604 N.E.2d 1376 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1992
Petitioner, TRW, Inc. ("TRW"), is seeking either a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, the Honorable Harry Jaffe, to follow the mandate of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Russ v. TRW,Inc. (1991),
This action arose due to the following facts: Russ brought suit against TRW for, inter alia, promissory estoppel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraudulent misrepresentation. A jury awarded Russ $600,000 compensatory damages and $100,000 punitive damages in an undifferentiated verdict. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment in favor of Russ on his claims of fraud (with one judge dissenting) and intentional infliction of emotional distress, reversed the judgment on the promissory estoppel claim, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial on damages, since the damages attributable to the claim of promissory estoppel were not allocated separately. Russ v. TRW, Inc. (Aug. 21, 1989), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 54973 and 57215, unreported. The parties appealed.
In the Supreme Court, Justice Sweeney wrote an opinion in which Justices Douglas and Resnick concurred, Justice H. Brown concurred in part and dissented in part, and Chief Justice Moyer and Justices Holmes and Wright dissented. Russ v. TRW, Inc.
(1991),
On remand to the trial court, Russ filed a memorandum on damages. TRW responded and moved in limine to prohibit Russ from introducing evidence of damages on his fraud claim, arguing that a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that Russ had not sustained his claim of fraud. The trial court denied TRW's motion, and TRW sought relief in mandamus/prohibition in this court.
In order for a writ of prohibition to be issued, a petitioner must establish that (1) the court or officer against whom the writ is sought is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and (3) the refusal of the writ would result in injury for which there exists no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.State ex rel. McKee v. Cooper (1974),
The first requirement for issuance of a permanent writ of prohibition, which is not in dispute, is satisfied, since respondent is about to exercise judicial power in retrying the damages portion of the Russ litigation. TRW must now show that the exercise of this power is unauthorized by law.
TRW posits that respondent is exceeding the scope of his authority and jurisdiction in retrying the issue of fraud damages because four of the seven Justices of the Supreme Court concluded that Russ had not sustained his claim of fraud. TRW contends that the opinion of the remaining three Justices cannot control on the fraud claim because the Ohio Constitution provides that a majority of the Supreme Court are necessary to render a judgment. Respondent and intervenor counter that the power to retry the issue of fraud damages is derived from the judgment and mandate of the Supreme Court, which stated that the judgment of this court was affirmed, not reversed. Respondent believes it is not his function to interpret multiple opinions of the Supreme Court, and intervenor argues that it is the judgment of a court that controls and not the various opinions of the justices.
Intervenor is correct that it is the judgment of a court that is controlling. See Squire v. Guardian Trust Co. (1944),
A judgment of the Supreme Court can only be that decision which is rendered by a majority of its Justices. Section
A thorough review of the opinion of the court discloses that all of the Justices agreed that a retrial on damages for the claim of promissory estoppel was barred. Two different majorities appear, however, for the remaining claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud, with Justice H. Brown writing the pivotal opinion. Four Justices (Justices Sweeney, Douglas, Resnick and H. Brown) voted to affirm the finding of intentional distress, and four Justices (Chief Justice Moyer and Justices H. Brown, Wright and Holmes) wrote to reverse liability for fraud. While Justice H. Brown concurred with the remand for a retrial on the emotional distress damages, which gave the court a majority on this issue, he dissented on the fraud claim.
Intervenor contends that even if the Justices' opinions are significant, a majority of the court found in his favor on the fraud claim because Justice H. Brown, in the opening paragraph of his concurring and dissenting opinion, agreed with Part IV of Justice Sweeney's opinion that remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages for "the surviving claims of fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress." Russ,
Intervenor suggests that we surmise from the denial of the motion for rehearing that the Supreme Court rejected TRW's interpretation of the judgment. The Supreme Court denied TRW's motion without comment, and it would be pure speculation on our part to supply the reasons for the court's denial. See (1991),
The order issued upon the judgment and in conformity therewith is the mandate. S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2). A trial court hearing a case on remand has no authority, absent extraordinary circumstances (which are not claimed here), to deviate from the mandate of the superior court. Nolan v. Nolan (1984),
Accordingly, the Honorable Harry Jaffe is hereby prohibited from conducting a new trial which includes the issue of damages for fraud in Russ v. TRW, Inc., Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas case No. 85-088191.
Writ to issue. Costs to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, P.J., JOHN F. CORRIGAN and HARPER, JJ., concur. *416