent lawmaking processes appropria in connection with people tion measures. Both the and the power upon it to confer deemed advisable approve appropriation bills in whole or part in ....” 233 Wis. at 447-448.7 subsequent in language quoted This has been in petitioners paraphrased cases and has been argument of their support the instant case solely is explicit purpose prevent logrolling.8 logrolling The definition of Rev., Harrington, Marq. supra, at 876. L. 6See Martin, particu "logrolling” objectionable or not in the 7In — recognized component inherent of an omnibus lar case —was as an combining subjects in of inconsistent bill where the Thus, "logrolling” contrary one bill is not to the state constitution. special of the omnibus bill and has a definition the context practice prohibited by described veto. It is not the law and Rather, opinion. practice it is a whose use below this may veto. omnibus bill be correctable argument by prior faulty manifest 8That is made nothing had decisions of this court where vetoes sustained "logrolling” "jumbling together” of to do with control of

443 apparently in mind consistent had Martin court given in term is other with the definition Dictionary, p. jurisdictions. ed., 5th Law Black’s (1979) logrolling as: defines embracing legislative practice "A in one bill perhaps, matters, which, none of

several distinct could and then legislature, singly the assent of the obtain passageby procuring its a combinationof ofthe into the minorities favor each measures adopt majority them all.” a that will logrolling on this definition of have Variations especially states, those with followed other been prohibitions against having a bill relate constitutional example, subject. to more than one For Gillert v. (Alaska 1974) 1120, 1122 Alaska, 522 P.2d State of logrolling Supreme Court described as deliber Alaska ately inserting or incon in one bill several dissimilar gruous necessary subjects in to secure order Washing support passage for the of the measure. The Supreme Morris, ton Court Flanders v. Wash. 2d (1977) recognized 184, 558 P.2d 769 that the constitu provision than tional that no law shall contain more expressed subject, title, has one which shall be in the purpose: dual Adamany, subjects, e.g., Sundby

inconsistent State ex rel. v. Wis. (1976), governor’s partial 237 N.W.2d 910 where the 2d making mandatory had the effect of certain referenda that Conta, optional, had made ex rel. Kleczka v. State (1978), upheld 82 Wis. 2d 264 N.W.2d 539 which changed option financing publicly the add-on for financed campaigns option. In neither of these cases was the to a check-off approval governor’s partial this court conditioned on controlling theory particular that the vetoes had the effect of eliminating logrolling. See discussion re the obvious infra meaning "logrolling” expressed by proponents of the 1930 expressed by previous opinions amendment and as of this court. "(1) 'logrolling,’ pushing legislation prevent or attaching it through necessary to other or (2) and to assure that legislation, desirable public are members of the proposed what generally is contained aware 2d 187. new laws.” 88 Wash. at Additionally, Anderson, 394, 399, 312 Minn. in Wass v. (1977), Supreme Court 131 Minnesota 252 N.W.2d logrolling of undesir as "'the attachment described passed upon to be because of "riders” bills certain able public desirability.’ popularity Sutherland, or 1A their (4th ed.), Statutory Construction, also, sec. 17.01.” See Ruud, Than "No Shall Embrace More One M. Law (1957). Subject,” 42 L. Rev. 389 Minn. appears cases, it that

From these selected logrolling generally accepted includes the definition of creating provisions concept joining unrelated passage legislation. to secure union interests interesting anti- It logrolling that Martin court identified is purpose amend-

as the of the constitutional giving the Wisconsin ment recognized power, inasmuch as Wisconsin has never statutory against prohibition any — —constitutional range dealing submitting with a broad omnibus bills respect topics. especially is true with of unrelated This budget bills. See Milwaukee the "omnibus” biennial DH&SS, 254 130 2d 387 N.W.2d v. Wis. Brewers (1986). "logrolling” implicitly By definition, such acceptable in the bill. IV, 18 of Constitution

Article sec. the Wisconsin embracing prohibits private only more or local bills provision requires subject; further that than one appears expressed subject title. It in the thus be always "logrolling” in has condoned that Wisconsin prohibited never this state has the sense inclusion of legislation substantive in bills has never adopted a "one-bill-one-subject” limitation on bills other than private and local limitation. See State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. 302, 315, Henry, (1935). Wis. N.W. If indeed the veto authority granted the constitutional amendment ratified in general the 1930 election was intended to prevent "logrolling” in the sense, traditional it was a particu- larly ill-suited and cumbersome way to achieve that in the goal especially absence of any concomitant — legislation or self-imposed legislative rule outlawing practice. veto in this state was adopted not to prevent the crime of logrolling, but to importantly, make it easier for .more to exercise what this court has recognized to be his "quasi-legislative” role, and to a pivotal be part of the "omnibus” budget process. bill The 1930 amendment provided for gubernatorial a control put mechanism to some limit on constitutionally sanctioned logrolling, the "jumbling together in one Act” of inconsistent subjects. What was "objectionable” under the 1930 amendment was left to the for excision under the partial power. veto

This conclusion is bolstered the fact that this state has since 1911—19 years before constitutional amendment —had a statute specifically prohibiting a defined type of logrolling. legisla- This prohibition tive 13.05, now found in sec. Stats. This statutory prohibition aimed at preventing individual legislators from exchanging i.e., reciprocal vot- votes — ing for each separate other’s bills —has remained relatively unchanged since its 1911 adoption. Sec. 13.05, provides: Any member of the

