Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment dismissing a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel a state agency to follow the law expressed in two of this court’s opinions.
{¶ 2} Under R.C. 4123.931(A), the payment of workers’ compensation benefits “creates a right of recovery in favor of a statutory subrogee against a third party, and the statutory subrogee is subrogated to the rights of a claimant against that third party.” The “statutory subrogee” is “the administrator of workers’ compensation, a self-insuring employer, or an employer that contracts for the direct payment of medical services.” R.C. 4123.93(B).
{¶ 3} Former R.C. 4123.931(A) specified: “A statutory subrogee’s subrogation interest includes * * * estimated future values of compensation and medical benefits arising out of an injury to or disability or disease of a claimant.” See 1995 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 278,146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3596.
{¶ 4} Former R.C. 4123.931(D) further provided:
{¶ 5} “The entire amount of any settlement or compromise of an action or claim is subject to the subrogation right of a statutory subrogee, regardless of the manner in which the settlement or compromise is characterized. Any settlement or compromise that excludes the amount of compensation or medical benefits shall not preclude a statutory subrogee from enforcing its rights under this section. The entire amount of any award or judgment is presumed to represent compensation and mediсal benefits and future estimated values of compensation and medical benefits that are subject to a statutory subrogee’s subrogation rights unless the claimant obtains a special verdict or jury interrogatories indicating that the award or judgment represents different types of damages.” Id. at 3596-3597.
{¶ 6} In June 2001, in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co. (2001),
{¶ 7} More specifically, we held: “By giving the subrogee a current collectible interеst in estimated future expenditures, [former] R.C. 4123.931(A) creates the conditions under which a prohibited taking may occur. This would happen in those situations where the amount of reimbursement for ‘estimated future values of compensation and medical benefits’ proves to be substantially greater than the
{¶ 8} In addition, we held:
{¶ 9} “[Former] R.C. 4123.931(D) establishes a procedural framework under which an unconstitutional taking of the claimant’s property or a denial of remedy by due course of law can occur. This frаmework distinguishes between third-party claims that are tried and third-party claims that are settled. In the case where an award or judgment is rendered in the third-party action, [former] R.C. 4123.931(D) allows the claimant to obtain jury interrogatories segregating damages that do not represent workers’ compensation or medical benefits and, therefore, are not subject to the reimbursement right of the statutory subrogee. In contrast, the entire amount of any settlement or compromise is deemed subject to the reimbursement right of the statutory subrogee, and the claimant is precluded, under any circumstances, from showing that his or her settlement or portions thereof do not represent or duplicate workers’ compensation or medical benefits.
{¶ 10} “ * * * [Former] R.C. 4123.931(D) operates unconstitutionally * * * because it allows for reimbursement from proceeds that do not constitute a double recovery.” Id.,
{¶ 11} In Holeton,
{¶ 12} “We hold * * * that [former] R.C. 4123.931 does violate Sections 2, 16, and 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. In so holding, we do not accept the proposition that a workers’ compensation subrogation statute is per se unconstitutional, and nothing in this opinion shall be construed to prevent the General Assembly from ever enacting such a statute. We hold only that [former] R.C. 4123.931, in its present form, is unconstitutional.”
{¶ 13} We also recognized that “virtually every jurisdiction provides some statutory mechanism enabling the employer or fund to recover its workers’ compensation outlay from a third-party tortfeasor.” Id. at 120,
{¶ 15} S.B. 227 repеaled the former provisions in R.C. 4123.931(A) and (D) that we had found unconstitutional in Holeton and set forth a new settlement procedure in which a claimant would receive “an amount equal to the uncompensated damages divided by the sum of the subrogation interest plus the uncompensated damages, multiplied by the net amount recovered.” R.C. 4123.931(B). The statutory subrogee would receive “an amount equal to the subrogation interest divided by the sum of the subrogation interest plus the uncompensated damages, multiplied by the net amount recovered.” Id. The claimant and statutory subrogee can instead agree to divide the net amount recovered on a more fair and reasonable basis. Id.
{¶ 16} In addition, S.B. 227 permits claimants to “establish an interest-bearing trust account for the full amount of the subrogation interest that represents estimated future payments of compensation, medical benefits, rehabilitation costs, оr death benefits, reduced to present value, from which the claimant shall make reimbursement payments to the statutory subrogee for the future payments of compensation, medical benefits, rehabilitation costs, or death benefits.” R.C. 4123.931(E)(1).
{¶ 17} The manifest objective of the General Assembly in enacting S.B. 227 was to comply with our holding in Holeton. See, generally, Legislative Service Commission, Bill Analysis of 2002 S.B. 227.
{¶ 18} On April 14, 2003, five days after S.B. 227 became effective, appellant аnd cross-appellee, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Region 2-B (“UAW”), filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County against the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and its administrator (collectively, “BWC”). UAW alleged that R.C. 4123.931 as amended by S.B. 227 contains provisions substantially identical to those in former R.C. 4123.931 found by the court to be unconstitutional in Holeton. UAW further alleged that R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931, as amended by S.B. 227, are invalid under the court’s holding in Glaspell v. Ohio Edison Co. (1987),
{¶ 19} UAW requested a writ of mandamus to compel BWC to “follow the law as set forth” in the court’s decisions in Holeton and Glaspell. UAW claimed that the BWC was bound to follow Holeton “notwithstanding the ill-fated attempt by the general assembly to act beyond their powers as conferred upon them by the constitution.” UAW did not allege any specific claim by it or any of its members that they had been harmed by the enactment of the present versions of R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931 in S.B. 227.
