State Ex Rel. Stephan v. Board of EducationState Ex Rel. Stephan v. Board of Education
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Fromme
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Fromme, J.:This is an original action in mandamus brought by the State of Kansas on relation of the attorney general asking this court to issue an order or writ to compel the Board of Education of Unified School District No. 428, Barton County, Kansas, to provide the students of that district with bus transportation. We are asked to hold that the Board must “provide or furnish transportation” by owning and operating its own vehicles or by contracting with a public or private carrier to transport the students.
*580 In response to the petition, the Board argues that the present statutes relating to the transportation of students authorize the Board to “provide or furnish transportation” either by transporting the students by bus or by providing for reimbursement of those persons who furnish transportation in privately owned automobiles.
The facts leading to the present action are not in dispute and in summary are substantially as follows:
The Board of Education of Unified School District No. 428 (the Board) on unification accepted the territory of a separate school district known as Bissell’s Point located in the northeastern portions of the county and of the unified district. Prior to unification the Bissell’s Point School District operated a bus system. Other districts in the area of the unified district No. 428 did not. Following unification this practice continued. Bus service was provided only in the area formerly in the Bissell’s Point School District.
In June, 1981, the Board, which is the respondent herein, voted to discontinue bus service to pupils residing in that portion of the district known as the Bissell’s Point area, effective with the beginning of the 1982-83 school year.
The Board notified the parents and guardians of pupils who would be affected by this action that the Board would contract with them for the transportation of their children at a reasonable rate per mile. During the fall of 1981, the Board distributed a questionaire to parents and guardians of pupils in the Bissell’s Point area who were eligible to receive either bus transportation or mileage reimbursement. Results of this questionnaire showed that over two-thirds of those responding favored mileage reimbursement over bussing.
In the fall of 1981, the Board requested a legal opinion from the Attorney General as to the extent of its duty in providing or furnishing transportation under the applicable statutes. The Attorney General issued a formal opinion advising the Board it had an affirmative duty to provide bus transportation, and could not employ mileage reimbursement contracts except under limited special circumstances.
The Board sought and obtained an estimate of the amount of original outlay it would take to establish bus transportation in the district. The business manager of the district estimated the cost to *581 be $350,000.00 to $500,000.00. The Board reaffirmed its earlier decision to end bus service in the Bissell’s Point area and to substitute mileage reimbursement contracts for the entire unified district. The present action by the Attorney General followed.
The petitioner and the respondent Board have filed separate memoranda of arguments and authorities. In addition the petitioner has filed a response to respondent’s memorandum.
Because of the press of time on school district budget questions and other critical factors which are concerned in any decision of this court, we have considered the arguments and authorities cited by both parties, and have decided that oral arguments are not necessary. A decision in this matter must rest in large part on a construction of certain statutes which govern the transportation of students by school districts.
The definitions section,
“(c) The words ‘provide or furnish transportation in addition to their ordinary meaning shall mean and include the right of a school district to: (1) Purchase, operate and maintain school buses and other motor vehicles; (2) contract, lease or hire school buses and other motor vehicles for the transportation of pupils, students and school personnel; (3) purchase, operate and maintain buses other than school buses for the transportation of pupils, students or school personnel to or from school-related functions or activities; (4) contract, lease or hire buses other than school buses for the transportation of pupils, students and school personnel if said buses are owned and operated by a public common carrier of passengers under a certificate of convenience and necessity granted by the state corporation commission or the interstate commerce commission and are operating within the authority granted to said public common carrier; and (5) reimburse persons who furnish transportation to pupils, students or school personnel in privately owned motor vehicles.” Emphasis supplied.
“(a) The board of education of any school district may provide or furnish transportation for pupils to or from any school of the school district. Every school district shall provide or furnish transportation for every pupil who resides in the school district and who attends any of grades kindergarten through twelve at a school of the school district subject to the conditions specified in provision (2) and to any one of the following conditions:
“(1) (A) The residence of the pupil is inside or outside the corporate limits of a city, the school building attended is outside the corporate limits of a city and the school building attended is more than 2 xh miles by the usually traveled road from the residence of the pupil, or
“(B) the residence of the pupil is outside the corporate limits of a city, the school building attended is inside the corporate limits of a city and the school attended is more than 2 x/% miles by the usually traveled road from the residence of the pupil, or
*582 “(C) the residence of the pupil is inside the corporate limits of one city, the school building attended is inside the corporate limits of a different city and the school building attended is more than 2 ¥2 miles by the usually traveled road from the residence of the pupil.” Emphasis supplied.