"Logrolling prohibited. gives, promises give or his legislature offers who against any or influence favor of or vote pending proposed proposition or to be measure or introduced, legislature in consideration or in the any person to the upon other elected condition give promise agree will or will or same against give his in favor or vote or influence pending or or proposition other measure any legislature, in such or proposed to be introduced promises give or gives, or his vote who offers against any measure on condition influence for or give his vote or any other member will any change any influence in favor of other proposed to in the pending or be introduced than nor legislature may be fined not less $500 $1,000 imprisoned or not less than one more than or both.” year years nor more than three event, governor’s partial In it is clear that any meth- ill-suited particularly would be logrolling attacking type preventing od of in sec. 13.05: How could statutorily defined ex- reciprocal if there had been governor know his use And he need to change why votes? would practice in view rectify 1911? the books since anti-logrolling statute on Martin court could to the referring not been have "logrolling.” statutory crime of Although partial continued use the governors Martin see decision, Legislative Refer veto after the Bureau, Veto in Wiscon "The Use of the Partial ence Bulletin, 75-IB-6, (1975), there sin,” p. Information challenge judicial until the next 35-year hiatus was of his brought governor’s to a exercise was Adamany, Sundby v. ex rel. State 71 Wis. In authority. (1976), challenge was N.W.2d 2d governor’s veto of two clauses in one subsection of resulting legislatively- a bill in the elimination of adopted procedures governments for local to exceed levy replaced legislatively their limits. That veto those prescribed procedures procedures with proposed initially original had in his executive upheld governor’s bill. This court exercise of his reaffirmed earlier test Henry stating: Martin, identified in "Thus, Henry and Martin principle establish the that the may be utilized to veto portion bill, any of a portion whether the itself is not, an item of if the result even change effectuates a legislative policy, long as portion separable vetoed is and the remaining provisions complete constitute and workable law.” 71 Wis. 2d at 130.9 Sundby, again recognized In this court governor may object portions of an specific which are not themselves concerned with appropriations. Sundby, court, This stated: "We conclude the action taken valid,

was portions vetoed, that the although not actually items of appropriation, separable were provisions, not constituting provisos or conditions to an item appropriation, remaining and the portions complete constitute a and workable law.” Id. at 135. Sundby,

Moreover, specifically this court re- jected argument only that the veto can operate negatively bring and can never about an change affirmative in the result intended question 9The of separability Henry was decided in Martin and restated in Kleczka. it not "im- This court said was legislature. has "every that distinction because veto pressed” by it.” Id. at about negative ring and affirmative both 134. dealing governor’s partial case with the

The latest Conta, ex rel. Kleczka v. State Wis. authority, veto (1978), was decided 2d 264 N.W.2d Kleczka, upheld In this court ago. a decade court partial his veto which governor’s authority exercise of proposed in changing legislatively resulted had on returns system taxpayers’ to a "check-off” "add-on” campaign fund. This court public to finance the state power granted broad to the again once reaffirmed the parts bills. the Kleczka decision Furthermore, significant it finally jettisoned because present analysis for our partial veto could not the idea that legislature had "provisos on or conditions” operate Kleczka, In this court upon appropriation. placed stating were dicta and prior out that cases so pointed involving other jurisdictions had relied on cases from provi- more restrictive constitutional different granted than the sions Id. at 714-715. This court clari- governor. Wisconsin law, governor may Wisconsin fied that under removing provisos his exercise long as the net "so to an and conditions complete, entire veto is a result passed have could bill which workable Id. at 715. instance.” in the first it because significant The Kleczka decision is also determining wheth- the test for stated that again once focuses on was "severable” part er the vetoed the veto: remaining after result "We conclude that the test of severability has clearly repeatedly and been stated this court simply be that what complete remains be a and power workable law. The of the Governor disassemble law is coextensive with the Legislature of the provisions to assemble its initial- ly.” Conta, State ex rel. Kleczka v. 82 Wis. 2d at 707-708. quintet nearly

From this unanimous deci- justice sions—one dissented in Kleczka—several con- trolling principles easily can First, be extracted. governor of Wisconsin under this state’s constitution granted uniquely expansive has been broad and parts appropriation to veto of an bill. This authority veto is broader than the item veto granted authority governors in other states and was adopted give in flexibility this state to deal with omnibus noted, bills. As in Wisconsin, priation appro- unlike states, other such omnibus permissible.10

bills are Second, in this state 10The Wisconsin prohibit Constitution does not substantive legislation being from included in Consequent bills. ly, prior governors prior legislatures as well as frequently have major policy included budget bill; indeed, initiatives in the one commentator process has described the budgetary policy- as the making process See, Gosling, this state. J. "Patterns of Influence and Choice in the Budgetary Wisconsin Process.” (Nov. 1985) Legislative Quarterly, States vol. 10 pp. 457-482. See also, Gosling,11 Lessons," J. Wisconsin Item-Veto Public Adminis Review, 292, 1986). tration (July/Aug.

