710 N.E.2d 290 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1998
Lead Opinion
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *239
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *240 The present case is a consolidated appeal from the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. In Summit Court of Appeals case No. 18330, Strategic Capital Investors, Ltd. ("SCI") appeals from the denial of a writ of mandamus. In Summit Court of Appeals case No. 18627, SCI and the Heritage Woods Neighbors Association ("Heritage Neighbors") present cross-appeals from a separate declaratory judgment action.
At some point thereafter, SCI, a limited liability company, obtained an option to purchase the Allotment from the Stiles. The option agreement gave SCI the right to consolidate the existing lots on the Allotment, as shown on the 1994 plat, and vacate Heritage Center Drive.
In early 1996, SCI presented a vacation and consolidation plat of the Allotment to the Summit County Planning Commission. The new plat called for Heritage Center Drive to be vacated and for all lots to be consolidated. On February 23, 1996, the planning commission approved the new plat; the Summit County Engineer approved the new plat in June 1996. However, a question arose as to whether the approval of the Summit County Council was required before the new plat could be accepted for recordation, so SCI requested that the Summit County Executive prepare legislation to allow approval of the new plat.
At two times during the process, the Summit County Prosecuting Attorney issued an opinion on the matter. The first opinion, issued on February 22, 1996, concluded that Heritage Center Drive could not be vacated by the recording of the new plat approved by the Summit County Planning Commission under R.C.
The legislation that SCI had requested was submitted to the Summit County Council, but it was sent to committee and later withdrawn. Some time thereafter, the county council introduced an ordinance for a viewing of Heritage Center Drive and a public hearing on the matter, apparently in accordance with the procedures required by R.C.
On September 24, 1996, Heritage Neighbors moved to intervene and for the alternative writ to be vacated. SCI responded in opposition. On October 18, 1996, the trial court granted Heritage Neighbors' motion to intervene and vacated the alternative writ.
After, the trial court vacated the alternative writ, SCI and Heritage Neighbors made cross-motions for summary judgment. Ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed SCI's petition for a writ of mandamus on January 15, 1997. SCI filed its notice of appeal to this court on January 31, 1997.
On April 10, 1997, Heritage Neighbors again moved to intervene, and SCI again opposed the motion. Heritage Neighbors then also moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted Heritage Neighbors' motion to intervene on June 13, 1997.
On July 3, 1997, the trial court issued its decision on the cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted SCI's motion on count one of its complaint, declaring that R.C.
On July 11, 1997, Heritage Neighbors filed its notice of appeal. SCI cross-appealed on August 1, 1997. Summit County, the county auditor, and the county recorder did not appeal.
Heritage Neighbors' first assignment of error delves into the heart of the parties' dispute. SCI argues, and the trial court agreed, that R.C.
Pursuant to Civ.R. 56 (C), summary judgment is proper if:
"(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party." Temple v. Wean United Inc. (1977),
Appellate review of a lower court's entry of summary judgment is de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court.McKay v. Cutlip (1992),
R.C. Chapter 711 deals with the recordation of plats. If the plat involves lands outside a municipal corporation, it may not be recorded without the approval of the board of county commissioners,3 unless the plat must be approved by a planning commission. R.C.
R.C.
"Any person owning, either jointly or severally, and either in his own right or in trust, and having the legal title to any land laid out in town lots, not within the limits or subject to the control of a municipal corporation, may change such lots and the streets and alleys bounding them by making, acknowledging, and having recorded, as provided in sections
Therefore, if a county planning commission exists, only the consent of the planning commission is required to record a plat changing town lots and the streets bounding those lots.
R.C. Chapter 711 also speaks to the dedication of public roads. If a plat dedicates streets or roads to the public, the board of county commissioners must separately accept the street or road before dedication takes place. R.C.
We contrast the preceding statutes with R.C. Chapter 5553, dealing with the establishment, alteration, and vacation of roads. R.C.
"The board of county commissioners may locate, establish, alter, widen, straighten, vacate, or change the direction of roads as provided in sections
The board of county commissioners may vacate a public road if the board "is of the opinion that it will be for the public convenience or welfare." R.C.
R.C. Chapter 5553 also speaks to dedication of roads. R.C.
"Any person may, with the approval of the board of county commissioners, dedicate lands for road purposes. A definite description of the lands to be dedicated with a plat of such lands thereto attached and signed by the party dedicating such lands, with the approval and acceptance of the board indorsed thereon, shall be placed upon the proper road records of the county in which such road is situated."
Thus, this section is in agreement with R.C.
The parties have asserted that a conflict exists between these two sets of statutes as they apply to the facts of the instant case. In the case at bar, SCI is, for purposes of our analysis, the landowner of all the lots bounding Heritage Center Drive. SCI contends that under R.C.
We hold that R.C.
Clagg v. Baycliffs Corp. (Mar. 7, 1997), Ottawa App. No. OT-96-023, unreported, 1997 WL 103843, appeal allowed (1997),
The trial court erred in holding that SCI could vacate Heritage Center Road through R.C.
