556 S.W.2d 712 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1977
Original proceeding in prohibition by which relator, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, sought to prevent Honorable James L. Sanders, Judge, Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, from proceeding further in the case of Herring v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, pending in that court.
The issues raised by the pleadings are (1) whether service of process on Robert An-dreae constituted valid service on State Farm, and (2) whether the City of St. Louis is the proper venue.
On the validity of service upon Robert Andreae
Rule 54.13(a)(3) provides: “Personal service within the state shall be made as follows: * * * Upon a domestic or foreign corporation * * *, by delivering a copy of the summons and petition to an officer, * * * or managing or general agent, or by leaving the copies at any business office of the defendant with the person having charge thereof or by delivering copies to its registered agent or to any other agent authorized by appointment or required by law to receive service of process.”
Exhibits attached to relator’s petition and answers to interrogatories show these facts:
Robert Andreae and relator entered into a written agreement styled “State Farm Agent’s Agreement,” by which Andreae was appointed agent of the several State Farm companies. The preamble emphasizes that the agent is an independent contractor. Section I 1. provides that the
Respondent claims the service upon Mr. Andreae is sufficient because he is a general agent of State Farm; that he is a general agent because he had power to countersign and deliver policies, and issue 30-day binders, and because State Farm purchased national advertising and advertised in the yellow pages of the telephone directory, at its own cost or on a cooperative basis with Mr. Andreae, who is listed in those pages. The case of State ex rel. MFA Mutual Ins. Co. v. Rooney, 406 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1966) controls the question whether Mr. Andreae is a general agent of State Farm. That case holds that a general agent is “an agent who has authority to sign, countersign and issue policies.” He must have the authority to do all three things, not any one of them, as respondent claims.
Since there was no personal service upon a general agent of State Farm the question whether the venue was properly laid in the City of St. Louis is immaterial and need not be ruled upon in this proceeding.
Preliminary writ of prohibition made absolute.
. The conclusion that he is a general agent if he has power to do any one of the three things, drawn from certain unfortunate language inadvertently used in Gaines v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 228 Mo.App. 319, 68 S.W.2d 905, 907[5] (1933), is unsound.