Furthermore, supra, as stated this state’s constitution does impose not subject” a "one bill one limitation on bills other than private IV., and local limitation found in art. sec. 18. See note 5, supra, accompanying also, text. See State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Henry, 315, 260 Co.v. (1935), Wis. N.W. 486 authority governor may exercise the appropria- provisos conditions or attached

over may third, bill; be affirmative tion negative This court has well as effect. recognized prior repeatedly cases our context governor’s partial limitation on exercise the veto is that what remains after complete As be a and workable law. was must Henry, specifically has adumbrated portions single piece "a of dissever Henry, legislation —” 218 which is not severable Wis. 314. at

Although recognized that we have respect quasi-legislative the exer- with has partial authority, and that he can of his veto be cise authority, in of such we have the exercise creative appears identify reason to what be never before had gover- "germaneness” limitation on the an inherent partial authority. We do so here because the nor’s argument. posed question in From 1931 was oral through governors state October appropria- partial over exercised the Legislative 988 Refer- bills a total of times. See tion in Bureau, "The Partial Veto Wisconsin—An ence (Octo- p. Update,” Bulletin, 87-IB-3, 7 Informational 1987). chal- of those vetoes were ber Some opinion lenged by seeking in an from the court or reported Attorney However, in none of those General. challenges governor’s partial result in vetoes did non-germane totally new, or unrelated the creation of provisions. DH&SS, Club v. 2d

Milwaukee Brewers Baseball 130 Wis. (1986). 106-17, 387 N.W.2d respect Indeed, with to the 290 vetoes present governor exercised in the 1987-89 summary prepared by bill, the of those vetoes Legislative reprinted Fiscal Bureau parties’ Stipulation of Facts submitted in this case provisions all indicates that resulted that were subject directly to the related matter of the vetoed provisions. focusing precisely, specifi- More on the cally challenged partial vetoes involved the instant provisions resulting case, it is clear that all of the new subject from those vetoes involve the same matter as original legislative enactment. this it From can be state, inferred that all chief executives of this includ- ing present perceived recog- incumbent, have implicit "topicality” "germaneness” nized limi- authority.11 tation on their We deem the long-standing recognition of this limitation to be a practical construction between relations legislature. As this court stated State Reynolds Zimmerman, ex rel. v. 544, 558, 2dWis. (1964): 551 N.W.2d relating "In power issues to the relative of co- government, ordinate branches of the view of the constitutional allocations of adopted by the political government given branches of will be great weight by upon the court when called make an judicial authoritative determination scope of authority.” implicit germaneness 11This limitation is consistent with 54, require Senate and Assembly any Rule 50 Rule which legislative legislative proposals "ger amendments must be subject original mane” to proposal. or intent of the germaneness governor’s partial This limitation on the authority practice recognize veto having is a which we as

achieved force of law. See State ex rel. Zimmerman, Frederick v. Wis. N.W.2d 473 (1949). expansive interpretation

This broad and governor’s partial authority veto as mandated impelled has, effect, rejec- constitution this court’s any separation argument powers-type tion of governor legislate affirmatively cannot the use power. Instead, of the adopted this court had objective permitting test the affirmative long parts use of the remaining as as the complete

after the veto are a and workable objective law. This test has been called an "attractive subjective alternative” to the test used in other jurisdictions, Harrington, supra, see at 825. Under this objective initially test can determine parts remaining whether the of an "complete after a veto will be a and workable” subjective hand, test, law. On the other which only holds that the item veto can be used negatively, often necessitates court action order to determine whether an item veto has an affirmative or negative Again, effect. it must be noted that Wiscon- objective premised language sin’s test is on the of our giving constitution of this state the authority parts bill, to of an distinguished grant from other states which their governors appropria- to veto items of interesting Nonetheless, tions. it is to note that even though Washington appears the State of to be an state, Ill, Const., "item” veto see art. sec. Wash. Washington Supreme recently Court has abandoned

453 recognized affirmative/negative test has the raised, appropriate is the argument such when item gubernatorial the vetoes on exercise "check” opportunity. override legislature’s two-thirds the v. Employees Federation State Wash Washington also, (1984). See 536, 682 P.2d 868 101 2d ington, Wash. (1984). Kean, 403 v. 92 479 A.2d Karcher N.J. out, pointed have As we provide in adopted was an effort this state dealing with some with flexibility chief executive legisla bills submitted appropriation omnibus state, of this general, legislative power In ture. including pass appropriation bills is IV, 1 Assembly. Art. sec. in the Senate and vested However, VIII, sec. Constitution. with art. Wisconsin bills, governor has a respect recognized legis role such specially constitutionally Sundby Adamany, supra, lation. State ex. rel. v. "quasi- governor at 134. The his Wis. 2d exercises regarding appropriations function” via his legislative ex State rel. Wisconsin Tele authority. v. Company Henry, supra, at 315. phone Wis. grant governor The at preventing this state was not statutorily aimed controlling it "logrolling”; defined was aimed at it It Henry. practice as was defined was also aimed achieving legislative at joint authority by exercise of governor legislature and the over It gave constitutionally recog bills. role in the function. legislative budgetary nized legisla recognized itself has in the budget by ceding tive role area to the the initial for responsibility preparing biennial him his budget report requiring to submit execu- budget together suggestions tive with for the best raising methods for the needed revenues. See sec. seq., 16.45, et Stats. It was no coincidence that legislature passed same 1929 which Laws of ch. adopting budget system the executive for this thereby creating statutory state, gover- role for the budgetary process, passed nor in the also the—for requisite joint propos- second time —the the resolution ing the constitutional amendment to art. sec. 10 to provide governor’s partial authority. for the veto part complete These acts were all of the overhaul of budget system place in this state that took at that governor may time. The simply exercise over bills is one tool he controlling budget has for his own executive bill. If the legislature governor’s partial wanted to restrict authority only appropriation, items of it could simply only submit true bills to the governor practice enacting and eliminate its omni- budget legislative policy bus bills laden with initia- tives which the is then free to In veto. other legislature words, if wants to insulate its initia- governor’s partial veto, tives from the it should make legislation policy sure that it individual, submits its general bills, and not include such enactments in the budget bill. question

