50 Mo. 353 | Mo. | 1872
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a petition for mandamus upon the State auditor to compel him to issue to the relator a warrant for a quarter’s salary alleged to be due the relator as judge of the Twenty-sixth, formerly Fifteenth, judicial circuit of this State. The facts of the case, as they appear from the record, are as follows: Under the law as it existed up to the 15th of March, 1872, the Fifteenth judicial circuit was composed of the counties of Iron, Reynolds, Washington and Jefferson. At the general election for judges, held in November, 1868, the relator was elected judge, and com
It will be seen from this statement that the question arising upon this record is whether the relator by this act was ousted from his office, or, if not ousted, whether he is not now the judge of the new Fifteenth circuit instead of the present Twenty-sixth circuit.
I suppose it will not be seriously contended that the Legislature has the power to expel a circuit judge from his office by a simple act of legislation. This office is created by the constitution, and as long as there is a circuit over which the judge may preside he is entitled to hold his office until the expiration of his term, if he behaves himself properly. Whether the Legislature, by abolishing his circuit, can also abolish his office, is a question not necessarily presented by this record. The weight of authority, however, seems to be that the abolition or alteration of the circuit does not abolish the office. The independence of the judiciary
Convenient circuits mean territorial districts, and not the names by which such districts may be called. The numbering of the districts or circuits is only a convenient mode of designating them. They might have been designated by giving them the names of distinguished persons or places, or in any other mode, so as to distinguish them apart from each other. The name or number of the circuit constitutes no essential part of it. The entity is the territory embraced within certain boundaries, and that remains the same whether the name or number be changed or -not. But when the number used in designating the circuit is also used in the commission issued to the judge, without inserting the boundaries of his circuit, he is thereby constituted judge of the territory which elected him. The simple change of the number designating his territory will not invalidate his commission as judge of that territory. He remains judge of the same territory notwithstanding the name or number of that territory is changed. It is urged,
The St. Louis circuit is designated in the commission of the St. Louis judges as the Eighth circuit, and the act of the Legislature designates the St. Louis circuit as the eighth in number. Now suppose the Legislature in a new act was to call if the tenthj and number the existing tenth as the eighth. Would the five judges in St. Louis have to emigrate to find their circuit, or could they still remain as the judges of that particular territory notwithstanding its number had been changed to the tenth? The absurdity of this carries its refutation on its very face, and yet there is no difference in numbering this circuit and numbering any of the others. The number in either case is only used as a convenient mode of distinguishing one from another.
Under this view the relator is entitled to his warrant. The return of the defendant is adjudged insufficient, and a peremptory mandamus granted.