151 Mo. 49 | Mo. | 1899
This is an action by the collector of revenue of the city of St. Louis to recover certain delinquent personal taxes for the years 1894 and 1895. The petition alleges that John K. Cummings was assessed for the year 1894 as beings the owner of personal property of the value of $23,000, upon which there was levied the sum of $471.50 for state, school, and city taxes; that for the year 1895 he was assessed as being the owner of personal property of the value of $25,000, upon which there were levied taxes to the amount of $512.50 for state, school, and city taxes. The petition further avers that by the laws of Missouri it was provided that all property in said city should be assessed by a board of assessors consisting of ;a president and one assessor for each assessment district; that said president and board of assessors at the proper time and in the manner required by law, proceeded to and assessed the personal property of defendant, and therefore, as required by law, made out their assessment
The plaintiff introduced the tax bills and certificates thereto, certified copies of which accompany this opinion. Objections were made to these tax bills, because — First, the petition did not state a cause of action; secondly, they were not properly certified; third, the taxes due the city could only be recovered by the city under the act of 1897. The objec
; The following are copies of tax bills and certificates:
II. The defendant insists that the president and board of assessor’s had no jurisdiction to assess his personal property until a list thereof was first made by defendant or the district assessor. He established by his own evidence that the district assessor, in strict compliance with the statute, went in person to defendant’s, residence, and gave him a blank and a notice to make out his list, andthathedefiantly refused to make his own list. It will be observed that the sufficiency of the notice is not questioned, nor, indeed, could it be, as defendant proved by the deputy the actual receipt of the notice on June 9, 1894, at his residence in St. Louis. What do counsel mean by jurisdiction, as applied to tax proceedings? As to the subjects of taxation, no doubt can exist as to the power of the State to tax persons living within, and property situate within the State. This is an inherent prerogative of the State to sustain its existence as such. In this case the defendant, Cummings, resided in the city of St. Louis, and in the assessment district in which he was assessed, and there likewise was his personal property. If counsel mean that some provision must have been made by law for notice, in order that defendant might protect himself against an arbitrary assessment, we think he is right. Such a right does not necessarily secure a hearing before the assessment. It is sufficient, to comply with the constitutional guaranty of “due process of law,” that he be accorded a hearing before some court or board before the tax becomes conclusive. This is seemed in many States, as it is in
Tested by these 'rules, it must be held that when the assessor, Brokate, went in person, on June 9, 1894, to the residence of defendant, and left the printed notice and blank. list requiring defendant to list his property, and defendant received that list on that day, the jurisdiction to assess attached. If, after receiving this blank list and notice, he failed to make out his own list, or refused peremptorily to do so, as is shown by his evidence, then the law authorized the assessor (section 7535) to make out the list on his own view, or “on the best information he could obtain.” The plea of the constitutional provision that taxes shall be uniform will not avail a taxpayer who has been scrupulously accorded all the protection of the Constitution, and who expressly waives its protection, and seeks to violate its spirit, by casting upon his neighbors that portion of the burden which he should bear. His contention that, because the district collector did not itemize the various pieces and kinds of personal property, he had no jurisdiction to assess him on any sum whatever, is not sound. At most, it is only an irregularity, — an irregularity caused by defendant himself, and of which he will not be permitted to complain. By a simple compliance with a just and reasonable law, he could have avoided the very thing of which he complains. But this is not all. Defendant had another day in court, so to speak. Having been notified to make his list, and having refused absolutely to do so, the district assessor, upon his best information, assessed him, and the board of assessors doubled his valuation as a penalty, in pursuance of section 7536, R. S. 1889. By section 7572, it is provided that “every person who thinks himself aggrieved by the assessment of his property may appeal, and every appeal shall be in writing, and verified by affidavit and shall state specifically the grounds of the appeal and the matter .or thing complained of, and no other matter shall be considered by the board.” By
III. The petition was sufficient. It averred the assessment of personal property, to a special amount; the levy of specific taxes thereon by the duly constituted authorities; the effort of the collector to collect the taxes; his failure so to do, and the return thereof as delinquent; and the necessity for this suit for the said taxes, and incidental penalties, costs, and attorney’s fees. It was not at all necessary for the pleader to set out the district assessor’s valuation in each year, and then aver a doubling thereof. The assessment was not com
IV. As to the point that the act of 1897 required the suit for the city’s taxes to be brought in the name of the city, and not by the State at the relation of the collector, it is sufficient to remark that section 2 of the act of March 24,1897 (Laws 1897, p. 213), expressly provides that the remedy thereby provided “shall be cumulative and shall not in any manner impair other methods or provisions now existing or which may be hereafter provided for the collection of the same,” to wit, city taxes. For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of the taxes certified, together with the interest, penalties, and costs.