We do not address the of whether such preferred public policy. action would constitute We give example, however, as an in sec. 39 of the legislature "repealed bill, 1987-89 15.157(1), dealing Stats., recreated” sec. with the makeup creation and of the Council of International Department Development. gover- Trade in the following "repealed.” and text the words vetoed12 nor on this item resulted Thus, "15.157(1) reading: budget bill 39 of the in sec. petition- no merit to the We find repealed.” statute his could not exercise argument ers in this manner. The partial veto 15.157(1), within the recreate sec. repeal and chose to budget legisla- bill. That of the omnibus corners four an it was not itself though tive enactment —even gov- to the subject became appropriation therefore, — State ex rel. Wisconsin authority. veto ernor’s 313-14; 218 Wis. at Henry, supra, Co. v. Telephone Dammann, 220 Wis. at supra, v. Finnegan State ex rel. Sundby Adamany, supra, v. 147-49; and State ex rel. 135. 2d at Wis. the interpreting decisions prior our Although authority appropriation over partial veto governor’s today we reach the result may have dictated bills vetoes of letters validating challenged these answered the words, prior cases has none our reduce governor may whether the question prior While our appropriation. enacted legislatively stroke, single with a the indicated that cases have into a statutory proscription turn a governor can held that specifically we have never prescription, We appropriation. reduce an governor may similarly that he may. conclude in the 16 instances petitioners identify budget governor, purporting where the

1987-89 appro- reduced authority, exercise his instances, governor In of those four priation. D-21, challenged specifically in the 37 vetoes 12Item one of this case. appropriation striking digits,13

reduced governor appro- twelve instances eliminated the priation entirely.14 conclude, consistent with the

We broad constitu- recognized governor tional we have pos- vetoing letters, respect single sesses with words and bill, parts of words an that has similar broad governor powers to reduce or eliminate appropriations numbers amounts bill. The has been authorized and the in art. sec. 10 our people approve appropriation part.” constitution to bills "in Again, in the of parts simply test whether complete what remains after the ais and workable law. recognize majority

We that of the jurisdic- tions that have considered issue —under provision "item” veto constitutional concluded —have has no such on the is, in an rationale reduction effect, item, an part type and thus of Print, 157, supra, authorized. Committee at et not See also, Gallet, 175, 43 Idaho 249 P. See Wheeler v. seq. (1926). Wisconsin, 1067 where the veto Contrarily, is in terms of authority phrased disapproving parts 13See, D-36, governor e.g., "1” in the Item where the vetoed $150,000 appropriation Recycling for the Waste Reduction and Program for and 1988-89. Grant 1987-88 14See, D-35, governor e.g., Item vetoed all of the where digits appropriation 131m and 132 of in certain amounts secs. challenged budget except for the last "0.” In two other instances, numbers, governor appropria reduced other than See, striking single digits in the text of the bill. tions item D-38 and E-23.

457 bill, governor that we conclude appropriation striking appropriations to reduce power has as well as to appropriate he deems digits numbers entirely. eliminate not Moreover, constitution does although our to governor with provide the specifically implicit. that appropriation, items of reduce Barnett, 199 Penn. Elkin ex rel. v. Commonwealth See Kean, and Karcher v. (1901), 97 N.J. 161, A. 976 48 (1984). The Constitu- 483, Jersey New 479 A.2d Wisconsin, that if tion, provides analogous to contains to the which presented bill is any appropriation, may items of one or more such items or items part any "in whole or object of the bill ....” portions the other approving while 1, Constitution, 15. In para. art. sec. Jersey New Karcher, upheld the Supreme the New Court Jersey reducing had the effect of vetoes which governor’s municipalities. The New appropriations aid state court stated: Jersey sum, relating provisions to state

"In because the municipalities appropriations, they are are aid to power. item subject to the line respect these governor exercised this with long appropriations in the most traditional of a reduction of sanctioned sense. His effectuation eligible municipalities a state aid represents precisely the sort of measure permit. power was intended to See line item veto (1st Cir.) Cordero, cert. 180 F.2d Blanch v. denied, 340 U.S. 71 S. Ct. L.Ed (1st Leon, (1950); 141 F.2d 886 Cir. Fitzsimmons v. 1944) empowers gover (Organic Act of Puerto Rico disprove as to items in nor to scale down as well appropriation governor may object bills since to an item, thereof) part, portion or .... governor empowered

"... The to make selective appropriations reductions or eliminations parts discrete elements or appropria- of included excessive, unwise, tions that he improper, deems unlawful, or unconstitutional. This rea- implied sonably is to be in order to avoid a stalemate with the that would arise if governor required were otherwise either statutory veto the appropriation entire or to suffer responsi- the nullification of his own constitutional bility.” 479 at 411 A.2d and 416.

