Lead Opinion
This is аn original proceeding in mandamus to compel payment for a highway built under a contract let by Pierce county pursuant to 3 Item, & Bal. Code, § 5879-1 et seq. The plans and specifications, approved by the state highway commissioner, provided that the paving be one of twelve kinds, on all of which bids being called for and various received, the relator becamе successful with one called bitulithic. Having long ago completed its work without payments, it alleges that the state highway commissioner actually, though not formally, accepted the work, has no just obj ections, and unreasonably withholds his certificate. Testimony on both sides is before us on an order of reference. The Attorney General, for the defendant officials, urged frаud in the original bid and defects in the work.
As to the first. Even before the contract was executed, one Warter, a taxpayer, commenced in Pierce county an action to enjoin the county commissioners from entering into it, alleging that the relator was getting it by fraudulently concealing a secret price from the patentees that gave him an advantage over other bidders. That action was dismissed without prejudice after a hearing.
Upon this dismissal the commissioners executed the contract and the relator immediately went forward with it. Nevertheless, another taxpayer, one Reynolds, of Pierce county, brought, a month after Warter’s dismissal, an action in
By the Warter suit alone the alleged fraud had been npised about before the contract was so much as let and work begun; nor, under the statutory relations between the state and county officials in this work, can it be pretended that the former were less apprised than the latter. Before this work was begun, therefore, a taxpayer had failed, and the state had not used its opportunity, to prevent it.
We have repeatedly held that, in its business relations with individuals, the state must not expect more favorable treatment than is fair between men. State ex rel. Gillette v. Clausen,
We have not to do here with the question of limitation of actions or with laches, but with estoppel m pais; and even where the government may not be barred by mere laches, it may be estopped in pais by such actions with individuals as make it a “question of honest dealing.” Gilbert, Circuit Judge, in United States v. Willamette Valley etc. Co.,
As in Ettor v. Tacoma, supra, we are of opinion that the state is estopped. But shall the contractor be relegated to quantum meruit or enjoy the contract itself? We sustain him in the latter. As for the fraud, it is not necessary in this case to pass upon that or upon the status of a bid on patented process unaffected by waiver or estoppel.
This contract was not void. Without reviewing a mass of authorities, often inharmоnious and often perplexing through a loose application of the word void to acts not ultra vires, we are clear that this was only a voidable contract subject to ratification. There was no such impairmant or exclusion of competition as to render this bargain absolutely void. To begin with, the board was competent to contract for this road. What it was buying was not something forbidden or outside of its powers. Now, no fraud being alleged against the board itself, we must assume that, when it invited bids for twelve kinds of pavement, one kind was as acceptable as another and any might have been chosen. Competitive bidding
To hold this сontract absolutely void we should have to say so on the call itself and pronounce the proceedings actually or substantially ultra vires. Is the including an invitation to one patented process to vitiate a call that includes fifty kinds not patented, because on the one competition is less free? In Great Northern R. Co. v. Leavenworth,
We do not say that, to be void, a contract must be either a forbidden one in terms or one plainly beyond a public body’s
As to the second ground, it is palpable from the record that the faults in the performance now discussed are so small as to be almost within the rule of de minimis. The state highway commissioner, for his part, gives no testimоny against thatperformance. His first assistant is called instead. That officer admits that his superior had said that he had no objection to the work, which he would accept were it not for the pendency of the Thurston county injunction. Now that was soon held to be without jurisdiction. Nor can this assistant point out any defects that strike us as amounting to just complaints. He concedes, too, that to the county engineer had been left the inspection and that that engineer was satisfied. No good reason does he give why the few things he points out today were not immediately complained of that the relator might remedy them. Indeed, much that is now drawn into this controversy has to do with whether the original specificatiоns were what they should have been, a question surely settled by the parties in their contract.
In the most gigantic contracts between private parties the courts have never hesitated to say that the certificate of an architect or engineer was earned and would be considered as delivered when in truth it ought to have been delivered аnd was withheld with no good reason. There is no sound authority against applying that doctrine to municipal construction contracts. County of Cook w. Harms,
To conclude, in State ex rel. Brown v. McQuade,
Let the writ issue, requiring payment by the respondent state auditor of whatever shall be found due upon this contract as one accepted and approved in all legal respects by the respondent highway commissioner.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) — The basic error in the majority opinion is in the holding that the contract in question is voidable only, and not void. The statute, 3 Rem. & Bal. Code, § 5879-9, requires that such a contract shall be awarded to
Where a statute requires that contracts for public work shall be let upon competitive bidding, or to the lowest responsible bidder, any secret fraud practiced on the part of the successful bidder or bidders which tеnds to avoid the competitive requirement of the statute, renders the contract void, not voidable.
