234 Mo. 299 | Mo. | 1911
Lead Opinion
— This is an action by the collector of Clay county by which it is sought to collect from defendant certain State, county, school and other taxes alleged to be due upon personal property owned or held by defendant. "Defendant filed answer, the necessary portions of which will be noted as required in the course of the opinion.
Plaintiff offered in evidence the back taxbill and rested the case. .Defendant then offered an agreed statement of facts as follows:
“In the trial of the above entitled cause it is hereby agreed between the parties plaintiff and defendant that the following facts are true, reserving, however, to each party the right to object to the introduction of any one or all of such agreed facts on the ground of its or tbeir irrelevancy, inadmissibility .or incompetency, to-wit:
“1. That defendant is an educational corporation duly organized under and by virtue of an act of the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, approved*? February 27, 1849, entitled ‘An Act to Charter a College in the State of Missouri,’ found in the Laws of Missouri of the year 1849, passed by the 15th General Assembly of said State, at page 232, 233 and 234.
“2. That said defendant acquired its name, to-wit, ‘Trustees of William Jewell College,’ and its college, ‘William Jewell College,’ was located in the town, now city, of Liberty, in Clay county, Missouri, on August 21, 1849, and a certificate, showing said name and location, was filed in the office of the recorder of deeds for Clay county, Missouri, on August 25, 1849, in accordance with the provisions of said act approved February 27,1849.'
“3. At the date of the passage of the act which defendant claims exempts it from taxation,, to-wit, February 22, 1851, defendant had no endowment in personal property. The endowment at that date, possessed by defendant, consisted solely of the real estate mentioned in said Act of February 22, 1851.
“4. That at and ever since said date of February 22, 1851, defendant accepted said act and has since, and is now engaged in the work of education and maintaining said college at Liberty in the State of Missouri. And all its property, real and personal was, and is now being used for that purpose exclusively, and not for. the purpose of private gain or emolument to the defendant, or any person or corporation.
‘‘5. That by the name ‘William Jewell College' in the title and first section of the Act of the General Assembly, approved February 22, 1851, found in the Laws of Missouri of the year 1851, at pages 64 and 65-, is meant said defendant, ‘The Trustees of William Jewell College.’
“6. That said defendant has since February 22, 1851, sold the lands mentioned in said act of that date except the land used as its college campus in Clay county, Missouri, and the proceeds -derived therefrom were turned into its general endowment fund. That*307 since that date and prior to the assessment of the taxes herein sued for, defendant has received its gifts and bequests of money for its educational endowment, and derived from the sale or proceeds of its real estate, personal property greater in amount than, the assessment on which the taxes sued for in this case are claimed to be levied, and that it had in its possession said personal property as a part of its endowment at the time of said assessment.
“7. The said defendant was not assessed for taxation after February 22, 1851, in Clay county, Missouri, until the assessment was made for the taxes sued for herein; nor has defendant paid any taxes on its said property, real or personal, since said date.
“8. That the various steps in levying said assessment for the taxes sued for herein, the returning of them to the county clerk, the extension of said taxes on the tax books, the delivery of said tax books to .the collector, and his endeavor to collect said taxes, are regular on their face and no objection is to be made thereto, except that the property of defendant is exempt from and not subject to taxation.”
Defendant also put in evidence the two acts of the General Assembly mentioned in the agreed statement of facts.
By oral evidence it was shown that the defendant had never been required to pay any taxes up to the time of this-suit, although it owned property in different parts of the State. It was also shown that the revenue officers of the State had always construed the Act of 1851 as exempting all of the college property from taxation.
The property sought to be taxed in the present case covers the endowment fund of the college. The trial court held that the property of defendant was exempted from taxation, and from its judgment the plaintiff brings the case here by appeal.
It is urged that exemption -statutes are to be strictly construed. Generally speaking, such is the rule. But we take it from the cases that there has been a well recognized exception to the rule. Perhaps a better wording would be to say that the courts have never been over anxious to apply the rule so as to impose burdens upon religious, scientific, literary and educational institutions. Strict construction has largely been applied to corporations organized for profit and gain, not to corporations performing a public service. As tending to show the drift of the courts, some of the cases may not be amiss.