In recent years, governors Wisconsin have on attempted occasion to exercise the partial veto author- See to reduce an ity appropriation. Legislative Refer- Bulletin 87-IB-3 Update, Bureau ence Information supra. challenged Some of those vetoes were seeking an opinion from the General Attorney regard- their ing example, For then validity. Gover- provision nor Patrick Lucey partially vetoed a by striking digit 1973-75 bill "2” from authorization, bonding million highway thereby $25 it In reducing request, to million. to a response $5 General an at 62 Attorney opinion issued OAG 238 (1973), vetoing action in stating that digit separable part one of a of an meaning "an within constituted art. objection 10,...” thus, and, voiding sec. had the effect relating highway bonding. entire subsection Fur- ther, opinion General ventured Attorney authority permitted "approve reject” part appropriation in whole or bills, "alter" permit but did not part bill. Governor separable legisla- advised the acquiesced and thereafter Lucey a attempted partial veto was that his ture to consider appropriation.15 of the entire General’s Attorney is not bound the by This court persua- entitled to such opinion. opinion only deems it warrants. State ex rel. as this court sive effect Stitt, 358, 375, 2d 338 N.W.2d La Follette v. Wis. (1983). situation, reasoning we reject In this opinion in the 1973 that General Attorney digit appropriation a from an not strike governor may impermissible that amount to an would because Again, point we out appropriation.16 alteration of constitution, V., of our under art. sec. that appropriation bills "... may approve provision ....” That does not state part or in whole not alter bills.17 governor may Update, supra, at 4-6. 15LRB-87-IB-13 Dreyfus digit Similarly, Sherman used a veto to Governor Lee appropriated 1979-81 cut million for state school aids $8.9 accomplished by vetoing point He the decimal bill. "96.9%,” decreasing percentage thereby 9 from the number calculating portion percentage school aids. That used of such for challenged, legislature subsequently veto was and the failed not Update p. it. LRB-87-IB-3 at 5. override respect agree opinion do we with that with to the effect 16Nor partial veto. of a defective question by of this

17Becausethe is not raised the facts case any specifically challenged, of the vetoes we do not decide the issue by writing may appropriations of whether the reduce legisla passed a different and smaller number than that ture, figures by adjusting than had rather note, however, Karcher, provided. originally that in the New We veto, changed legisla Jersey governor, by utilizing his line-item prescribed percentage changed tively the aid limits set legislature from million to million. The effect of these $125 $140 Clearly, approved only if an bill is part, reject Attorney Therefore, it is altered. we governor may General’s conclusion that the not exer- thereby cise his to reduce and appropriations agree Instead, alter reasoning bills. we with the Jersey

of the New court in Kean, Karcher v. supra. resulting We hold that a in a precisely reduction in an the sort of governor veto measure the of this state is pursuant authorized to V, take to art. sec. Wis. Const.18

changes was to specified reduce the amount state aid to municipalities by million. $32 petitioners prepared 18The by note that a brief Edwin E. Witte, Legislative Chief of the Wisconsin Library Reference September support proposed of 1930 in of the amendment to art. V, sec. 10 which upcoming was on the ballot for the November general election, stated: "the Wisconsin amendment does not governor items, allow the only to reduce entirely but to veto them According petitioners, ...” to the contemporaneously pro provides duced document authority holding direct for that the 10, give amended art. sec. governor was never intended to appropriations. this state the to reduce persuaded significance We are not of the Witte brief. In place, impact the first its on the issues raised in this case is throughout weakened Witte’s erroneous statements the brief proposed give governor that amendment would "item” Furthermore, authority. question contemporane- we whether ously garnering written political support briefs aimed at for a proposed per- constitutional amendment can ever be considered attempts suasive interpret when a court later the constitutional provision that accurately was amended. Even if Witte could be amendment, called the drafter of this the amendment to the accomplished manner, including constitution was in the usual passage by legislatures approval two consecutive and ratifica- people XII, tion general of Wisconsin at the election. Art. 1, Thus, sec. Wis. Const. unlike the situation where the court must five out that our earlier decisions

Again, point we governor’s partial broadly have construed which led to the decision we ineluctably have authority, that has the today. conclusion reach Our subsections, sections, paragraphs, to veto words, sentences, letters, words, digits parts as long what included law, not is a should be complete remains workable give imprimatur that we our read to mean have remaining provisions purposes. only for all We valid challenged that vetoes are determined i.e., 1987-1989 biennial sense result — bill, Wis. Act 27 when which became 1987 approved part July it on —was express opinion no complete and workable law. We specific challenges might be regarding other to the in that act. refrain from provisions raised We resolving opinion petitioners’ claim this that challenged some of vetoes are invalid because inartful, resulting ungrammat- are provisions clumsy, note, however, ical or We that incomprehensible.19 governor’s applied validity test to determine enactment, legislative statutory intent for a ascertain State cf. 255, Bluff, Society Maple 2d Historical v. 112 Wis. N.W.2d (1983), contemporaneously this written of what Witte account meant, thought proposed is not constitutional amendment persuasive actually as to do we what the amendment did. Nor find persuasive proposed it earlier that would amendment have appropriations allowed the to reduce which did but not prescribed legislature, approval have never went referendum, nullity, it and hence was is evidence that would be (of contrary legislature? people?) to the intent whom? the passed permit appropriation. the amendment reduction of an 19See, e.g., E-16. Item grammar. only vetoes is not one of The