In 6 R. C. L. 818, it is said:
“Though there are English and Canadian decisions to the contrary, the rule is settled in the United States that agreements which, in their necessary operation upon the action of contractors bidding for public work, tend to restrain the natural rivalry and competition of the parties, and thus produce a result disadvantageous to the public, are against public policy, and void.”
See, also, 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed.), § 781; Editor’s note to the case of Citizens’ Nat. Bank of Chickasha v. Mitchell, 20 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 886.
The fact that a good road may have been constructed under the contract in question, and that the relator was the only person equipped to properly perform the contract, if such are the facts, have no bearing on the question. Contracts awarded in defiance of the statutory provision requiring competitive bidding are illegal in their nature and tendency, and for that reason no inquiry is necessary as to the particular effect of any one contract, bеcause it would not alter the general nature of the contract, or the force of public policy which condemns them.
In Conway v. Garden City Paving & Post Co.,
*458 “The test of illegality is not the result in a particular case, but the tendency of the contract if recognized as valid in the law.”
In McMullen v. Hoffman,
“Contracts of the nature of this one are illegal in their nature and tendency, and for that reason no inquiry is necessary as to the particular effect of any one contract, because it would not alter the general nature of contracts of this description or the force of public policy which condemns them.”
The contract, being void, cannot be made the basis of an action. The contractor’s only remedy is for the reasonable value of the work done and the materials furnished. In other words, the remedy is not upon the contract, but upon a quantum meruit. Green v. Okanogan County,
In this case, in the proposal for bids, one kind of paving specified was “Bitulithic surface material,” which was a patented article. The specifications required the patentee to furnish this material to any successful bidder at a definite 'reasonable price per square yard. The patentee was required to file with the board what is known as a license agreement or statement that it would furnish such patented material to any successful bidder at the price named. This license agreement or statement was filed, and provided that the Bitulithic surface paving mixture would bе furnished to any contractor at ninety cents per square yard. The patentee, at the time, had a secret agreement with the relator whereby it could acquire the Bitulithic paving mixture at a cost to it of approximately thirty-eight cents less per square yard than other contractors would be required to pay under the license agreemеnt filed with the board; It requires no argument to show that, under the secret agreement with the patentee, the relator had a material and substantial advantage over any other contractor that might desire to bid upon that particular kind
The fact that a number of other kinds of pavement were called for in the proposal, and bid upon, does not alter the situation. The bitulithic pavement being a patented article, may be used under a statute which requires сompetitive bidding, provided it can be acquired at a reasonable price, and is bid upon in such a way that it will be subject to the greatest amount of ^competition which is possible. This is the doctrine of the case of Great Northern R. Co. v. Leavenworth,
In my opinion, the method adopted to secure the contract in question was unfair to other bidders, injurious to the public, indefensible in morals, and renders the contract illegal and void in law. • For the reasons stated, I am unable to concur in the majority opinion, and therefore dissent.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) — I concur with Judge Main in the conclusion that thе contract between the county commissioners and the relator is void. But if the rule be that the contract is voidable only, as held by the majority, I cannot concur in the conclusion that the state is estopped from questioning it. The facts showing the contract to be voidable developed upon the trial of the suits brought by the individuals to restrain the paymеnts. This was the first knowledge
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring) — It is within the powers of the public authorities to let contracts for public improvements. The contract let in this case was, therefore, voidable and not void.
The state, by its conduct, is estopped to deny the obligation of its contract after having notice of the things now set up against it.
I do not want to be understood as indorsing or giving a judicial approval to the manner in which the contract was let in this cаse. Had the case referred to as the “Warter case” come to this court, I would have concurred in an opinion holding that the contract should not be entered into by the commissioners.
Wherefore, upon the ground of estoppel, I concur in the opinion of the court.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) — An examination of the authorities cited by Judge Main convincеs me that the contract here in question should be held void. The fact that it is not void as ultra vires of the state to make under any circumstances, seems to me foreign to the issue. Neither was the contract involved in Green v. Okanogan County,
I concur with Judge Main.