70 Wis. 543 | Wis. | 1888
The learned counsel for the appellant claims that the allegations in the return clearly shoy that the adjourned town meeting mentioned in the relator’s petition, as well as the special town meeting therein mentioned and referred td, were not lawful town meetings, and so show that the relator, the town of Rochester, was not placed in a position to call upon the respondent to act under the provisions of said ch. 187, Laws of 1885. He also claims that the seventh paragraph of the return is a full defense to the writ, because it shows that the county board as such has no power to appropriate any money for the purpose mentioned in said writ. The substance of said ch. 187, Laws 'of 1885, is stated in the opinion in the case of State ex rel. Baraboo v. Sauk Co., ante, p. 485 (filed at the same time as this opinion), and need not here be restated at length.
Assuming that it was not necessary for the electors of the town of Rochester to vote by ballot upon the question of the necessity of building the bridge in question, or upon the question of raising the money for that purpose by a tax upon the taxable property of the town, or upon the question whether the town would call upon the county board of supervisors of the county of Racine to aid in the construction of such bridge, or upon the question of directing the
The allegations in the return upon which the illegality of said adjourned and special town meetings are predicated, are that they were not called to order in the one case until the afternoon, and in the other until 1:30 p. m. ; and that the meetings adjourned within an hour after the resolutions passed at such meetings were adopted. There is no allegation that the adjourned meeting was not adjourned to the time when the same was convened in the afternoon, nor that the special meeting was not called to be held at 1:30 p. m. of the day on which the same was held, or that the special meeting was not properly called as prescribed by law.
There is nothing in the return which shows that the adjourned and special town meetings were not properly called and fairly conducted; and if the electors had the power to vote the tax, and transact the other business transacted at such meetings, without voting by ballot, then the county board can have no reason to complain. See State ex rel. Bruce v. Davidson, 32 Wis. 120, and the cases there cited.
It is contended bjr the learned counsel for the relator that when a petition is presented and filed by the town board of supervisors of any town setting forth the fact that said town has voted to construct or repair any bridge or bridges wholly or partly within such town, designating the location of such bridge or bridges, and stating that such town has provided for the payment of one half of the cost of such construction or repairs, and that the cost of said bridge or bridges or repairs exceeds one fourth of one per centum of all the taxable property in said town according to the last equalized valuation, the county board must make the appropriation' required by the statute; that the county board cannot go behind the petition and attack the legality of the proceedings on the part of the town or contest the necessity for building or repairing the bridge or bridges or the cost thereof. In this case there is no necessity for passing upon this question, as we hold that the proceedings of the town were regular and legal, and the county board admits the duty of the town to construct the bridge in
The learned counsel for the appellant relies mainly upon the seventh paragraph of the return as a full defense to the writ. It is claimed that neither the town nor the county has anjr power to appropriate money for the construction of the bridge in question until the question of levying a tax for that purpose has been first submitted to the electors of the town and county in the manner prescribed by sec. 1321, R. S., and that consequently the county board has no power to make the appropriation or to levy the tax as required by said writ of mandamus. This contention is based upon the fact that said paragraph alleges that, at the place where the bridge is proposed to be built over the Fox river, such river is a meandered stream within the meaning of sec. 1320, R. S.; and that under the provisions of said secs. 1320, 1321, R. S., no money can be appropriated by either the town or county board for such purpose until such appropri
In order to give a reasonable construction to these sections, and one which shall to some extent harmonize with the other provisions of law upon the subject of the construction, repair, and rebuilding of bridges, it will be necessary to look to the origin of the provisions, and, as near as we can, get at the intention of the legislature in enacting them. The substance of these sections was first enacted as a law of- the state by ch. 229, Laws of 1874. The act is entitled “An act to authorize counties, towns, cities, and villages to levy a tax for the building and aiding in building and construction of bridges in certain cases, and to issue bonds in aid thereof.” The only material difference between this act and the present provisions in secs. 1320,1321, R. S., is that the law of' 1874 authorized a tax of two per centum to be levied, or bonds for that amount to be issued; a,nd sec. 1320, R. S., limits the power to levy a tax for five mills on the dollar valuation, or to issue bonds for such purpose to the amount of two per centum of the valuation. The limitation of the tax to five mills on the valuation was made by sec. 2, ch. 252, Laws olf 1877; and the law of 1874, as amended by sec. 2, ch. 252, Laws of 1877, was transferred to the Revised Statutes of 1878 as secs. 1320, 1321.