In State v. Fisk University, 87 Tenn. 233, the Supreme Court of Tennessee says: “The contention on behalf of the State and county is that, inasmuch as the Constitution of 1870 requires all property to be taxed, with the exceptions therein stated, the exception and exemption must be strictly construed, and nothing not within the letter of the exception must be allowed to escape its share of the burdens of government. It is unnecessary to resort to argumentation, or to .cite authorities for the general principle that exemptions from taxation are generally to be construed with great strictness. Our reported cases state and maintain the rule as contended for, and this court has no purpose or disposition to depart from such construction. But this, like all other rules of construction, is made
So, too, in Indiana, the Supreme Court of that State, after recognizing the general rule, in the case of City of Indianapolis v. Grand Master, 25 Ind. 518, said: “In favor of literary and scientific institutions possibly a more liberal construction would be required, for the reason that the encouragement, of educational facilities is in furtherance of a public policy deemed so vital to the success and permanence of free government, that it is prominently manifested in our Constitution and laws. ’ ’
In People ex rel. v. Tax Commissioners, 11 Hun, l. c. 506, it is said: “The'Revised Statutes provide that the real and personal property of every public library shall be exempt from taxation. [1 R. S. 388, see. 4, sub. 5.] The question is whether the relator is such a public library and entitled to the statutory exemption.. The question is not free from doubt. Statutory exemptions are, in general, strictly construed, and there is force in the contention that such exemption
An exemption statute was under discussion in L. & N. R. Co. v. Gaines, 3 Fed. 266. In that case, Baxter, C. J., said: “The office of a good expositor, says My Lord Coke, ‘is to make construction on, all its parts together. ’ The plainest words may be controlled by the context. It is the intention expressed in the act, as a whole, that is to prevail. Courts look to the centext, as well as to the words, for the meaning’ of particular
At least it should be-said that the courts in, such cases -will not permit the evident intent of the legislative mind to be thwarted by its use of unfortunate words, when the intent can •be clearly gathered from the context of the act, when considered along with the attendant public policy and other surrounding circumstances. [Hale v. Stimson, 198 Mo. l. c. 165.]
The cardinal rule of construction is that which requires the legislative intent to be ascertained, and to this all other rules are subservient. With these observations we proceed to the real task allotted by the issue made in this case.
II. The Act of 1851 (Laws 1851, p. 64), reads:
“An Act for the benefit of William Jewell College.
“1. Certain lands owned by ‘William Jewell College’ exempted from tax.
“2. Delinquent lands relieved from payment of taxes; duties of Register of Lands.'
“3. Penalty for trespass on lands.
“4. This is a public act; duties of circuit court.
“Be it enacted, by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as folloivs:
“1. That all the land and improvements thereon now owned by the ‘William Jewell College’ in the counties of Clay, of Grundy, Mercer and Sullivan, and all the lands that may hereafter be granted or devised to said college, or any other institution of learning in this State, for the benefit of education, be, and the same are hereby exempted from all taxes and assessments so long as said lands may be owned by said college.
*312 “2. That the lands belonging to said college in the counties of Mercer and Sullivan which have been returned delinquent for non-payment of taxes, are hereby released from the same; and the Register of Lands is hereby authorized to grant an acquittance of the same to said college on payment of the office fees.
“3. That any person or persons, who shall willfully cut, injure, destroy or remove any timber or other •, materials, from, or on, any of the lands belonging to said college without the consent of the board of directors thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to be indicted and punished as in cases now .provided for by law.
“á. This act is hereby declared a public act, and shall be given in charge to the grand juries of the counties of Clay, Grundy, Mercer and Sullivan, at each term of the circuit court.
“This act to take effect.and be in force from and after its passage.
“Approved February 22,1851.”
The agreed statement of facts shows that at the time this act was passed the entire endowment fund of the defendant was in lands.
Defendant contends that the word “lands” as used in this exemption statute means that the endowment fund of the defendant was and is to be exempted from taxation. The plaintiff urges a strict construction and therefore claims that this term does not apply to any of the college endowment, except such as is in' fact invested in lands. Plaintiff also urges that there has been a repeal of the Act of 1851 by subsequent constitutional provisions. The latter contention we will consider, if necessary, in a further paragraph.
As bearing upon the suggestion made in our paragraph one, supra, in a well recognized authority on statutory construction (2 Lewis’s Sutherland, Stat. Constr., sec. 376), it is said: “The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail
And the same author at section 379, says: “A thing which is within the ob ject, spirit and the meaning of the statute is as much within the statute as- if it were within the letter. Conversely, a thing which is not within the intent and spirit of a statute is not within the statute, though within the letter.”
These rules this court has fully recognized. [Hale v. Stimson, 198 Mo. l. c. 165; Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 42, and Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, and cases cited therein.] Earlier cases in this State are Andrew County v. Kirtley, 135 Mo. 31; Bryant v. Russell, 127 Mo. 422; State v Bixman, 162 Mo. 1.