Heritage Neighbors' second assignment of error asserts that case No. 18627 is barred by res judicata. We disagree.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, "[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action." Grava v. Parkman Twp.
(1995),
In addition, case No. 18330 did not definitively answer the question before us in case No. 18627: whether R.C.
In its first cross-assignment of error, SCI contends that the trial court improperly allowed Heritage Neighbors to intervene under Civ.R. 24. We disagree.
We review a trial court's determination of a motion to intervene under an abuse-of-discretion standard. In re Stapler
(1995),
Civ.R. 24 allows a party to intervene in two circumstances: intervention of right under Civ.R. 24 (A), and permissive intervention under Civ.R. 24 (B). Civ.R. 24 states:
"(A) Intervention of right.
"Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action * * * (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
"(B) Permssive intervention.
"Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action * * * (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. * * * In exercising its discretion the court *248 shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."
In addition, Civ.R. 24 is given a liberal construction in favor of intervention. State ex rel. Smith v. Frost (1995),
Upon reviewing the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Heritage Neighbors to intervene. Though the trial court did not specify whether the intervention was permissive or of right, its decision was not unreasonable or arbitrary.7 Heritage Neighbors has an interest in the Heritage Center transaction that bears protection.
SCL also argues that Heritage Neighbors lacks standing to participate in this action. Specifically, SCI attacks Heritage Neighbors's claim to status as a real party in interest under Civ.R. 17 (A). SCI's contention lacks merit.
Civ.R. 17 (A) states that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." This refers to who may sue, not who may be sued. Heritage Neighbors is not prosecuting this action, but is a defendant. Under R.C.
The trial court did not err by permitting Heritage Neighbors to intervene. SC I's first cross-assignment of error is overruled.
SCI's second cross-assignment of error asserts that the trial court improperly dismissed the three remaining counts of SCI's complaint when SCI sought summary judgment on only one of those counts. We agree.
Upon granting summary judgment in favor of SCI, the. trial court thereafter dismissed the remainder of SCI's complaint with prejudice. The remaining counts sought declarations that Heritage, Center Drive is not a public road, that the Summit County Council's approval was not required for SCI to be able to file the new plat vacating Heritage Center Drive, and that the Summit *249 County Council did not consider the proper factors in rejecting the ordinance that would have vacated Heritage Center Drive. Presumably, the trial court dismissed them as moot, having granted the relief that SCI sought. However, this was improper. SCI's motion for summary judgment extended only to the first count of the complaint. If the trial court was granting summary judgment in favor of Heritage Neighbors on those other counts, it should have stated so. Those other counts remain to be decided.8 SCI's second cross-assignment of error is sustained.
In case No. 18627, Heritage Neighbors' first assignment of error is sustained. Heritage Neighbors' second assignment of error is overruled. SCI's first cross-assignment of error is overruled. SCI's second cross-assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment accordingly.
DICKINSON, J., concurs.
SLABY, P.J., concurs in judgment only.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the foregoing opinion. I write separately only to emphasize that the question of whether Heritage Center Drive was publicly dedicated remains to be decided on remand.
Concurrence Opinion
Two questions appear to have been presented to the trial court in the declaratory judgment complaint. First, the trial court was asked whether the county auditor had to accept and record the new plat. Second, the trial court was asked to determine the right of SCI (the developer) to vacate (tear up) the public road. *250
In terms of the first question, whether the county auditor had to accept and record the new plat, the question is barred by the doctrine of yes judicata. Under Ohio law, an existing final judgment or decree between the parties to litigation is conclusive as to all claims which were or might have been litigated in a first lawsuit. Natl. Amusements, Inc. v.Springdale (1990),
"`[W]here a party is called upon to make good his cause of action * * *, he must do so by all the proper means within his control, and if he fails in that respect * * *, he will not afterward be permitted to deny the correctness of the determination, nor to relitigate the same matters between the same parties.'" Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale,
SCI filed for a writ of mandamus asking the trial court to force the county auditor to accept and to record the new plat. The trial court refused to order the auditor to take such action. Because the trial court denied the writ of mandamus, SCI is barred by res judicata from having the trial court address the issue in the declaratory judgment.
In terms of the second question, which asked the trial court to determine the right of SCI (the developer) to vacate (tear up) the public road, such a determination would be an advisory opinion. In order to obtain a declaratory judgment as an alternative to other remedies, three elements must be established: "(1) that a real controversy between adverse parties exists; (2) which is justiciable in character; (3) and that speedy relief is necessary to the preservation of rights which may be otherwise impaired or lost." Fairview Gen. Hosp. v.Fletcher (1992),
"The law is well settled that Ohio statutes providing a remedy in declaratory judgments do not authorize advisory opinions.Armco, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1982),
The trial court provided that "[t]he main issue in which [sic] this court must decide is whether or not Plaintiff could vacate Heritage Centre Drive according to O.R.C.
"In considering the language of O.R.C.
Essentially, the trial court was asked to determine which statute would be applied for the vacation of a roadway. Thus, no genuine controversy between parties with adverse legal interests existed.
I would reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a dismissal because (1) the first question is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and (2) the second question should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.