requirement remaining is that the result after the "complete veto is a and workable law.” supra, Kleczka, 82 Wis. 2d at 707-08. Awkward phrasing, syntax, alleged incomprehensibility twisted vagueness only are matters to be resolved on a .case-by-case specific challenges basis in which applications provisions discrete of the new are raised complete setting. in a factual exception upholding With the of our conclusion governor’s partial powers the exercise of the resulting appropriations in the reduction of and our making explicit implicit, german- i.e., what was the— requirement eness case makes no new law. —this simply prior opinions Instead, we reaffirm our which placed singular position have Wisconsin in the having the most liberal and elastic constitutional provision adopted years ago regarding almost — — governor’s partial appropria- over tion bills.20 concurring-dissenting opinion in footnote 1

posits hypothetical probative brilliantly expressed opinion p. the rationale at pointed wherein it is out that has protect ability within its own its own initiatives from the constitutional comparative analysis 20For an exhaustive of the "item” veto provisions constitutions, Print, in state supra. see Committee That document Experience entitled "Item Applica Veto: State and Its prepared tion to the Federal Situation” was the Committee on Representatives Rules of the House of for its consideration of and response Reagan’s repeated proposals to President Ronald that the President, states, governors given, like the of 43 be statute or amendment, appropriation constitutional item veto over bills. general enacting power by "individual, and bills

veto budget While, bills.” include such enactments not opinion points concurring-dissenting out, the governor’s felony hypothetical murder statute, 940.03, Act contained in Wisconsin sec. legislation "intolerable,” to relat- is include such 399 ing appropriation bill, when law in an criminal legislation any totally fiscal is removed from such concerns, it be from then to assume will insulated

and governor’s partial power, is little short fatuous. legislative policy

Act is loaded with non-fiscal interjected determinations, all of have been which Clearly, legislature an bill. into point of are From its view there faces obviously dilemma. good exactly are reasons to do that —some good political, practical, some make sense some "jumble together” administratively unrelated bits —to legislation. legislature it But the cannot have both ways. expediency may in fact Practical sensible present practice, it a continuation of the but is dictate practice, together” "jumbling of unrelated this pieces legislation demonstrated in the concur- —as opinion’s example ring-dissenting the invita- is—that tion "terrible abuse.” Keep simple: is

The solution obvious legislature’s generated internally initiatives out of (unless prepared is to face veto), possibility of a or amend the consti- provide veto, a veto of tution for an "item” and not "parts” fantasy It bill. continue to adhere to the notion only. years is of For 60 "items” 10 of court has and reasserted that art. sec. asserted respect the Wisconsin Constitution is a veto "parts” repeated assertion, to and not to "items.” This holding by in case after case as a decisional this court seriously. legislature people taken should be If the and governor only power wish have to veto items appropriation bill, in an a constitutional amendment may should, be It however, desirable. be understood toy court this has no with the constitu- grant tional of a veto to the and to replace may it with a veto be more sensible palatable. Any part claimed excesses on the in the exercise of this broad by by court, are correctable not but people, by either at the ballot box or constitutional amendment.

By adjudged: the Court.—It is declared and (1) parts That those of enrolled 1987 Senate Bill passed by legislature by but vetoed governor pursuant V., to art. sec. 10 of the Wisconsin duly Constitution, were, in therewith, accordance legislature vetoed and returned to the with the governor’s objections thereto, and were then refused passage.

(2) passage That virtue of approval part by governor, in 1987 Wisconsin upon validly publication enacted, and, Act 27 was thereof, in VII, accordance with sec. art. constitution, 991.11, Stats., and sec. became and now is in force and effect as law. questions concerning validity

No of 1987 relating Wisconsin Act other than those approval, publication enactment, thereof, are now determined.

Relief denied. concurring

BABLITCH, (dissenting part, J. part). Appro- ... approve bills.

"Governor part may approved whole or priation be bills law, part approved and ... the shall become to returned in the same part objected shall be (Emphasis provided for other bills.” manner as 10, added.) V, Wis. Const. Article Sec. to; give consent sanc-

approve: "1. to one’s Dictio- tion; ...” New World confirm. Webster’s 1972). (2d nary ed. a) pro- prohibiting "1. some

veto: order person act; prohibition, esp. by a posed or intended b) power prevent to action such prohibition. ...” Id. opinion portion

I to that of the majority dissent of let- gubernatorial individual which allows V, 10 of Constitution Article Sec. the Wisconsin ters. to governor power "approve” gives give governor It to "veto.” does not power far to The to create is so removed create. plain meaning "approve” from the of the words V, Art. 10 strains the interpret that to so Sec. "veto” breaking point. Yet that English language beyond the majority’s opinion. The precisely result of the purpose: but one single veto of letters can have with new when joined create words. These new words others, legislation create that turn necessarily new as 12 approval law with the of as few becomes legislature. opinion majority members creatively legislate with few allows plus of and the of one-third pen approval strokes his legislature. one member of one house of the That not intent the framers could have been the simply Art. who it. It is approved Sec. nor the voters majority, an invitation to terrible abuse.1 Yet the rigidly adhering principles says decisis, to the of stare power. constitution affords the If past principle result, cases demand that then the yield stare decisis should to a result consistent with bill, example, 1For the 1987 1987 Wisconsin Act. 472zkcp. It contains sec. reads: "940.03 of the statutes is created read: Felony "940.03 murder. Whoever causes the death of being committing attempting human another while or to commit 940.225(1) (2)(a), 943.10(2) specified 943.02, may a crime in s. be

