History
  • No items yet
midpage
STATE EX REL., WILCOX v. Strand
442 N.W.2d 256
S.D.
1989
Check Treatment

*1 $9,197.95amount due ally dispute on the exception of “Outside owing with the anchor bolts and what-

of that for the $200 was”. No affirmative

ever the material pleaded in the answer.

defenses were

Therefore, there clear abuse of is no judge ruling Enlargement of Time not be

the motion for above, pointed out

granted, which as I have delay. expansion

included an

Court, in 423 N.W.2d 818 Clarke v. Clarke

(S.D.1988) and Peterson LaCroix very recently held, general subject and has

treated this two-prong requirement

must be met to obtain relief. is no years

different now that it was some 40

ago Judges Rudesill and Lam- when Circuit

pert compliance insisted on with this two-

pronged Lastly, rule. I would add that a transpired

great delay amount of relying

case as a result of Diamond

their Minnesota counsel to handle this mat- telephone.

ter via the When work,

telephone correspondence did in, brought

South Dakota counsel was hour,

the eleventh the default was unlit, long lamp

entrenched. Too ungirded.

the loin Pokela, Sp. Gen.,

A. Atty. Thomas Asst. Falls, plaintiff appellant. Sioux Marmet, Robert G. of Marmet Arm- & Centerville, strong, for defendant and pellee. Dakota, STATE of South MORGAN, Justice. WILCOX, Raymond M. Plaintiff South Dakota of Social Appellant, Services, Support Enforcement Divi- (Department) appeals from an order STRAND, A. A. f/k/a request modify sup- a child Maine, Appellee. Defendant port determination between Wil- (Raymond) cox (Judy). Strand Nos. 16345. We affirm.

Supreme Court of South This action to be the latest in Considered on Briefs March disputes biological 1989. series of between the (Child) parents of a male child born on 1989. August Litigation began with a

hotly paternity contested suit. The result paterni- was determination of ty imposition of Child and the of the result- *2 pay Shortly why Judy show cause should child support. for requirement ant sought was thereafter, Raymond support. termination The for the order the permanent cus- rights and Judy’s allegation that the parental in the affidavit sought change to tody He also of Child. 25-7-7. Judy court had violated action, After trial that Child’s surname. to sought of the order show dismissal subject Ray- custody to awarded was upon statutory cause and constitutional visitation. right to reasonable mond’s grounds. hearing, a After instigation, Department determined had that agreeing permanent to signed stipulation matter, authority to visi- Raymond, with reasonable custody 28-7-17.2, entered an or but nevertheless in her. It also authorized rights tation motion.* De Department’s der stipula- change surname. The of Child’s partment brings Raymond that provided tion further exclusively financially liable “solely be raises appeal, Department temporal welfare” responsible for requires issue: Whether SDCL “[Judy] shall owe no child of Child and that entry support of an for all cases in order stip- support [Raymond].” Although the to capable parent is which noncustodial filed, presented to ulation it was was obtaining employment chooses not to? but Nevertheless, approval. the court for review, By Judy urges notice of the lack of by it several parties apparently abided for authority Department to seek modifica years. Depart of child where support tion orders Raymond petitioned Depart has interest. ment no financial require Judy to make trial court to ment, Special through the office Judy’s response payments. child support Attorney deign did not Assistant General court request was that the enforce respond of review. Since to to the notice vesting custody in her. earlier properly of an to brief an appellant failure Following hearing at which an adversarial citation of author argument issue counsel, represented parties both were issue, ity can of such result in waiver Gra that best the trial court determined Child’s State, ham v. by continuing custo- served interests were might to hold that the fail appropriate be dy Raymond. The trial court further Department’s respond to ure of counsel to Raymond financially found able to that is a the notice of review issues concession high living; at a standard of validity correctness. Because to hand, that the other was a full- Judy, on issues, do not to reach we those mother, in- time with no housewife occasion. choose not so on this to do come, Judy’s and that financial condition however, that it is strongly suggest, unable make a was such that she was province to brief the to Child’s be- not the of this court financial contribution yond happy she made his visits who are delinquent that which cases for counsel Ray- unwilling with her. The trial denied fray into to con- jump request beyond for child mond’s see end. Nor do we tinue to it out to the Judy pay the costs of requirement Special Assistant deem it office of travel visits her. for Child’s Attorney make a determination General to unlikely issue is so frivolous Septem judgment was entered on That merely ig- succeed that the issue can be immediately ber Almost there aspects this child nored. Some after, on October question into scheme have called been Department sought aid of to overturn grounds constitutional so By means of judgment. an affidavit notice attorney general are on and the signed Special Attorney Assistant by a General, exist. Department secured an order to some doubts do * judgment provided accordance with The if and trial court employment, shall obtained she child; living of the standard of appeal, our The issue on Returning to State’s child; (4) The special needs of the traditionally age been of review standard relating custody and exercised discretion effect trial court

