43 Wash. 501 | Wash. | 1906
Between January 1 and May 2, 1893, the city of South Bend, a city of the third class, caused certain warrants to be issued on its- general fund. These warrants-were issued for necessary current expenses of the city, and aggregated the sum of $553.05. They were
The only question presented on this appeal is whether the warrants bear interest It is contended by the appellant that
Ҥ 2795. The legal rate of interest shall be ten per centum per annum.
“§ 2796. Any rat© of interest agreed upon by parties to a "contract, specifying the same in writing, shall be valid and legal.”
Appellant insists that these provisions apply only to the ordinary contracts of individuals, and do not apply to cities. In the ease of Seymour v. Spokane, 6 Wash. 362, 33 Pac. 832, this court held that municipal corpbrations were liable for interest upon their warrants from the time of refusal to pay for want of funds; where there was no statute requiring the payment of interest. It was there said:
“An amount of money due from a city or other municipal corporation should draw interest until it is paid, the same as if due from a private plerson; and while it is probably true that, under the strict rules of law, interest could not be collected upon money due and unpaid by a municipal corporation .without some legislative provision therefor, there is no good reason for such rule.”
In the ease of Union Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Gelbach, 8 Wash. 497, 36 Pac. 467, 24 L. R. A. 359, this court held that a county warrant is a contract to- pay money, and bears interest at the legal rate.
“The rule in respect to interest on debts against municipal corpbrations does not ordinarily differ from that which applies to individuals ” 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th ed.), § 506.
In some states it has been held that, in the absence of statutory authority, a municipality cannot provide for the payment of interest on its warrants; but it is said in 21 Am. &
It is not necessary, however, to rest the decision of this ease upon that point, for it is conceded that the city of South Bend, prior to the time these warrants were issued, plassed an ordinance agreeing to pay interest on such warrants from the date of presentment and indorsement “Hot paid for want’ of funds.” Conceding that the city is an agency of the state and a part of the sovereign power, and can incur no obligation except by authority of the state;, we find that the state has conferred upon such city the power,
• “To pass ordinances not in conflict with the constitution and laws- of this state or of the United States. . . . 21. To make all such ordinances, by-laws, rules', regulations and resolutions, not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the state of Washington, as may be deemed expedient to maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, commerce and manufacture.” Bal. Code, § 938 (P. C. § 3488 ).
There is no prohibition in either the constitution or laws of the state against the city agreeing to pay interest on its warrants or contracts of any kind. The city, therefore, must be held to have’had authority to pass the ordinance.
We do not understand that the validity of the ordinance is questioned, except that appellant contends that the state itself should have passed a statute making such cities liable for interest before the city could do so. This, of course;, does not follow, because the state may grant such' power to the city. The provision above quoted from the city charter granted by the legislature is broad and general. It undoubtedly gave to cities of the class named the right to provide for the payment of interest upon warrants issued' for necessary current ex
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Cbow, Dunbak, Boot, and Eullebton, JJ., concur.