imprisoned years for not more than 20 in excess of the maximum imprisonment period provided by law for crime or attempt.” pen, opinion majority With a creative now allows the governor to veto that section as follows: "940.03 of the statutes is created read: Felony "940.03 Whoever murder. causes death of being committing attempting

another human while or to commit 940.225(1) (2)(a), 943.10(2) specified 943.02, may a crime in s. or be imprisoned years for mere SO not than in excess of “the maximum ” imprisonment period provided-fey attempt. of for law that crime or That section would now read as follows: of "940.03 the statutes is created to read: Felony "940.03 murder. Whoever causes the death of being committing attempting another human while or to commit 940.255(1) (2)(a), 943.10(2) specified 943.02, may a crime or s. be sentenced death.” approval plus With the of one-third one member of one house legislature, of the penalty. the has created death germane? unquestionably Is it Almost so. power? Quaere: power it an

Is abuse of is it an abuse use says this court the constitution allows? Could the Clearly framers the voters have intended this? not. meaning plain words within the amend- of the

ment. past

However, not from this court do dictate cases history of that the the amend- result. I conclude purposes purposes creation, for its and the ment consistently today has relied on but which this court principles, abandons, well as basic constitutional by opposite from result that reached dictate majority. HH legislative history of the constitutional The consistently amendment, this court until relied on length petitioner’s today, brief, noted at logrolling prevention of at that the was indicates proponents the minds of forefront of The to veto individual letters is amendment. accomplish purpose. necessary that not opinion attempts majority’s to minimize the significance anti-logrolling objective of Article implicit- noting 'logrolling’ Sec. "such budget ly acceptable "[i]f in the and that indeed bill” governor by authority granted general the 1930 amendment ratified in constitutional 'logrolling’ prevent intended to election was particularly sense, it was a ill-suited and traditional way goal. Majority ...” cumbersome achieve according opinion past Yet, at 15-16. to this court’s interpretations amendment the constitutional prevention logrolling bill, within a albeit logrolling, paramount purpose "legal” behind governor. grant to the of Beginning v. with State ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. (1935), Henry, 302, 486 315, 218 260 Wis. N.W. 468 relied anti-logrolling court on the objective of the provision as a for justification upholding exercise governor’s partial stated, veto power. The court

"there are why reasons should veto, have coextensive of to enable pass, him to gwasi-legislative the exercise of his function, on separable piece legislation each of on its own law merits. That is not necessary in many they states because have constitutional provisions prohibit which from passing a bill which contains than more one subject. Wisconsin, however, prohibi- has no such except tion as private and local bills. ... There- fore, in prevent order check or the evil conse- far, quences improper joinder, least, so at concerned, appropriation bills are it may well have necessary, deemed good been in the interest government, upon governor, to confer as was 10, done the amendment in 1930 of sec. art. constitution, right pass Wisconsin indepen- dently every separable piece legislation on in an (Emphasis bill.” in original.) subsequent In the decision of State ex rel. Martin Zimmerman, v. 233 (1940), Wis. N.W. and more Sundby State ex rel. v. Adamany, recently 118, 127, (1976), Wis. 2d 237 N.W.2d 910 this court again that, reiterated

"we entertain no doubt either as to reason for, of, meaning or the the 1930 amendment.... Its purpose prevent, possible, adoption was to if bills, omnibus logrolling, prac- jumbling tice of together act one inconsistent subjects passage uniting in order force partic- minorities with different interests when the provisions ular pass separate could not on their legislation merits, objectionable riders of with general to to bills order attached the entire bill and thus force the to veto the government approve stop the wheels of Zimmerman, 447. at obnoxious act.” Wis. apparent governor’s above, the it is that From the partial power primarily veto was of constitutional improper joinder a check on the of to serve as intended budget legislation the omnibus the promoting process. only the anti- It is in the context of during logrolling objective V, 10, of Art. Sec. chal- lenges governor’s to of veto authori- exercise recognized governor’s ty, has that this court even "quasi-legislative” in the function bud- constitutional Sundby get process. Thus, 71 Wis. 2d at 133-34. to See argue, majority, as does adopted governor’s partici- power facilitate was pation budget process, in the rather than to omnibus legislative logrolling, practice majority curb opinion of see objective at mischaracterizes past governor’s amendment, function, and our interpreting cases amendment. light anti-logrolling objective Art.