{¶ 21} In January 2004, a court of appeals magistrate recommended that the court either deny the writ or grant BWC’s dismissal motion. The magistrate concluded that although UAW had the requisite standing, it had not established that BWC had refused to comply with Holeton or Glaspell. The magistrate further concluded that insofar as UAW sought a holding that S.B. 227 is unconstitutional based on Holeton, it had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
{¶ 22} The parties filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. BWC asked that the court adopt the magistrate’s decision, “but clarify that UAW also lacks standing.”
{¶ 23} In February 2005, the court of appeals overruled UAW’s objections, held that BWC’s objections were moot, and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals determined that UAW’s allegations indicated that the real objects sought were a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction and that UAW had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through a common pleas court action for declaratory judgment. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s findings and conclusions with the exception of those regarding UAW’s standing to institute the mandamus action, which it held were moot.
{¶ 24} This cause is now before the court upon UAW’s appeal and BWC’s cross-appeal from the judgment of the court of appeals. UAW and BWC submitted briefs, and the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, the National Federation of Independent Business, the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, and the Ohio Self-Insurers Association filed an amicus curiae brief in support of BWC.
Oral Argument
{¶ 25} The parties request oral argument pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2). Oral argument is not required in this appeal as of right. S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(1). Instead, in these appeals, the decision whether to conduct oral argument lies within our discretion. See S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2)(A) (“In an original action, оr in an appeal that is not scheduled for oral argument pursuant to Section 1 of this rule, the Supreme Court may order oral argument on the merits either sua sponte or in response to a request by any party”).
{¶ 26} “ ‘Among the factors we consider in determining whether to grant oral argument in appeals in which oral argument is not required is whether the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue or a conflict between сourts of appeals.’ ” State ex*437 rel. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Zaleski,98 Ohio St.3d 395 ,2003-Ohio-1630 ,786 N.E.2d 39 , ¶ 5, quoting Clark v. Connor (1998),82 Ohio St.3d 309 , 311,695 N.E.2d 751 .
{¶ 27} UAW claims that the merit issues have statewide importance because they affect the administration of the workers’ compensation system and BWC’s disregard of the court’s binding decision in Holeton threatens our supreme authority under the Ohio Constitution. BWC contends that this case is important because it gives us the opportunity to reexamine our application of standing and mandamus jurisdiction based upon State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999),
{¶ 28} Despite the parties’ contentions, oral argument is not warranted here.
{¶ 29} First, although the underlying issue whether S.B. 227 is unconstitutional is an issue of importance concerning the subrogation provisions of the workers’ compensation law, this issue need not be resolved in this case, because other grounds are dispositive.
{¶ 30} Second, the BWC did not disregard Holeton. That case addressed a previous version of R.C. 4123.931 that is not at issue here.
{¶ 31} Third, we need not use this case to reexamine and limit or overrule our holdings on standing and mandamus jurisdiction in Ohio Academy and its progeny. Those cases are distinguishable.
{¶ 32} Fourth, the parties’ and amici briefs are sufficient to resolve the various legal issues raised, and there is no conflict between courts of appeals. See State ex rel. WBNS TV, Inc. v. Dues,
{¶ 33} Based on the foregoing, we deny the parties’ requests for oral argument and proceed to a consideration of this appeal and cross-appeal.
UAW Appeal: Compliance with Holeton and Glaspell
{¶ 34} UAW seeks a writ of mandamus to compel BWC to follow the court’s holdings in Holeton and Glaspell. In order to be entitled to thе writ, UAW must establish a clear legal right to the benefit of compliance with the holdings, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of BWC to comply, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Smith v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas,
{¶ 35} " Writs of mandamus and prohibition are appropriate to require lower courts to comply with and not proceed contrary to the mandate of a superior court.’ ” State ex rel. Frailey v. Wolfe (2001),
{¶ 37} Moreover, as the court of appeals concluded, BWC has not disregarded the holdings of this court in Holeton and Glaspell. In Holeton,
{¶ 38} Finally, a “ ‘writ of mandamus will not issue to compel the general observance of laws in the future.’ ” State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency,
{¶ 39} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err in dismissing UAW’s claims insofar as it sought extraordinary relief in mandamus to compel the BWC to comply with our holdings in Holeton and Glaspell.
UAW Appeal: Constitutionality of S.B. 227
{¶ 40} UAW alsо claims that R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931, as enacted by S.B. 227 following Holeton, are unconstitutional and that it is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the BWC to comply with Holeton.