At the time of the passage of ch. 229, Laws of 1874, the county board had authority, without any vote of the electors, to levy a tax not exceeding $15,000 on the taxable property of the county, as a special county road tax, to be
The above-mentioned provisions of law in regard to the powers of towns and counties to appropriate money and levy taxes for the building and repair of bridges were none of them expressly repealed by said ch. 229, Laws of 1874, or by any amendment made thereto since its enactment; and all said provisions of law were substantially re-enacted in R. S. 1878, except sec. 113, ch. 19, R. S. 1858, as amended by sec. 1, ch. 63, Laws 1867. See subd. 1, sec. 776, as to the power of towns to vote taxes at town meetings for building and repairing roads and bridges, and sec. 1318, as to the authorit}»' of the supervisors to raise money for the rebuilding or repairing bridges; also sec. 1225, R. S., of the power of the supervisors to appropriate money raised for highway purposes for the repair of bridges in the town; sec. 1.108, of the power of the count y to levy taxes to keep in repair certain highways; and sec. 1319, of the power of the county board to raise taxes for the purpose of building or repairing in any town when the board shall think a bridge in any town necessary. Sec. 1320, R. S., is amended by sec. 3, ch. 345, Laws of 1885, so as to authorize two adjoining towns to unite in building or maintaining, or aiding in the building or maintaining, a bridge across a navigable or meandered stream, in the same manner that a town, county, or city was authorized to do by the original act of 1874.
This law of 1874 should be construed so as to harmonize with the other laws then in force. It contains no repealing clause, and the legislature evidently considered that it did not conflict with the other laws in force upon the same subject. It was a law which was intended to confer a power
That the town of Rochester had the power to maintain and rebuild the bridge in question is clear from facts alleged in the petition for the writ of mandamus, and is as clearly admitted by the return to the writ by the respondent. The allegation in the petition for the writ is, after describing the point where the bridge is proposed to be built, “ that said town has a large amount of travel, and numerous diverging roads leading to it; that the bridge crossing the river at that point is a public necessity,, and has been from early times.” At another place it is alleged that the town had built in the same place an iron bridge in 1877, which had been swept away by a flood in 1881. The return of the respondent admits “ the location of the bridge, also the destruction of the bridges heretofore built at such place, and the necessity of rebuilding the same.” We must infer from these statements of the relator, the return of the respondent, and the fact that this bridge has been in existence
Giving the construction to the act contended for by the appellant, no town, county, city, or village could expend a dollar to repair or rebuild or construct a bridge over a navigable or meandered stream or river without first submitting the question of such expenditure to a vote of the electors of the municipality, and a vote by ballot taken upon the question of such expenditure. It does not seem to us that such could have been the intention of the legislature. The same construction must be given to the act as re-enacted in the Revised Statutes that would have been given to it before it was embraced in such statutes and while it remained a separate and independent chapter of the law. See State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Messmore, 14 Wis. 177; Buckstaff v. Hanville, 14 Wis. 77, 78. We think it clear that the act of 1874 does not restrict the county, town, city, or village from rebuilding or repairing a bridge which the county, town, city, or village had legal authority to rebuild or repair previous to the enactment of ch. 229, Laws of 1874, and therefore is no bar to this proceeding on the part of the relator.
Whether the general, and apparently absolute, power
By the Court.— The order of the circuit court appealed from is affirmed, and the case is remitted to the circuit court for further proceedings.