121 Minn. 202 | Minn. | 1913
An ordinance of the city of Crookston makes it unlawful for any person, company, or corporation to buy or sell, within the city, any hay, straw, or coal, where the quantity sold exceeds 500 pounds, without first having the same weighed by the city sealer and weigh-master and obtaining his certificate of the net weight thereof. Kelator was charged with a violation of the ordinance before the municipal court of that city, 'and subsequent to his arrest sued out a writ of habeas corpus for his release and discharge, upon the ground that the ordinance is void and unenforceable. At the hearing in the •court below the writ was discharged, and relator appealed.
It is contended by appellant (1) that the ordinance, in so far as •concerns the weighing of coal, does not come within the power and authority of the city as conferred by the city charter; (2) if so authorized, that it is unreasonable and discriminatory in its application; and (3) that the ordinance is in conflict with chapter 156, p. 197, Laws 1911.
“It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to buy or •sell in the city any quantity or amount of hay, straw, coal or firewood, sold or- bought by weight or measurement, without first having, “the same weighed or measured by the city sealer and city weigh-master, and obtaining his certificate of the net weight or measurement thereof: Provided, that nothing herein shall prevent any person, firm or corporation, in a transaction of purchase and sale, from accepting the weight or measurement of the buyer thereof, if the «buyer is the owner or operator of a scale or measuring appliance of ¡sufficient size and capacity to weigh or measure the same, and the*204 seller is satisfied with the weight or measurement so ascertained!,. In case of a disagreement between the parties upon the weight or measurement of the commodities enumerated in this section, then the said commodities shall be weighed or measured as in this ordinance provided: And provided further, that in any transaction of purchase and sale of said commodities by weight or measurement where the quantity of hay, straw or coal is less than five hundred pounds in weight, or where the quantity of firewood is less than half a cord, the same may be weighed or measured privately, but. without charge, when the parties to said transaction accept the weight or measurement so ascertained, but not otherwise.”
The first question presented is whether the ordinance is within the authority of the city as conferred by the powers expressly reserved and granted by its charter. This question requires no extended discussion. The charter, among other things, expressly confers upon the municipality power:
“Eighteenth — To establish public markets and other public buildings; to make rules and regulations for the government and management thereof, and to provide for the enforcement of all rules; and-regulations in regard to the same.”
“Twentieth — To regulate the place and manner of weighing and selling hay and straw, and the measuring and selling of firewood,, coal and lime, and to appoint suitable persons to superintend and; conduct the same.”
“Twenty-sixth — To appoint inspectors, weighers and gaugers, and to regulate their duties and prescribe their compensation.”
The authority to define and provide a uniform standard of weights; and measures rests with the legislature, under the police power of the state. And though that authority is exclusively legislative, the enactment of such regulations and restrictions in the use and application of the .standard so prescribed, as local conditions may justify,, may be delegated to municipal corporations. Of this there is no question in the case at bar. The precise point on this branch of the case is that the power to prescribe the manner and place of weighing coal is not conferred by the provisions of the city charter. Subdivision twentieth, above quoted, provides that the city may pre
We do not think this fatal to the asserted power of the city as respects the weighing of coal. The three subdivisions of the charter above quoted are in pari materia and should be construed together. So construing them, it seems clear that the grant of power was intended to authorize the general supervision and regulation ■of both the weighing and measuring of all the commodities therein referred to. Coal is only sold by weight, and it is not reasonable to suppose that the legislature, in framing the charter, intended to leave that article of daily bargain and sale to the uncontrolled action of the shortweight dealer, and to exclude it from the operation of the general power of regulation there granted. The reasonable construction of the grant justifies the conclusion that weighing •of coal, as well as the weighing of the other commodities referred to, was intended to be included therein. We so hold.
The order appealed from is. affirmed.