Nor should we overlook the fact that under certain circumstances we can call to our assistance extrinsic aids in the construction of statutes. [Black on
In the Smith case we said: “These allowable extrinsic aids are numerous and varied, including public documents and papers, statutes in pari materia, contemporary history, contemporary construction and usage, executive and legislative construction, journals of the legislative body, opinions of legislators, motives of the legislative body and perhaps others.”
Prior to the 'Constitution of 1865 there was no restriction upon the legislative power in the matter of granting.exemptions from taxation. The public policy of the State prior to 1865, as evinced by numerous acts incorporating educational institutions and exempting their property from taxation, is clearly apparent. That public policy was to encourage and foster educational institutions. Some of these acts of the Legislature this court has -had occasion to discuss. [St. Vincent’s College v. Schaefer, 104 Mo. 267; State ex rel. v. Westminster College, 175 Mo. 52.]
Going now to the special acts pertaining to William Jewell College, we find that the college was incorporated by the Act of February 27, 1849. Some portions of this act will be necessary to reach the legislative intent as undertaken to be expressed in the Act of 1851.
The preamble of the Act of 1849 reads: “Whereas, the United Baptists in Missouri and their friends are desirous of endowing and building up a college in the State, and for that purpose have under the direction of the General Association of Baptists in Missouri already secured pledges to the amount of about twenty thousand dollars, for the endowment of the same in shares of forty-eight dollars, each payable in installments of six dollars per share annually, now therefore to enable the parties above mentioned to carry out their contemplated purpose,
By section 1 of the act, 26 persons named therein are constituted a body politic, with perpetual succession. By section 2 it was provided that the college mentioned should be located at some place in the State by a majority of the donors to the endowment of the same (one share of $48 constituting a vote) and also given a náme. •
Section 3 of the act thus reads: “After the college shall have been located and named as provided in the-second section, the persons named in the first section and their successors in office shall be- known and styled by the name of the trustees of the college thus named, and shall have full power in their corporate capacity, to hold by gift, grant, demise, devise, or otherwise any lands, tenements, hereditaments, monies, rents, goods, or chattels of what kind soever the same may be, which is or may hereafter be given, granted, demised to or purchased by them for and to the use of the aforesaid college, and may sell and dispose of the same or any part thereof or lease, rent or improve in such manner as they shall think most conducive to the interest and prosperity of said college. ’ ’
Other sections, from 4 to 12 inclusive, provide for the details of the corporation thus organized and the duties of the officers thereof, with other matters immaterial here. Section 13, the last section of the act is significant and reads: “That the property, real and personal, authorized to be held by said corporation by virtue of this act, shall be held and applied in good faith to the purposes of education according to the provisions of this act and for no other or different purpose.”
The significance of the last section lies in the fact that the use of the property is restricted to a public purpose. It clearly indicates the interest that the State was taking in the corporation. This is peeu
Now with this situation let us take up the exemption statute in question. Starting with the proposition that the State was limiting the use of the property to be acquired by the corporation to a much-needed and public use, what means this exemption statute? "We say much-needed use, because we can not blind our eyes to the public history of our State. • Of such things courts take judicial cognizance. We should never lose sight of the fact that by this Act of 1849, the State was licensing the twenty-six men and their successors to
Going now to the act in question, the defendant contends that the word “land” as therein used should be ¡construed as “property,” and thus fit the context of the original act providing for an endowment fund for the institution. By the original act the corporation was authorized to receive all. kinds of property for its use, which use was limitedas aforesaid. When these several acts were passed the Constitution of the State said to the lawmakers: ‘ ‘ Schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged in this State.” Encouraged how? Not by the simple permissive act of giving them a mere license to exist. The State was interested in schools and the constitutional idea was to foster and aid them in such manner as could be done.
