3 S.D. 586 | S.D. | 1893
Relator applied to the court below for a mandamus to compel defendant, as county treasurer of Brown county, to make and execute a tax deed to a piece of land definitely described, which was in November, 1889, duly sold to the relator for delinquent taxes. The court below granted the mandamus, and the county treasurer appeals. No question is made as to the regularity of the proceedings resulting in the sale, but the' defendant, the county treasurer, declines to issue the deed, for the reason that relator has not complied with the conditions of chapter 151 of the laws of 1890, passed, it will be observed, subsequently to the sale; so that the only question in this case is, can said chapter 151, so far as it may give additional time for redemption, or so far as it imposes new and increased burdens upon the purchaser at the tax sale, be legally applied to and control the rights of purchasers under sales made prior to the passage of said act? By the law in force when the sale was made to the relator, he was entitled at any time after the expiration of two years, upon production of the certificate of purchase, to demand and receive from the county treasurer a deed of the land remaining unredeemed. Section .1638, Comp. Laws. But said chapter 151 requires such purchaser, before he may receive a deed, and after the expiration of said two years, to cause a notice to be served upon the person in possession of the land so sold and unredeemed, and also the person in whose name the same is taxed, (if he reside in the county where the property is situated,) in the .manner .and- containing the information prescribed by said act, and then, if said land remain unredeemed at the end of 60 days from the completed service of said notice, the treasurer shall issue a deed therefor to such purchaser. The relator contends that this chapter 151 is inoperative and void as to sales already made at the time of its passage, for the reason that it violates the contract of the sale. We think he is correct. His rights grow out of and must be determined by his contract. It was a contract of bargain and sale between the state and himself. The land was
The law of 1890, for noncompliance with which appellant justifies his refusal to make a deed-to relator, necessarily adds more than 60 days to the time allowed-’ for redemption by the law in force when the sale was made; for it requires that, after the expiration of two years, (the time of redemption named in the, first law) the holder of the certificate of purchase shall cause to be served the notice already referred to, and not until 60 days after the completed service is the treasurer authorized to make such deed. It materially lengthens the term of redemption, and imposes new burdens upon the purchaser. It thus, without the consent of the parties, undertakes to import new terms into preexisting contracts, and to impose burdens upon one of the parties which he never undertook. In State v. McDonald, supra, it was held that the legislature could not, by any act subsequent to-the sale, impair to any extent the right acquired by the purchaser to a deed of the land, subject to the redemption provisions of the law under which the sale was made. Our conclusion, is- that the rights acquired by relator under his contract with the state cannot be controlled by said chapter 151, Laws 1890, and that, so far as said act attempts to do it, it is void. The court below so held, and its judgment is affirmed.