The sharpest conflict between the parties seems to arise from their differing construction of
“In those cases where it is impracticable to reach a student’s residence by the prescribed transportation route, and where such residence is more than one mile by road from the prescribed route; and in those cases where it is impracticable to schedule a school bus for the transportation of a student; the board of education may contract for the transportation of such student to the regularly prescribed school route or to the school building. Such contracts shall provide for the payment of mileage at a rate not to exceed the rate specified inK.S.A. 1972 Supp. 75-3203 and any amendments thereto for each mile actually traveled; shall be limited to two round trips per day on a route prescribed by the board of education; and shall be subject to any rules or regulations adopted by the board of education. In those cases, where more than one student is transported in the same vehicle, mileage shall be paid for only one student.”
We note in passing that
In determining the legislative intent for the purpose of statutory construction the historical background and changes made in a statute are to be considered by the court, and any changes and additions made in existing legislation raise a presumption that a change in meaning and effect was intended. Shapiro v. Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, 211 Kan. 452, Syl. ¶ 2, 507 P.2d 281 (1973); Southeast Kansas Landowners Ass’n v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., 224 Kan. 357, 367, 582 P.2d 1123 (1978).
Two prior cases of this court have been decided which concern the question of school transportation. They are: Harkness v. School District, 103 Kan. 573, 175 Pac. 386 (1918), and Kimminau v. Common School District, 170 Kan. 124, 223 P.2d 689 (1950). Under the statutes in effect when those cases were decided this *583 court held that the district had an option to pay the persons transporting pupils or to furnish transportation by bussing.
Kimminau was decided under the laws which later appeared in the General Statutes of 1949. 72-609 through 72-612 provided for transportation and for the establishment of bus routes to accommodate elementary and high school pupils. 72-614(3) defined the words “provide or furnish transportation” to mean and include the right of the school district to contract or hire buses, “in addition to their ordinary meaning.” 72-615 authorized the governing body of any school district to provide or furnish transportation to and from school. 72-621 provided that if the district board did not provide transportation for all elementary and kindergarten pupils who resided two and one-half miles or more from the school, that the district was required to pay to the person transporting any such pupil mileage at the rate of five cents per mile. Under 72-617 when the district furnished bus transportation and established regular routes, special provision was made for payment of mileage in those instances where it was impracticable to reach students in “out-of-the-way places.” For any student required to be transported to school under 72-621, who lived more than a mile from the regularly established bus route, the district was required to pay the person transporting them to and from the bus route five cents per mile.
We note that a complete repeal and recodification of the above sections of G.S. 1949, ch. 72, art. 6 occurred in 1968. See L. 1968, ch. 401, §§ 1 through 13. The new codification of these laws concerning the transportation of students first appeared in
In
Now turning to the provisions of present statutes governing the transportation of students, we direct our attention to
The petitioner contends that 72-8304 limits the circumstances under which mileage reimbursements may be paid, and that payment can be made only when one of the two situations mentioned in the statute exist: first, when it is impracticable to reach a student’s residence by the prescribed transportation routes and the pupil resides more than one mile off the route; second, when it is impracticable to schedule a school bus for the pupil’s transportation. Petitioner argues if the district is free to pay mileage for all eligible pupils the first part of the statute, i.e., that part limiting payment to situations where the student resides more than a mile from the regular route and where it is impracticable to reach the residence by bus route, is superfluous. We do not agree.
We see no great change in substance wrought by the 1968 recodification. There was a rearrangement, some much needed deletions, and a condensing of various sections. However, the definition of the term “provide or furnish transportation” continues to include both transportation by bus (
The present authorizing statute,
*585
As we read
However, where transportation routes for buses are prescribed pursuant to
In view of the provisions of the present statutes and considering the lack of substantive changes in the 1968 recodification we are of the opinion the ultimate holdings with regard to providing and furnishing transportation in Harkness v. School District, 103 Kan. 573, and Kimminau v. Common School District, 170 Kan. 124, were not changed by the recent statutes.
Under the provisions of
Petition denied.