A few lines from State v. Fisk, supra, are appropriate here: “How can it be contended that it is the policy of the State to encourage education, and to levy direct taxes upon its citizens for the purposeoffurnisb
The. aid provided by the Act of 1851 and other similar acts was such aid as the State could give. This Act of 1851 clearly exempts all further grants of land from taxation. It was evidently passed in the light of the fact that the college endowment was then wholly in the lands named in the act. It stands admitted that the lands mentioned in the Act of 1851 constituted the sole endowment fund of defendant at that time. We can see no good reason for the G-eneral Assembly exempting one class of property belonging to the endowment fund of the college and taxing the other class, especially in view of the fact that both classes were to be used for the same public purpose. In those days it would appear that endowments were largely made in lands. Not only so, but about the same time college after college was by its charter relieved of all kinds of taxes on all kinds of property for all time to come, and the act before us speaks of other institutions of learning. The original act authorized the gathering together of an endowment for the college. The fund thus collected was limited to a use which the State not only recognized as a. public use, but one which the State should foster and aid. To my mind when all the surroundings are considered, the public policy of the State considered, these two acts considered, and other acts about the same time are considered, it is evident that there was a legislative intent to relieve the property constituting the endowment fund of this corporation from the burdens of taxation.
In addition we have the construction placed upon the act by officials for the past half century. It is true
III. It is next urged that this statute has been repealed by subsequent constitutional and statutory provisions. The claim is made that there is a direct repeal of the law or an attempted direct repeal of the law. The question, however, has been fully settled by the adjudications of this court upon similar statutes, and we shall not re-open nor re-argue it. [St. Vincent’s College v. Schaefer, 104 Mo. 261; State ex rel. v. Westminster College, 175 Mo. 52.
It follows from the foregoing that the judgment nisi should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
— -The foregoing opinion from Division One is adopted as the opinion of the Court in Banc.
Concurrence Opinion
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION.
— I agree with my learned associate Judge Graves, that tbe judgment of the trial court should be affirmed; but I do not concur in all that he has written in arriving at that conclusion.
In order to affirm the judgment, it is necessary to construe the word lands where it occurs the second time in section 1, Laws of 1851, page 64, to mean property, thus embracing both real and personal property.. It
The word “land comprehends all things of a permanent, substantial nature, being a word of very extensive signification.” [Anderson’s Law Dictionary.] As ordinarily used, this word does not embrace personal property, and whether or not as found in the Act of 1851 its meaning should be so enlarged as to include personal property is the main issue before us.
To ascertain the true intention of the lawmakers of 1851, it is necessary to consider their surroundings and the conditions which called for the enactment of the law under consideration. An eminent authority has aptly said: ‘ ‘ All laws must be executed according to the sense and meaning they imported at the time of their passage.” [Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 85, p. 115.] Words used in a statute enacted sixty years ago do not always convey the same meaning as when used in a statute of more recent date.
In the year of 1851 most of the-surplus wealth of our State was invested in lands and slaves, while bonds and stocks, now frequently used in endowing colleges, were very scarce; hence, I think there is sound reason for the presumption that by the use of the word lands in the act under consideration, the General Assembly intended to embrace every kind of surplus property which benevolent citizens might desire to donate to the cause of education, a cause then sorely in need of financial aid in our State.
Another reason which impels me to hold that the word lands as used in the Act of 1851, supra, was intended to include personal property, is that the holding of large tracts of land by corporations, whether such corporations be formed for commercial, educational or religious purposes, has always been exceedingly obnoxious to the public, as tending to prevent citizens from acquiring* homes • and I cannot conceive of any cause which could have created an intent on the
To follow the strict letter of this act would result in taxing the funds which defendant may have obtained by the sale of non-taxable lands. This would encourage defendant to invest its endowment funds wholly in lands, .to the end that it might thereby escape taxation; and I cannot bring myself to believe that any General Assembly was so unmindful of the public welfare as to intend such a result.
I am aware that we are not permitted to modify or enlarge the letter of a statute except in extreme cases, when it is necessary to do so in order to effectuate its true intent, or when, to follow the letter of the law would place upon it an absurd or impractical construction. [Cole v. Skrainka, 105 Mo. 303; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 105 Mo. App. 207.] In the case at bar, to hold that by the Act of 1851 it was intended to exempt the real estate of the defendant, and-leave its personal property subject to the burdens of taxation, would amount to convicting the General Assembly of enacting 'a very absurd law. There are many valuable rules and maxims for construing statutes-, but all ■ other guides must give way to the one paramount rule that courts should give effect to the real intent of the lawmakers. [Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. l. c. 65.]
The Act of 1851, supra, purports to be a public act and provides that “all the lands that may hereafter be granted or devised to said .college, or any other institution of learning in this State, for the benefit of education, be, and the same are hereby exempted from all taxes.” This language conveys to my mind an intent to encourage donations not only to defendant, but
The framers of the Constitution of 1875 evidently deemed the holding of large tracts of land by corporations to be inimical to the welfare of the people, and sought to discourage such holdings. [Sec. 6 and 7, art. 10, and sec. 7, art. 12, Constitution of 1875.] However, I do not believe that these provisions of our present organic law would create a right in the State to tax personal property of a corporation chartered for educational purposes before the Act of 1851 was passed. If this suit involved an attempt to collect taxes from real estate acquired by defendant after the adoption of the Constitution of 1875, a very different question would be presented, but one upon which it is not now necessary to express an opinion.