{¶ 41} It is axiomatic that “if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999),
{¶ 42} Although the allegations of UAW’s complaint are couched in terms of compelling affirmative duties, i.e., to “follow the law” in Holeton and Glaspell, the manifest objectives of relator’s complaint are (1) a declaratory judgment that R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931, as amended by S.B. 227, are unconstitutional under this court’s holdings in Holeton and Glaspell and (2) a prohibitory injunction preventing the BWC from applying the amended statutory provisions. See, e.g., State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell,
{¶ 44} Nevertheless, we have at times permitted mandamus actions to test the constitutionality of legislation. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mill Creek Metro. Park Dist. Bd. of Commrs. v. Tablack (1999),
{¶ 45} UAW claims that notwithstanding the general authority precluding a mandamus action to challеnge the constitutionality of statutory provisions, mandamus is appropriate to contest the constitutionality of S.B. 227 based upon State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich (1994),
{¶ 46} UAW’s contentions lack merit. In Voinovich, Martin, United Auto, and Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., we never expressly considered the general jurisdictional preclusion concerning mandamus actions that are actually disguised actions for declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction, although dissenting opinions in United Auto and Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. would have applied this general rule to dismiss the mandamus
{¶ 47} Moreover, the mandamus actions in United Auto and Martin challenged administrative decisions instead of newly enacted legislation.
{¶ 48} Furthermore, in Ohio Academy,
{¶ 49} “We have expressed quite clearly in our preamble to this issue [at 467,
{¶ 50} Simply put, this case is not a rare and extraordinary ease in which the challenged legislation operates directly and broadly to divest courts of judicial power. S.B. 227 does not “transform[ ] the civil justice system” as did Am.Sub. H.B. No. 350, which was at issue in Ohio Academy. Id.,
{¶ 52} Unlike the relator in Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Assn., UAW does not allege any specific casе in which BWC has failed to comply with its alleged legal duty. In fact, as an administrative agency, BWC has a duty to abide by S.B. 227 because “[i]t is settled that an administrative agency is without jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of a statute.” State ex rel. Columbus S. Power Co. v. Sheward (1992),
{¶ 53} Therefore, in accordance with the general rule, the court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction over UAW’s mandamus claim because UAW’s real objectives were a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction. Neither a court of appeals nor this court has original jurisdiction over these latter claims. State ex rel. Mackey v. Blackwell,
UAW Appeal: Adequate Remedy
{¶ 54} The court of appeals also concluded that UAW had an adequate remedy at law, which precluded entitlement to the requested extraordinary writ. Mandamus will not issue if there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Ross v. State,
{¶ 55} UAW has an adequate remedy by a common pleas court action for declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction. As we unanimously held in Satow,
{¶ 56} “[I]f H.B. 329 is declared unconstitutional in a declaratory judgment action and a prohibitory injunction is issued against applying its provisions * * *, there will be no need for an extraordinary ancillary mandatory injunction ordering respondents to follow the preexisting * * * formula. In fact, before the challenged provisions were enacted, we already effectively ordered respondents to follow this alternate formula. * * * Presumably, respondents would abide by*442 the applicable law. And R.C. 2721.09 authorizes courts to grant further relief based upon a previously granted declaratory judgment ‘whenever necessary or proper.’ ”
{¶ 57} Similarly, if a common pleas court should find S.B. 227 unconstitutional and issue a prohibitory injunction preventing BWC from applying S.B. 227, there would be no need for a mandatory injunction that BWC not apply the predecessor statute, because it was found unconstitutional in Holeton. There is also no evidence that BWC would not comply with the law declared in Holeton.
{¶ 58} Therefore, these adequate legal remedies preclude UAW’s entitlement to the writ. This result is consistent with our rule that “[constitutional challenges to legislation are generally resolved in an action in a common pleas court rather than in an extraordinary writ action.” Rammage v. Saros,
BWC Cross-Appeal: Standing
{¶ 59} In its cross-appeal, BWC argues that the court of appeals should have also dismissed UAW’s complaint based on a lack of standing. BWC claims that under Civ.R. 53(E)(4)(b), the court of appeals had a duty to rule on its objections to the magistrate’s decision concerning standing. Id. (“The court shall rule on any objections”). The court of appeals determined that because of its dismissal, the standing issue was moot.
{¶ 60} We need not determine this issue, because any error did not prejudice BWC. It was entitled to dismissal of UAW’s mandamus claim on the previously discussed grounds. This conclusion “comports with our well-settled precedent that we will not indulge in advisory opinions.” State ex rel. White v. Kilbane Koch,
{¶ 61} Therefore, we hold that our disposition of UAW’s appeal renders BWC’s cross-appeal moot.
Conclusion
{¶ 62} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err in dismissing UAW’s complaint for extraordinary relief in mandamus, because the court lacked jurisdiction over claims that were actually claims for declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction and UAW has an adequate legal remedy by way of a common pleas court action to raise its claims. This holding renders moot BWC’s
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 63} I dissent because this case presents issues that merit oral argument. Although the granting of writs of mandamus and prohibition to determine the constitutionality of statutes is “ ‘limited to exceрtional circumstances that demand early resolution,’ ” issues regarding Ohio’s workers’ compensation system, due to its comprehensive reach and wide impact, have in the past been the focus of exceptional review. State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp.,