State ex rel. T.C.
hThe Defendant, T.C., appeals the judgment of the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Orleans, adjudicating him delinquent of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. For the reasons set fоrth below, we affirm the adjudication.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
On July 21, 2008, T.C. was charged by delinquency petition with violating one count of La. R.S. 14:68.4, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. An adjudication hearing was held on September 14, 2009. At the conclusion of the hearing, T.C. was found to be delinquent for the crime of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. A disposition hearing was held whеrein T.C. was committed to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections for a period of six months. The trial court suspended the six-month commitment and placed T.C. оn inactive probation for six months.
At the adjudication hearing, Officer Ti-wana Alexander testified that on July 4, 2008, at approximately 11:00 a.m., she observed a vehicle, with a Tеxas license plate, traveling in the 1000 block of Bien-ville Street. The Officer noted the brake tag and registration tag on the vehicle’s windshield had expired. She eleсted to stop the vehicle for traffic violations. She then approached the driver’s side of the | ¡vehicle and asked T.C. for identification. She stated that T.C. did not hаve identification on him, but willingly gave his name, date of birth, social security number, and address. Officer Alexander testified that T.C. told her that he got the car and the keys from his cousin, Torey C. After determining that the vehicle had been reported stolen, Officer Alexander arrested T.C.
Ms. Lucinda Lawson, the owner of the vehicle, testified that on July 4, 2008, she reрorted her 2001 Chevrolet Malibu, bearing Texas license plate No. T73SBR, missing. Ms. Lawson informed the investigating officer that she believed her husband’s cousin, Torey C., may have taken the car and the keys. Ms. Lawson also testified that she did not observe anyone take her vehicle. According to Ms. Lawson, she
On appeal, T.C. contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
In order to adjudicate a child delinquent, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the delinquent act alleged in the petition. La. Ch. C. art. 883. The standard for the State’s burden of proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is “no less strenuous then the standard of proof required in a criminal proceeding against an аdult.” State in the Interest of G.M., (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/14/93),
|sIn еvaluating the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
In addition, La. Const, art. V, § 10(B) mandates that an appellate court review both law and facts when reviewing juvenile adjudications. Therefоre, as in the review of civil eases, a factual finding made by a trial court in a juvenile adjudication may not be disturbed by an appellate court unless the recоrd evidence as a whole does not furnish a basis for it, or it is clearly wrong. See State in the Interest of Batiste,
LAW AND ANALYSIS:
La. R.S. 14:68.4(A) defines unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as “the intentional taking or use of a motor vehicle which belongs to another, either without the other’s consent, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations, but without any intention to deprive the other of the motor vehicle permanently.”
LThe Louisiana Supreme Court has expressly construed unauthorized use of a movable as “requiring a showing of mens rea or criminal intent....” State v. Bias,
In the Interest of H.N., L.C., T.B.,
In State in Interest of O.B.,
Recently, in State in the Interest of C.B.,
Above we noted related jurisprudence that involved juvenile unauthorized use of motor vehicle. In those cases this Court has consistently considered such circumstances as indicative of a defendant’s lack of knowledge that the vehicle in question had beеn stolen.
In contrast to the above cases, in the present case, T.C. is the driver of the stolen vehicle, not an unwitting passenger.
The only two witnesses at trial were Offiсer Tiwana Alexander and Ms. Lucinda Lawson. The crux of their testimonies is stated above. Through the uncontrovert-ed testimony of both of these State witnesses, the State рroved that T.C. was driving Ms. Lawson’s Chevy Malibu without her permission. T.C.’s argument that the vehicle was undamaged, a key was in the ignition and that he thought the vehicle belonged to his cousin Torey C. is of no moment in the establishment of the requisite mens rea.
When Officer Alexander stopped the vehicle with a Texas license plate and an expired registration and brаke tag visible on the windshield, T.C. was unable to produce any form of identification or ownership of the vehicle. He orally provided his name, social security number and date of birth.
Ms. Lawson testified that she owned the vehicle, reported it stolen and did not know T.C. nor did she give him permission to drive her vehicle. The fact that she testified that her husband may have given the keys to Torey C. or that there was a possibility that Torey C. had taken the keys, when examining the record as a whole goes to credibility.
|fiThe trier of fact, in this case, the juvenile court, is charged with making credibility determinations. Credibility determinations, as well as the weight to be attributed to the evidence, are soundly within the рrovince of the fact finder. State v. Brumfield,
In finding T.C. guilty as charged, the juvenile court clearly accepted the testimony of the two State’s witnesses and the
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court adjudicating T.C. delinquent.
AFFIRMED.