whether *3 visitation; (5) The trial court care. support obligations. We or Child setting child in the statute and obli- of to disturb child considered refused upon the trial it from the schedule based deviated gations unless Rykhus upon spe- v. its discretion. therein based has abused factors enumerated (S.D.1982). This required by Bruning. 167 findings Rykhus, cific on the reasonable has centered (1) Raymond court found that ability obligor’s child and needs of the $24,600 earn spouse his new between and Gross, pay. Gross (2) $27,600 no income year; and $12,000 a less than her husband earns the stat legislature enacted In (3) persons in her Judy has four year children, minimum child providing for ute including two small household codified as SDCL guidelines, now in persons his Raymond has three while parents a child are “The of provides: household, including The trial court Child. nec severally obligated for the jointly Judy provides trans- recognized that also maintenance, education essary he support for Child when portation and respec child in accordance with of the clearly sup- These visits. made legislature In means.” tive and we find ported by the evidence in child and added major revisions part of the trial discretion on the abuse of as we now and Guidelines” the “Schedule do, kind of find a court. We were the The amendments know them. De- part of counsel for arrogance on the of the South Dakota Commis product work It is partment pressing in this ap Support, a commission on Child ap- he have the courts would obvious by executive or by governor, pointed inept- ply the statute with the same blind of der, requirements comply part decried on the of itude that we Support En legislation, the Child federal supra. hearing Bruning, examiner in In of 1984. Brun forcement Amendment Further, that the child we do not believe (S.D. Jeffries, ing v. was enacted support enforcement scheme 1988),commenting of the on the enactment to harass the give parent another tool stated: “We guidelines and a re- parent. When there has been other the enumerated deviations believe that determination, in judicial this case cent adopted giving consid 25-7-7 were month, any change of without within this and with no intent to abolish eration to circumstances, to us that in law[,]” referring to our decision settled caseload without Department has sufficient Gross, supra. apply suggest that it creating more. We that the trial Department contends against parents its efforts to enforcement ordering its discretion court abused adjudicated or who have have not been who spite Judy to previously payments make the failed to unemployed, was she was then fact that judicial case- The burden on the mandated. three, children, ages five and caring for her by this of action and load enhanced sort time also her husband was at appeal appreciated. is not argues unemployed. It affirm the statutory guide may deviate from the court. parent, capa 25-7-7 when a lines of SDCL working, voluntarily chooses not to ble SABERS, J., concurs. light of the facts in employment. seek HENDERSON, J., concurs case, agree. we do not writing. factors, number, set five The deviation MILLER, J., WUEST, C.J., are, pertinent part: (2) in result. parents; of the Financial condition application make parent which would HENDERSON, (concurring). (emphasis inequitable.” of the schedule note, agreement, concurring, language supplied). Bruning majority’s reference Jef legislature has to indicate that pears 579, 581 fries, necessity equity these recognized the passage of held that the wherein this Court cases, lockstep mental- derogation case not abolish settled 25-7-7 did majority’s and ity disapproved in both the support awards must which child law under Bruning. writings this author’s upon the reasonable be based means of child and financial court reached needs of the that the trial *4 just must be parents. by exercising Guidelines its discre- equitable result rigidly They not to be guidelines. tion, I concur. Tesch, applied. Tesch v.

blindly Here, (S.D.1987). 880, WUEST, (concurring re- Chief Justice Tesch, court did not abuse sult). fashioning its child by the I in the result reached award. specially to disassociate majority, but write support guidelines of SDCL The child remarks directed at coun- myself from the 25-7-7, inflexibly, result interpreted if Department. sel and the ju “dejudicialization of the unconstitutional Peterson, Peterson v. See diciary”. result). MILLER, (concurring (S.D.1989) (Henderson, 732, 739-41 holding, majority’s agree I with the concurring in J., concurring part, result Justice, specifically I disasso- like the Chief state are part). judges of this sentences myself ciate from the last three schedule-automatons, not to be reduced concluding paragraph. facts, i.e., plug in some read a id., Peterson, comes the answer. See Getman, 740, Donohue v. (Henderson, J., spe 283-5 concurring). Rigid application of cially 25-7-7, whereby child could moving finger process to a

be reduced legislature, provided by the

on a chart doctrine of would shatter the constitutional Dakota, Plaintiff STATE of South in S.D. separation powers, enshrined Respondent, Constitution, Art. II. Such a result was here, through past reference to avoided SABERS, Defendant Jo Samantha grave injustices avoid precedent. To Appellant. adjudicate on inequities, a trial court must situation be the realities of the domestic No. 16287. Larsgaard v. Lars fore it. State Supreme Court of South gaard, April on Briefs Considered Recognizing that this is not the occasion the wrinkles out of the to knead 21, 1989. legislative ses- the 1989 cloth woven sion, the extensive revision observe in 1989 S.D.Sess. 25-7 contained

SDCL Ch. (H.B. July

L. Ch. effective

1081). provides that 10 of that act Section support guidelines, from the child

deviation party, may be made

if raised upon,

upon entry specific based “[a]ny condition of

Case Details

Case Name: STATE EX REL., WILCOX v. Strand
Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 21, 1989
Citation: 442 N.W.2d 256
Docket Number: 16326, 16345
Court Abbreviation: S.D.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.