The defendant has the right to acquire personal property for the purposes expressed in its charter and hold same free from the burdens of general taxation; and as this suit only seeks to collect taxes on personal property of defendant, the judgment of the trial'court denying such recovery, is for the right party and should he affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION.
— I concur in all that my associate, Judge Graves, has written in this case, except the points dissented from’by Judge Brown, in his concurring opinion filed herein. I also concur in the latter opinion; and, in doing so, I wish to add, that to my mind it is clear, from reading the Act of 1851, that the Legislature intended therebly to exempt the endow
Dissenting Opinion
DISSENTING- OPINION.
— 1 respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court and the concurring opinion delivered in this case. In stating the reasons therefor, I shall avoid a discussion of the great educational and religious work and influence for good of the respondent, on the one hand, as well as on the other, the fact that respondent is now seeking a construction of a law which would give to it an immunity from the burdens of taxation denied to every other similar institution in this State founded since the year 1865. These are matters aside from the question directly presented for decision in the case.
The taxes sought to be collected in this suit are taxes on respondent’s personal property. Its lands are conceded to be exempt from taxation. The sole question for consideration is whether the Legislature of this State, by the Act of 1851, which exempted respondent’s lands from taxation, in speaking of “land and improvements thereon,” “lands in the counties
The Act of 1851, to be construed, is set out at length in the opinion of the court and need not be reproduced here. It appears from this act that in the year 1851 respondent, incorporated two years before, owned lands in Clay, Grundy, Mercer and Sullivan counties in this State, in the latter two of which taxes on its lands were then delinquent, and that by the provisions of said act respondent was granted an acquittance from such taxes.
The following references to this act appear in the House Journal of the Sixteenth General Assembly, 1850, namely, at page 231 of the appendix:
“Report of the Committee on Education upon the Petition of the Trustees of William Jewell College, Accompanied by Bill for Relief of said College.
“The committee on education, to whom was referred the petition of the trustees of William Jewell College praying that lands belonging to said college may be exempted from taxation and protected from trespasses, have had the same under consideration and beg leave to
“report.
“That it appears that said college, besides the lands donated to them adjoining the town of Liberty,*325 for a college location, they have had donated to them, for the canse of education, about four thousand acres of land in the counties of Grundy, Mercer and Sullivan,. and your committee believe that these lands, and all others that may be donated for the cause of educations, should be exempted from taxation so long as such lands may. be owned by said college, they therefore recommend the passage of the accompanying bill.
“McPherson, Chairman.”
And at page 323, is the following:
“Mr. McPherson, from the same .committee, to which were referred the petition of the trustees of William Jewell College, asking exemption from taxation of college lands, reported by bill entitled,
“An act for the benefit of William Jewell College;
“Which was read a first time, rule suspended, read a second time;
“When Mr. Clark offered the following amendment;
“Amend by way of rider as follows:
“In section 1, after the words, ‘to said college,’ insert ‘ or to any other institution • of learning in this State;’
“Which was read a first time, rule suspended, read a second time;
“When the bill as amended was read a third time and passed.”
Prom the foregoing sidelight thrown on this legislation, together with the record in this case, it is disclosed that the “Act for the Benefit of William Jewell College” was introduced and passed by the General Assembly of this State in response to a petition “for the relief of said college,” presented by the trustees thereof; that respondent had no personal property at the time of the passage of said act. And the conspicuous absence of another fact also appears, which should not be overlooked, in view of the emphasis given to and
I shall not enter upon a discussion of the rules of construction and interpretation of laws, which may be invoked in a proper case to ascertain the legislative intent, and for the evident reason that resort to such rules is permissible only when the language used is susceptible of different meanings, or is ambiguous, and therefore supplies the necessary doubt as a basis for construction. When the Legislature has used plain, ordinary words, of well recognized meaning, as in the act before us, there is nothing left for construction, and it is not the province of the court to go outside of the act itself and resort to extrinsic facts and circumstances, in order that immunity from taxation may be extended to a class of property not exempted by the language of -the act. •
This well established principle of law is given expression in Lewis’s Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2 Ed.), vol. 2, sees. 366 and 367, as follows: “The certainty of the law is next in importance to its justice. And if the Legislature has expressed its intention in the law itself, with certainty, it is not admissible to depart from that intention on any extraneous
It is not questioned that, as stated in the opinion in this case, “the cardinal rule of construction is that which requires the legislative intent to be ascertained and to this all other rules are subservient,” but it is equally cardinal that, “this intention, however, must be the intention as expresséd in the statute, and where the meaning of the language is plain it must be given effect by the courts or they would be assuming legislative authority.” [36 Cyc. 1106.]
