¶ 1. In this habeas corpus action, Walter G. Szymanski, an inmate of the Wisconsin state prisons, argues that he is entitled to early releasе on parole because the parole commission has waived the minimum service of sentence requirements pursuant tо WlS. Stat. § 304.06(lm)(a) (1999-2000). 1 Like the trial court, we reject Szymanski's argument. We hold that § 304.06, read as a whole, provides that an inmate is entitled to early parole eligibility, not immediate release on parole, when the commission determines to waive the minimum service requirements. We affirm the order denying Szymanski's request for habeas relief.
*275 WISCONSIN STAT. §304.06AND THE FACTS
¶ 2. Wisconsin Stat. § 304.06(l)(b) provides, in part, that "the parole commission may рarole an inmate of the Wisconsin state prisons . . . when he or she has served 25% of the sentence imposed for the offense, or 6 months, whichever is greater." Paragraph (lm)(a) of the statute states:
The parole commission may waive the 25% or 6-month serviсe of sentence requirement under sub. (l)(b) under any of the following circumstances:
(a) If it determines that extraordinary circumstancеs warrant an early release and the sentencing court has been notified and permitted to comment upon the proposed recommendation.
¶ 3. The facts are not in dispute. In October 1986, Szymanski was convicted in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court of six counts of second-degree sexual assault. He was sentenced to forty-two years in prison by Judge John E. McCormick. On February 18, 1992, John Husz, the Chairрerson of the Wisconsin Parole Commission, notified Judge McCormick that the parole commission intended to waive the 25% servicе of sentence requirement pursuant to WlS. Stat. § 304.06(lm). The letter explained that the proposed waiver would make Szymanski eligible fоr sex offender and alcohol and drug treatment programs.
¶ 4. The record does not reflect any response from Judge McCormick and, in due course, the parole commission waived the minimum service requirements and changed Szymanski's parole eligibility datе to March 17, 1992. Since then, Szymanski has been considered for parole approximately eight times. Most recently, in December 1999, the commission denied *276 Szymanski parole and deferred further parole consideration for two years.
¶ 5. Szymanski responded with thе instant habeas corpus action. He argued that since the commission had found extraordinary circumstances warranting his early release pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 304.06(lm), he was entitled to release on parole. The trial court concluded that the commissiоn's determination rendered Szymanski eligible for early parole consideration, but did not entitle him to immediate release on рarole. Szymanski appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Habeas Corpus
¶ 6. The State contends Szymanski sought the wrong remedy by pursuing habeas corpus relief. The State notеs that habeas relief is not available where other adequate remedies, such as common law certio-rari, exist.
Seе State ex rel. Dowe v. Circuit Court for Waukesha County,
¶ 7. We have no quarrel with the State's recital of the law, but it misses the point of Szymanski's argument. Szymanski is not challenging the commission's denial of parole and he does not seek review of the commission's latest decision in that regard. Rather, Szymanski contends that he is illegally restrained because the commission has found extraordinary circumstances and waived the minimum service requirement pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 304.06(lm). As *277 such, Szymanski reasons that the statute entitles him to immediate release on parole.
¶ 8. Hаbeas corpus is the proper remedy in the face of such a claim. "[The function of habeas corpus] is to protеct and vindicate a person's right of personal liberty by freeing him from illegal restraint."
J.V. v. Barron,
2. Wisconsin Stat. § 304.06
¶ 9. The issue is one of statutory construction. The objective of statutory interpretation is to discern and give effect to the intent of the legislature. To do so, we look first to the plain language of the statute. "When the statutory language clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, we may not look beyond the language to determine its meaning."
County of Jefferson v. Benz,
¶ 10. Wisconsin Stat. § 304.06 establishes the following procedure in an early parole setting. Before the commission can decide to waive the minimum service requirement of para. (1)(b), it must first determine that "extraordinary circumstances warrant an early release." Sec. 304.06(1m)(a). However, even if the commission finds such extraordinary circumstanсes, the waiver of the minimum service requirement is still dis *278 cretionary with the commission. "The parole commission may waive the [minimum service requirement] . . . [ijf it determines that extraordinary circumstances wаrrant an early release. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
¶ 11. The question on appeal is whether a parole hearing is necessary where the cоmmission has found extraordinary circumstances and waived the minimum service requirement pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1m). Szymanski contends that this subsection wаs designed to supersede discretionary parole in extraordinary circumstances. We disagree. This subsection simply permits thе commission to waive the minimum service requirement if certain conditions are met. Such a determination removes the parоle eligibility conditions which would otherwise apply under para. (1)(b), but it does not eliminate, either expressly or implicitly, the necessity for a parole hearing. While the grant of parole might logically follow from a determination of extraordinary circumstances in most cases, the statute does not inexorably dictate that result.
¶ 12. Szymanski1 s literal interpretation of the "extraordinary circumstances/early release" provisions of Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1m)(a) does not comport with the statutory procedure created by the legislature. Moreover, Szymanski's interpretation is unreasonable because it precludes the next two decision-making lеvels of the inquiry: (1) whether the minimum service requirement should be waived, and, if so, (2) whether the inmate should be granted parole. "A literal reading of a statute may be rejected it if would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result that does not reflect the
*279
legislature's intent."
Logterman v. Dawson,
CONCLUSION
¶ 13. We hold that Szymаnski has properly sought habeas corpus relief as his remedy in this case. However, reading WlS. STAT. § 304.06 reasonably and in its entirety, we hold that Szymanski is not entitled to early release on parole pursuant to para. (lm)(a).
By the Court. — Order affirmed.
Notes
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 version.