i. dbamsiioi? licenses: police power: taxing power. The State has the right, in the exercise of its police power, to prohibit the salе of intoxicating liquors without a license. Austin v. State, 10 Mo. 591; State v. Lemp 16 Mo. 389; State v. Searcy, 20 Mo. 489. The license fee exacted by the general law regulating dramshops and the act amendatory thereof, approvеd March 24th, 1883, is not a tax within the meaning of sections 1, 3 and 10 of article 10 of the constitution, but is a price paid for the privilege of doing a thing, the doing of which the legislature has а right to prohibit altogether. Such laws are regarded “ as police regulations, established by the legislature for the prevention of intern*305perance, pauperism and crime, and for the abatement of nuisances,” and are not regarded as аn exercise of the taxing power. “ Pursuits that are pernicious or detrimental to рublic morals may be prohibited altogether, or licensed for a compensation to the public.” Cooley on Const. Lim., (4 Ed.) p. 727; Burch v. Mayor, etc., 42 Ga. 598; Bohler v. Schneider, 49 Ga. 195; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43; People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 554; East St. Louis v. Trustees of Schools, 102 Ill. 489 ; s. c., 40 Am. Rep. 606; and cases cited; Henry v. State, 26 Ark. 523; loc. cit. 525. It does not follow because the license fee is large, or because it may become a part of the public revenue that it is, therefore, a tax. State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St. 225. Many fines, penalties and forfeitures become a part of the public revenue of the State that are not derived from taxаtion. The disposition made of the fund derived from the license fees does not neсessarily determine the character of such fees. The legislature were evidently of opinion that the taxation of a large license fee would tend to diminish the numbеr of saloons and improve the character of those licensed, and therеby secure to a greater degree compliance with all the regulations аnd restrictions which the law has thrown about such resorts. "We are of opinion, therefore, that the act of March 24th, 1883, is not unconstitutional.
2._. clty of st> Louis-We are further of the opinion that section 5441, as amended by the act of March 24th, 1883, is applicable to the city оf St. Louis. It was said by the court in the case of the State ex rel. Attorney General v. McKee, 69 Mo. 508, decided at the April term, 1879, that a genеral law with reference to the counties of the State would not apply to the city of St. Louis. But it is provided by section 3126 of the Revised Statutes, which took effect in Novеmber, 1879, that “whenever the word ‘ county ’ is used in any law general in its character to the whole State, the same shall be construed to include the city of St. Louis, unless such construction be inconsistent with the evident intent of such law, or of some law specially *306applicable to such city.” We think it was the obvious purpose of the act of March 24th, 1883, to increase the license fee for the sale of intoxicating liquors throughout the State, and it is not, therefore, inconsistent with the evident intent of the act to declare it applicable to the city pf St. Louis. Nor is such construction inconsistent with any law specially applicable to the city of St. Louis. The only law on that subject applicable to the city of St. Louis is its charter, which authorizes it to license, tax, rеgulate or suppress saloons, beer houses, tippling houses, dramshops, etc., but the charter does not fix the amount of the license fee to be required, and the lаw in question, which limits the amount thereof, is, therefore, not in conflict with the charter, but is cоnsistent with and supplementary thereto. It follows that the ordinance passed in pursuаnce of the charter fixing the amount of the license fee at $60 is repealed by the act of 1883, which prescribes a limitation as to the amount to be charged in сonflict with said ordinance.
s.-. We are further of opinion that under the act of 1883 it is the duty оf the municipal assembly of the city of St. Louis, and of the county courts of the severаl counties in this State to fix the amount of license fee to be charged under said аct within the limits prescribed, and until such action is taken by said municipal assembly, and said cоunty courts, no collector has a right to issue a license to any person as a dramshop keeper. As it does not appear from the agreed statemеnt on which this 'cause has been submitted, that the municipal assembly has ever fixed the amount of license fee to be charged in the city of St. Louis, the collector has no right to issue a license, and the peremptory writ of mandamus will, therefore, be refused.
Judges Norton and Sherwood did not sit, being absent.
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