37 S.C. 551 | S.C. | 1892
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is a petition, addressed to this court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, praying that a writ of mandamus may issue, requiring the respondent, as mayor of the city of Anderson, South Carolina, to sign and issue bonds of the said city to the amount of one hundred and eleven thousand dollars, thirty-six thousand dollars of which to be used in retiring that amount of bonds still outstanding, heretofore issued by said city in aid of the construction of the 'Savannah Valley Bailroad, and the remaining seventy-five thousand dollars to be used in iiaying the subscription of said city to the South Carolina Industrial and Winthrop Normal School, proposed to be established within the corporate limits of said city. The respondent, in his return to the rule to show cause why the writ demanded should not issue, states three objections: 1st. That the amount of bonds which it is sought to requird him to issue, exceeds the constitutional limit of eight per cent, of the assessed value of all the taxable property in said city. 2d. That there has been no vote taken in favor of the issue of such bonds, as required by the charter of the city. 3d. That the purpose for which seventy-five thousand dollars of the bonds are to be used is not a corporate purpose.
The return has not been traversed, and, therefore, the facts stated therein must be accepted as true. It is there stated that the total amount of property assessed for taxation in said city, as appearing on the tax books of the city for the year 1892, made up from the l’eturns of personal property by individuals for taxation, during the month of Januaiy, 1892, and the assessments of real estate made by the persons appointed for
On the next day this committee reported to the city council: ‘ ‘That they have carefully examined the city’s tax books, which were made up from returns of personal property by individuals for taxation during the month of January last (1892), and the assessments of real estate made by the committee heretofore appointed by you in said month. We find from said books that the assessed value of all property for taxation under your ordinance at that time was the sum of $1,305,885.” The committee also add that they find other property, specified in their report, which has been by ordinance temporarily exempted from taxation for city purposes, as well as certain additional bank stock paid up since the 1st of January, 1892, upon which they place a value aggregating in the whole the sum of $214,000, which, added to the amount appearing on the city’s tax books, will, in their opinion, make the total value of all the taxable property in the city on the 7th of March, 1892, the sum of $1,520,385; and as eight per cent, of this last named amount is more than the amount of the bonds which it is now proposed to issue, it is very obvious that the material inquiry is, whether the amount last named can be accepted as the assessed value of all the taxable property in the city of Anderson, or whether the amount appearing on the tax books of the city must be taken as such assessed value.
This word, “assessed,” has, and had at the time of the adoption of the constitutional provision now under consideration, a well defined meaning, when applied to taxable property, and the framers of that provision must be assumed to have used it in the same sense in which it was used in the various acts of the legislature relating to the subject of taxation. It must be regarded as meaning the value placed upon property for the purpose of taxation by officials appointed for that purpose. It certainly cannot properly be construed as meaning a mere estimate placed upon the value of the taxable property of a given corporation, perhaps by persons so blinded by a desire to ein
From these statutory provisions it is obvious that the only assessment of the taxable property which the city council is empowered to make is au annual assessment, and it is not empowered to make any other or additional assessment. Now, in this case it appears that, in pursuance of these statutory provisions, the city council did make an assessment of the taxable property within the corporate limits of the city during the month of January, 1892,' which was duly entered upon the books of the city treasurer. Hence the so-called subsequent assessment or estimate of the value of the taxable property in the city, made by a committee of three gentlemen, on the 24th of March, 1892, after the subscription to the industrial school, for the very purpose of showing that the amount subscribed, added to the outstanding debt of the city, would not create a debt exceeding in amount the constitutional limit, was wholly unauthorized and void.
It is contended, however, that by the act of 1891 (20 Stat., 1217), the city council of Anderson- is specially authorized to issue the bonds in question, and hence the restrictions upon the power of the city council to issue bonds, contained in the amended charter of the city above mentioned, are necessarily abrogated by this subsequent act. In the preamble to that act it is said: 1 ‘Whereas, the city of Anderson, by the mayor and aldermen of said city, pursuant to the written request of a large majority of the taxpayers and real estate owners of said city,is desirous of submitting a bid of not less than seventy-five thousand dollars nor more than one hundred thousand dollars, for securing the location and establishment of ‘The South Carolina Industrial and Winthrop Normal College’ in said city; and whereas, the said city of Anderson is desirous of making good such subscription, * * * and for that purpose proposes to issue coupon bonds in a sufficient amount to make good such subscription,” &c. The act then proceeds, in its first section, to authorize and empower the-city council to subscribe a sum not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars to the institution-above named; and in its second section the city council is “authorized aud empowered” to issue the requisite amount of bonds for the purpose of making good such subscription; audio the last section it is declared, “that all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act be, and they are hereby, repealed.”
It will be observed that there is no express repeal of the
Inasmuch as the power of the city council had, by previous legislation, been so limited that a debt exceeding the sum of fifty thousand dollars could not be contracted, the manifest object of the act of 1891 was simply to extend that limit to the sum therein mentioned, and there is not a word in the act of 1891 inconsistent with the previous provision that no debt, no matter how small the amount, should be contracted, except by the authority of a previous vote of the qualified electors of the city, given at an election held pursuant to a request of a majority of the real estate owners. The act of 1891 simply ‘ ‘authorized and empowered” the city council to issue bonds to an amount exceeding thelimit previously fixed, but did not require such issue, nor did it undertake to change the mode previously prescribed in which any debt could be contracted. There is nothing inconsistent in the two acts, so far as relates to the conditions upon which the corporation might contract a debt, except as to the limit of the amount of the debt; and to that extent, and that only, does the latter act operate a repeal of the former. As indicative of the intention of the legislature not to repeal the provisions of the charter of the city of Ander
Surely it cannot be contended that the recital in the preamble of the act of 1891, that a petition signed by a large majority of the taxpayers and real estate owners, desired the issue of the bonds, can supersede the necessity of an election expressly required by statute. In view of the facility with which petitions may be gotton up, it would be a dangerous doctrine to hold that such a paper would deprive the voters of their constitutional right to vote by ballot.
The third position taken by the respondent in his return, that the debt in question was not for a corporate purpose, while not distinctly abandoned, was not pressed in the argument, and, under the view which we have taken, cannot arise.
So, too, it is unnecessary to consider the question, whether the acts of the legislature and ordinances of the city temporarily exempting certain property within the corporate limits of the city from taxation, are in conflict with the Constitution, for, under our view, such question cannot arise, and hence it will not be considered.
We are of opinion, for reasons above stated, that the relators are not entitled to the writ of mandamus prayed for.
It is, therefore, the judgment of this court, that the petition be dismissed.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent, and will file a dissenting-opinion.