55 Wash. 2d 714 | Wash. | 1960
This is an original application for a writ of prohibition. Early in 1959, the plaintiff, W. G. Platts, Inc., commenced an action for damages against one Ruthine Guess in the Superior Court for Thurston County. At the same time, the plaintiff caused writs of garnishment to issue against certain persons alleged to be indebted to the principal defendant. Trial was had before the Honorable Charles T. Wright, respondent in the instant proceedings, and, on March 18, 1959, an order was entered dismissing
The plaintiff’s contention is that, inasmuch as a notice of appeal has been filed as to the orders dismissing its second cause of action, and quashing the writs of garnishment, the trial court is without jurisdiction to act further in the matter. This contention is based solely upon Rule on Appeal 15, 49 Wn. (2d) xx, which provides:
“A party may appeal from any order, judgment, or decree enumerated in Rule 14 by giving notice of appeal as provided in Rule 33, and the supreme court shall thereupon acquire jurisdiction of the appeal for all necessary purposes and shall have control of the superior court and of all inferior officers in all matters pertaining thereto, and may enforce such control by a mandate or otherwise and, if necessary, by fine and imprisonment, which imprisonment may be continued until obedience shall be rendered to the mandate of the supreme court. But the superior court shall, nevertheless, retain jurisdiction for the purpose of all proceedings by these rules provided to be had in such court, for the purpose of settlement and certification of the statement of facts, and for all other purposes as might be directed by order of the supreme court.”
Clearly, both an order dismissing a cause of action and an order quashing a writ of garnishment are self-executing orders in the sense that no further action of the court is necessary to enforce them. We have held that a self-exe
In the instant case, although timely notice of appeal was filed, both as to the order dismissing the relator’s second cause of action and as to the order quashing the writs of garnishment, no supersedeas bond was posted, nor does it appear that the respondent court was ever requested to fix the amount of such a bond. The impact of the Pioneer Mining & Ditch Co. case, supra, seems clearly to be that to whatever extent an order dismissing the primary action may be superseded, in order to keep funds sequestered by garnishment intact, it is not superseded merely by filing a notice of appeal from the order dismissing the primary action.
The adoption by this court of Rule on Appeal 15, supra, as quoted above, eliminating the former requirement that a bond for costs be filed as a condition precedent to the acquisition by this court of jurisdiction over an appeal, in no way alters the necessity for posting a supersedeas bond in order to supersede the effect of a judgment of dismissal
Thus, we are of the opinion that, contrary to the contentions made by the plaintiff in the instant case, the filing of a notice of appeal does not by itself stay or supersede the effect which the trial court’s judgment of dismissal has upon his writ of garnishment. Further action on the part of the plaintiff is required in order to preserve intact, pending appeal, the funds sequestered by the writ of garnishment; namely, the posting of a supersedeas bond.
Since such action was not taken by the plaintiff, it follows that the respondent court may properly order distribution of the sequestered funds. The application for a writ of prohibition should be denied. It is so ordered.
Weaver, C. J., Mallery, Donworth, and Rosellini, JJ.,, concur.
April 25,1960. Petition for rehearing denied.