In the charter granted by the Legislature to respondent, apt words were employed, conferring upon the trustees of the respondent the power “to hold by gift, grant, demise, devise or otherwise, any lands, tenements, hereditaments, moneys, rents, goods or chattels of what kind soever the same may be,” and in other acts of the General Assembly which passed the Act of 1851, charters were granted similarly giving power to acquire and own lands and personal property, showing clearly that when the Legislature intended so doing it did make use of the words “lands” and “personal property,” in their plain,, usual and ordinary sense. This fact, which under all rules of discur
But the strength of the State’s case does not rest alone in its insistence upon the use of the word ‘ lands ’ ’ in the plain and ordinary sense as usually understood. It-goes further and urges in support of its position the language and provisions of the law.
It surely cannot be maintained that the words “lands and improvements thereon,” in the first section, and the words “lands belonging to said college in the counties of Mercer and Sullivan,” in the second section, and the lands referred to in the third section, on which it is made an offense to cut or remove timber, were intented to include “ moneys, rents, goods or chattels,” and no valid reason can be given why the word was used in any different sense in the clause “and all lands that may be hereafter granted or devised to said college,” in the first section. Indeed, the strongest confirmation that the words last quoted were used in the same sense as in the other provisions of the act, is found in the fact that the report of the committee, who had before them the petition of the trustees, speaks of respondent's “about four thousand acres of land, situate in the counties of Grundy, Mercer and Sullivan, and your committee believe that those lands and all others that may be donated for the cause of education,” etc. Can it be doubted that the words “and all others,” as thus used, meant all other lands such as were owned in the counties named and such as had “improvements thereon,” and on which persons were forbidden to cut timber? Can it be maintained that the Legislature exempted personal property by the use of the words “ lands and
It is stated in the concurring opinion herein that there may be a question as to the exemption from taxes, under the provisions of said act, of lands acquired by respondent since the adoption, of the Constitution of 1875. As the taxes in controversy are on personaL property which may have come to respondent since that date, for aught that appears to the contrary, then we have the possibility suggested of a construction by this court of an act purporting to exempt land from taxes which would leave lands subject to taxation, while at the samé time exempting personal property.
It is shown by the entries above cited from the House Journal, and by the act itself, that respondent owned lands upon which taxes were due and delinquent and as to the legality of which no question was raised; that respondent appealed to the Legislature of this State, through the petition of its trustees, asking relief from the payment of its taxes and exemption of its lands from taxation in the future. That the' Legislature generously granted the petition and an acquittance from the taxes. Now respondent comes into court and says that because it “accepted” this bounty which it petitioned for, a consideration moved from it to the State which made the act of the State and.respondent’s acceptance a contract under which respondent is entitled to assert rights as against the State, its benefactor iu this transaction.
On the other hand appellant maintains that the Act of 1851, being a mere immunity and privilege, not based upon any valid consideration, did not constitute a contract by which vested rights aro,se and, therefore, that it was subject to repeal at will and was repealed by later inconsistent constitutional and statutory provisions.
There are few words of more frequent use in the laws Of this State than the word “lands” and few in use in common speech in which the meaning is so well understood.
It is defined by section 8057, Revised Statutes of 1909, as 'follows: ‘ ‘ The terms ‘real property ’ or ‘ premises,’ or ‘real estate’ or ‘lands,’ shall be deemed to be coextensive with lands, tenements and hereditaments.” By the same section the words “personal property” and ‘ ‘ property ’ ’ are defined as follows: ‘ ‘ The words ‘personal property’ shall include money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt. The word ‘property’ shall include real and personal property.”
In the laws of this State in force at the time of the passage of the act before us the word “lands” is found used in the same sense as thus defined and as contended for by the appellants, in many instances, and no case has been found or called to our attention in which it is used in the sense of including personal property. The sense in which it is thus used in the law is identical with the meaning given to it in ordinary speech and as generally understood. In my opinion the word was used in that sense in the Act of 1851 and, if so, the taxes were legal and the judgment should be reversed.