State Ex Rel. Stearns v. BlumeState Ex Rel. Stearns v. Blume
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Fosheim
In this action, the State of South Dakota (appellant) seeks reimbursement from Ronald Blume (appellee) for ADC payments paid to relatrix Debra J. Stearns, on behalf of her daughter. The alleged father, appel-lee, appeared specially through his attorney and moved for dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations and the court lacked personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion on the statute of limitations grounds. No determination was made of the jurisdictional issue. This appeal is from the order dismissing the action. We reverse.
Debra J. Stearns is a resident of Lake County, South Dakota. She gave birth to a daughter on December 20,1979. Debra applied for ADC from the State of South Dakota and named appellee as the father. This operated as an assignment of all support rights for the child to the State of South Dakota pursuant to statute. 1
In October 1980, the State of South Dakota ex rel Debra J. Stearns commenced an action alleging that appellee was the child’s father. The complaint requested the court to order appellee to reimburse the State for expenses of the pregnancy, to support the *723 child, and “for such other and further relief as may be appropriate under SDCL ch. 25-8.” 2 Appellee admitted service of the summons and complaint. He subsequently served a general denial answer. Discovery consisted of blood tests of Debra, the child and appellee. Thereafter appellee moved to Minnesota. He appeared personally with his attorney at the time set for trial, but the State was unable to proceed because Debra Stearns did not appear. The State’s motion for a continuance was denied. Ap-pellee then moved to dismiss the action. Dismissal was granted without prejudice on condition the State pay certain amounts to appellee. Such conditions were paid.
The instant action was thereafter commenced in March 1982. Unlike the first action, this complaint does not refer to SDCL ch. 25-8. It does make reference to
In
Deckert v. Burns,
75 S.D. 229, 62 N.W.2d 879 (1954), we held that the two-year provision of the Uniform Illegitimacy Law (now
We also concluded in
Deckert
that by adopting the Uniform Act, the Legislature created a new, entire and complete act which superseded and repealed any then existing law upon the subject. We need not disturb that holding in
Deckert,
except to note that it seems inconsistent with the provision in the act itself (
In 1963, and since
Deckert,
the Legislature enacted
In addition to statutory law, that responsibility is also established by the common law. In
Deckert,
we said that by the adoption of the Uniform Illegitimacy Act, the legislature created a right unknown to the common law. That statement should, be qualified. A common-law duty of parents to support their minor children was recognized in South Dakota well before the Uniform Illegitimate Act was adopted in 1923.
McCook County v. Kammoss,
7 S.D. 558, 64 N.W. 1123 (1895). It was reaffirmed after 1923 and before
Deckert
in
Haakon County v. Staley,
60 S.D. 87, 243 N.W. 671 (1932), and again in
Matthews v. Matthews,
71 S.D. 115, 22 N.W.2d 27 (1946). Since
Deckert,
we have clearly held that a parent’s common-law duty to support a minor child does exist separate and distinct from any statutory obligation.
State ex rel. Wieber v. Hennings,
311 N.W.2d 41 (S.D.1981);
Johansen v. Johansen,
305 N.W.2d 383 (S.D.1981);
State v. Zobel,
81 S.D. 260, 269, 134 N.W.2d 101 (1965). The rules of the corn-
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mon law are in force unless they conflict with a statute.
The “other proceeding” is a civil action based on the common law duty of a father to support his minor child. Inherent in such an action is the jurisdiction of the court to determine paternity.
State ex rel. Andrew v. Cardella,
282 N.W.2d 117 (Iowa 1979). Being a civil action upon an obligation or liability implied and imposed by law, it must be commenced within six years after the cause of action shall have accrued.
It’ follows that this action was timely brought pursuant to
The conclusions we have here reached render moot the other issues raised by appellant.
All the Justices concur.
Notes
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. SDCL chapter 25-8 is entitled “Paternity Proceedings.”
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In this state the rules of the common law, including the rules of the law merchant, are in force, except where they conflict with the will of the sovereign power, expressed in the manner stated in § 1-1-23.
SDCL 1-1-23 reads: The will of the sovereign power is expressed:
(1) By the Constitution of the United States;
(2) By treaties made under the authority of the United States;
(3) By statutes enacted by the Congress of the United States;
(4) By the Constitution of this state;
(5) By statutes enacted by the Legislature;
(6) By statutes enacted by vote of the electors;
(7) By the ordinances of authorized subordinate bodies;
(8) Rules of practice and procedure prescribed by courts or adopted by departments, commissions, boards, officers of the state or its subdivisions pursuant to authority so to do.
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Except where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute,!*] the following civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can be commenced only within six years after the cause of action shall have accrued:
(1) An action upon a . . . obligation, or liability, express or implied!.]