State Ex Rel. Williams v. HendersonState Ex Rel. Williams v. Henderson
On May 26, 1971 petitioner was sentenced to two and one-half years at hard labor for attempted simple robbery. Defendant appealed and this court affirmed the conviction. Rehearing was denied оn June 13, 1972. On August 15, 1972 the Caddo Parish district attorney filed a bill of information charging petitioner with being a fourth felony offender.
Subsequently petitioner sought habeas corpus relief from the First Judicial District, Parish of Caddo, which was denied without hearing. We granted petitioner‘s application for writs of certiorari and hаbeas corpus.
Petitioner alleges that
We reject the contention that
“D. If, at any time, either after conviction or sentence, it shall appear that a person conviсted of a felony has previously been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or has been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States; ...” (Emphasis added).
We are confronted with the question of whether the language emphasized above means that an enhanced penalty can be imposed after a defendant has served his sentence and after some nineteen months hаve elapsed since the sentence on the underlying charge. In State v. George, 218 La. 18, 48 So.2d 265 (1950), this court held that the statute permitted an information to be filed and an accused sentenced as a multiple offender even after the original sentence imposed had been served. In George, the re-sentencing procedure was held approximately one month after imposition
The majority of states which have recidivist statutes require that the proceeding be instituted at a specific time or within a specified time limit. Sоme require that the defendant be charged as a multiple offender in the indictment charging the underlying offense. E. g.
In Reynolds v. Cochran, 138 So.2d 500 (Fla.1962), that court interpreting a statute similar to ours stated:
“The statutory language used to accomplish this result reads as follows:
“`If at any time after sentence or conviction it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of crimes as set forth either in § 775.09 or § 775.10 the prosecuting attorney * * * shall file an information accusing said person of such previous convictions, whereupon the court * * * shall cause said person, whether confined in prison or otherwise, to be brought before it. * * *’
F.S. § 775.11 , F.S.A.“The statutory language of significance is italicized. The State cоntends that the language used does not limit the time within which the procedure prescribed thereby shall be followed. See People ex rel. Fernandez v. Kaiser, 230 App. Div. 646, 246 N.Y.S. 309, aff. 256 N.Y. 581, 177 N.E. 149, cert. den. 284 U.S. 631, 52 S.Ct. 16, 76 L.Ed. 537; State v. George, 218 La. 18, 48 So.2d 265; State v. Sudekatus, 72 Ohio App. 165, 51 N.E. 2d 22; Little v. Gladden, 202 Or. 16, 273 P.2d 443. In a word it is asserted that the statutory language mеans that the state is never precluded from proceeding against a second offender, even after he has completed his last sentence and has been at liberty for many years.
“Such an interpretation gоes too far. It is not consistent with the theory that recidivist legislation does not create a separate crime but that it merely prescribes an enhanced punishment for the last offense committed. Such a construction of our statutes would require a re-examination of our prior position that these acts do not violate our constitutional guaranties that a person shall not be placed twice in jeoрardy for the same offense. We know also that with the available assistance
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and our Florida Sheriffs’ Bureau, it is indeed difficult for a felon to conceal a criminal reсord now. We believe the better view requires a construction which limits the applicability of §§ 775.09 and 775.11 to the period of time during which a convicted felon has not completed the lawful sentence imposed against him for his last felonious offense.”
See also, State v. Shank, 115 Ohio App. 291, 185 N.E.2d 63 (1962).
We agree with this rationale.
State v. George, supra, should not be extended beyond its facts. We find that
A case must end at some point. Even persons who have been convicted of two or more felonies must be assured, after some passage of time, that the consequences of past criminal acts have abated. The present interpretation of the time limitation in which to institute the proceeding is certainly adequate to permit proper exercise of the prosecutorial function while doing away with the uncertainty of the consequences to an accused fostered by an open-ended interpretation of the statute.
A defendant has a right to a speedy trial.
In the instant case, petitioner was sentenced on May 26, 1971 to serve two and one-half years at hard labor. On August 15, 1972 proceedings were initiated under
The State contends that the petitioner‘s plea of guilty to the habitual offender charge waived any right he may have had to contest imposition of the enhanced penalty. Cf. State v. Valentine, 259 La. 1019, 254 So.2d 450 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). We disagree with this contention. A guilty plea in a recidivist proceeding is sui generis. The defendant is not charged with nor is he pleading guilty to a crime.1 He is only admitting that he has been convicted of other crimes, thus relieving the State of the necessity to prove the prior convictions. Because of thе peculiar nature of an enhancement-of-sentence proceeding, an admission of prior convictions should not have the
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court is vacated and it is оrdered that the petitioner be discharged from custody.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
MARCUS, J., dissents.
SUMMERS, Justice (dissenting).
I cannot subscribe to the discharge of this fourth felony offender. The plain language of the Habitual Offender Law permits an accusation for a previоus conviction “at any time, either after conviction or sentence“.
In State v. George, id., the defendant had been convicted as a fourth felony offender and had been released from custody when the State filed a bill of information charging him as an habitual оffender. In the instant case, the bill of information was filed prior to the defendant‘s release from custody; it was filed shortly after defendant‘s conviction was affirmed on appeal and while he was serving his sentence. Thus the facts in the case at bar involve a much shorter interval of time after sentence and make this case stronger than the George Case under the rationale of the majority. The facts of the casе at bar also remove it from the category of cases affected by the decision in Reynolds v. Cochran, 138 So.2d 500 (Fla.1962), where the defendant had completed serving his sentence.
In the exercise of its sovereign power the State‘s Legislature authorized the bringing of this accusation “at any time, eithеr after conviction or sentence“, and it is an abuse of this Court‘s power to refuse to apply the law as written. Habitual offender laws are designed to protect society from the continuing activities of recividist offenders; these laws should be upheld by this Court.
I respectfully dissent.