In expansion majority’s Sec. power within strike individual letters goes beyond far bill what neces- accomplish objective.

sary al- possesses ready words, to strike individual phrases paragraphs and, within the provi- effectively any objectionable thus, disassemble eliminate sion. The individual letters does governor’s ability not enhance the to combat "the practice jumbling together in one act inconsistent passage uniting subjects in order to force a minori- particular with when the ties different interests provisions pass separate could not on their merits....” Zimmerman, 233 Wis. at 447. important,

Equally usurpation it is a of the legislature’s power legislate to and a violation of the separation powers doctrine of of between the coordi- government permit nate of branches to the executive and, effect, branch to create new words new law through the selective of excision individual letters. power legislate, policies The to and determine programs, exclusively is vested in the senate and assembly. IV, 1, Art. Sec. Const.; 15.001, Wis. Sec. governor granted Stats. While the has been the power legislature constitutional extraordinary to convene the on expedient

occasions, to recommend legislature’s consideration, matters for the to direct preparation budget the of the state biennial and to approve legislature’s appropriation the bills in whole part, nothing is there in the constitution which governor legislation. authorizes the to enact new See Const.; Art. Secs. Wis. Sec. 16.46. by governor granting power However, the the "germane,” legislation new, enact albeit from the array bill, of letters contained within the given governor extraordinary legislative court has power surpassing the legislature.

even of the that Ordi- narily, pass for to become law it must both majority houses of each, with a vote in approved governor. then be Under the power given opinion, majority in the can create new words stroke of his pen acquiescence plus and, with the of one-third one just legislature, member of one house of new law. opinion important also overlooks majority governor’s ability "check” limitation on limi legislation. of That improper of practice joinder tation, ex in this court’s decision of State enunciated 679, 707-708, Conta, 82 Wis. 2d rel. Kleczka v. (1978), that the Gover power is N.W.2d "[t]he is the law coextensive with to disassemble nor its Legislature provisions assemble at 218 Wis. 315. This Henry, also initially.” See governor’s partial limit on the additional because, the requirement in contrast significant "be what remains after the exercise the veto law,” complete and workable the former restricts gubernatorial simply veto rather than exercise limiting power. the end result of exercise In to the limit on failing consider "coextensive” power when governor’s granting governor the the letters, power to excise individual has majority governor of power created an imbalance between effect, In has legislature. given majority power legis- than the governor greater disassemble assembling legislation. practi- lature exercises As a matter, legislators legislative do not assemble cal proposing arranging provisions individual by Rather, are concepts letters. bills are based on which words, in turn from paragraphs— built sentences and of meaning each which have individual and contribute Thus, legislation. grant to the ultimate of meaning power to disassemble which exceeds legislature’s power abrogates the limit to assemble forth in and our coextensive set Kleczka previous decisions.

There by further imbalance created now, majority opinion. Up legislature as the assem- a bill containing bled an did so appropriation, they principle they under the that the words Kleczka assembling subject disassembling by were were governor. They could, their choice and limitation of words, circumscribe to some extent ability By to "create” use of the veto. No more. holding legislation is in essence a alphabet potpourri soup you letters, of individual if stripped majority any will, the has parameters opportunity to circumscribe the of the gubernatorial effects of a veto. The is now only by the letters in front him limited and the imagination, subject only extensiveness of his to the germaneness requirement. majority’s precedent majority The "ineluctably maintains that former today.” led to the decision we has Slip opinion reach disagaree. at I 416. This court has never governor may permissi- before addressed whether the bly strike individual letters from an authority. under his dissenting Hansen, Kleczka, While Justice potential noted the abuse of this court’s broad inter- pretation Kleczka, particular governor’s ability a bill to reduce to its "single digits punctuation marks,” letters, ... majority at time was not confronted with a veto Kleczka, 726. of individual letters. See Wis. 2d at

HH I—I principles We need not abandon the Kleczka goes beyond letters the declare veto of individual power I the veto. would continue authorized governor power to individual to allow the the appropriation bill, in an consistent with words principles recognized in as well of Kleczka. As Kleczka Henry, Sundby, every Martin, as in veto has both negative effect, and affirmative bring and some vetoes will change inevitably policy. about a While the may veto of an individual word or words at times policy, always create new necessarily is not inevitable nor agree Further,

an intentional result. I portion holding majority’s with that permits which digits the veto of individual to effect a appropriation. power properly reduction This is governor’s power subsumed within the part.” Allowing to veto "in governor to veto individual words digits, requiring while that what remains be germane provides governor vetoed, to the section ample with prerogatives discretion to exercise his constitutional separation powers

consistent with the doctrine. sharp contrast, however,

In stands power new selectively to veto individual letters. This only

excise letters can be used with the and, hence, intent to create new words new If law. principle majority of stare decisis leads us as the "ineluctably” principle states, result, to this then the yield precepts should to fundamental and a result plain meaning consistent with the of the words within give the amendment. The constitution does not to create and Art. Sec. 10 sensibly interpreted cannot be to do so. majority provides mistake,

Make no grant with that, a broad in the judgment Certainly writer, of this cannot be tolerated. suggested majority can, opinion, attempt to enact a constitutional amend- process requires lengthy ment. But such a large expenditure of state and local resources. If passed, parameters language of the new will requiring undoubtedly court, even thus be tested say any answer to It is not an resources. more gubernatorial through may rectified excesses be particularly amendment, box or constitutional ballot regard any to the here, when, governor’s "excesses” primarily from derive pen. to adhere to for this court It is far better our own meaning plain the amend- words within principles longstanding constitutional ment depletion limited resources. thus avoid SHIRLEY that JUSTICE I authorized state am STE- DONALD W. and JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON S. part opinion join which dissents in this INMETZ part. and concurs

Case Details

Case Name: State Ex Rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson

Court Name: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 14, 1988

Citation: 424 N.W.2d 385

Docket Number: 87-1750-OA

Court Abbreviation: Wis.