263 Mo. 701 | Mo. | 1915
This is a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto instituted by the prosecuting attorney of Wright county, Missouri, in the name of the State at the relation of M. N. Whelchel et al., to oust the defendants from exercising the functions of
The case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts. From the stipulated facts it appears that relators are resident tax-paying citizens of School District number 63 in Wright county, Missouri, and that, on December 2, 1912, the time of the institution of the suit, the defendants were performing the offices of school directors of said school district.
It further appears that for the school year beginning July 1, 1911, and ending June 30, 1912, a levy of forty cents on the hundred dollars’ valuation was made, which, together with public funds and cash on hand, provided sufficient funds to enable said district to have eig’ht months ’ school in said school year, but that only five months ’ school was had in said district during said year. It was further admitted that the failure to have said eight months’ school in said year did not result from irregularity or void proceedings had for that purpose.
It is contended by appellant that under the facts shown, the failure of said school district to have eight months’ school in the school year beginning July 1, 1911, caused said district to lapse “as a corporate body, and the territory theretofore embraced within such lapsed district” to become “as unorganized territory,” etc., under the provisions of section 10776, Revised Statute 1909. And further, that since said school district had lapsed as a corporate body, the respondents were unlawfully attempting to exercise the functions of school directors, and that the court erred in failing to enter judgment of ouster against said respondents.
The decision of the case involves the construction of said section 10776. That section provides that, “Whenever any school district in this State . . .
What does the clause “provide for an eight months’ school,” as used in said statute, mean? That is the main question lodged in this appeal. If it is merely to provide the money necessary to pay the expenses of an eight months’ school by making the levy of forty cents on the hundred dollars’ valuation, then the school district did not lapse, because in the present instance such a levy was made and the necessary money thereby provided. If, on the other hand, it means that the school district must not only take the required steps to provide the revenue but must also take such other action as shall provide a teacher, schoolhouse and fuel for the eight months, then the school district in the present case became lapsed because only five months’ school was provided or had during the year in question. We have not been favored with a brief by respondents and are therefore at a loss to know the grounds urged by them in justification of the trial court’s ruling. But it does appear from the record, by the court’s action in refusing the appellant’s declaration of law, that the learned trial judge was of the opinion that the clause above quoted only meant that the school district should provide the required funds. We are unable to agree with that construction. It will not do to say that an eight months’ school has been provided for when only the money necessary to pay the cost of the school has been levied and collected. That is only one step in the right direction.
It therefore follows that, for the reasons stated above, said school district “lapsed as a corporate body” and that thereupon the respondents lost their official powers as such school directors and should have been ousted from further acting in such official capacities.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to the said circuit court to enter up judgment of ouster against said respondents.
The foregoing opinion of Williams, 0., is adopted as the opinion of the conrt.