11 S.W.2d 30 | Mo. | 1928
This is an original proceeding- instituted in this court by the St. Louis Young Men’s Christian Association, a corporation organized and existing- under the statute governing benevolent, religious and educational associations. Relator seeks by certiorari to annul and quash certain assessments and-tax bills issued against three pieces of real estate owned by it in the city of St. Louis, which assessments "were regularly made by the officers of that city. The City Board of Equalization having declined to comply with the request of relator that such property be declared exempt, application to this court for certiorari w'as made. The respondents herein .are the assessing and tax-collecting officers of the city of St. Louis. • : '
It is claimed by relator in its petition for writ of certiorari that the assessment of the three pieces of real estate belonging to it is in violation of Section 6 of Article X of the Constitution of Missouri and Section 12753, Revised Statutes 1919, both of which exempt from taxation real estate of certain size in incorporated cities and the buildings thereon, “when the same are used exclusively for religious worship, for schools or for purposes purely charitable.” It is claimed by respondents, in their return, that the properties in question are not used exclusively for religious worship, for schools or for purposes purely charitable; and do not, therefore, come within the exemption authorized by the Constitution and law's of Missouri, but are subject to taxation. Relator has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The issue is clear cut. There is no dispute about the facts, counsel having filed in this court an agreed statement, which Judge Sherwood some years ago said w-as a very good w7ay for lawyers to try a case.
Relator first obtained its legal existence by a pro-forma decree of the St. Louis Circuit Court in 1877 under the statutes governing the organization of benevolent, religious and educational associations,
Relator owns a lot at the southeast corner of Sixteenth and Locust. Streets, and the building thereon, known as the “Downtown Building;” it is ten stories in height.. The first floor is used for the following purposes: for men, lobby, lounge, reading and writing room, billiard room, soda fountain and part of the offices; for boys, a lobby, game, and club rooms, and boys’ offices, also locker rooms for both men and boys. On the ground floor is a cafeteria, barber shop, tailor shop, community boys’ club, shower bath and swimming pool. The second floor is an assembly hall for general use, educational class-rooms for Y. M. C. A. School, gymnasium and office. The third floor is used for three handball courts and educational class rooms. The fourth floor is used for the office of the Metropolitan Church Federation of St. Louis, the general offices of the Y. M. C. A. and bedrooms, There are three handball courts on the fifth floor, and the
Relator owns real estate situated at the corner of Grand and Sullivan Avenues, with a building four stories high thereon, known as the “Northside Building.” The first floor is used for a lobby, reading and writing room for men; for a lobby, game room and read
The third piece of real estate belonging to relator is known as the Pine Street Building at 2838 Pine Street, and is used for colored men; it is four stories high. The first floor is used for a men’s lobby, boys’ reading room ¿nd game room, offices, and gymnasium. The ground floor contains a small cafeteria, billiard room, locker room, swimming pool and showers. The second floor is used for educational class-rooms and bedrooms. The third floor is used for bedrooms, and the fourth floor is used for assembly room and bedrooms. There is a dormitory room in this building, containing twenty double-decker beds. There are eighty-seven rooms, of which seventy-seven are single and ten are double rooms. The charges for the rooms are the same as in the other buildings and application must also be made by signing an agreement in the same manner. Relator maintains a small cafeteria in this building to which members and their friends are invited. Membership in relator is not required as a condition precedent to admission to the cafeteria. Meals are occasionally served without charge to worthy young men, the same as in the other buildings. The average served in the cafeteria in this building is seventy for breakfast, ninety for lunch and ninety for dinner, and the average prices are respectively thirty-five, thirty-five and forty-eight cents. The charges for gymnasium, swimming and billiard facilities are the same as in the other buildings.
A large number of young men and boys of St. Louis and from other parts of the country receive accommodations in these three buildings, some paying for their services in full and others receiving said services without pay. The average young man remains in the building approximately three months. Relator is financed through membership fees, through income resulting from the serving of meals, the renting of rooms and from other activities. As stated, there has
Article IT of relator’s amended charter provides that members of relator must be over the age of eighteen years; and in 1926, relator adopted a rule limiting the renting of bedrooms to persons between the ages of eighteen and thirty years, except where an older man is helpful to the service program; and also providing that residents (i. e. persons renting rooms) must hold full privilege membership in relator.
The record recites a number of instances in which relator rented its rooms to different persons, from which it may be reasonably inferred that there were numerous instances similar to these. They are as follows:
Reverend A, a minister from Kansas, and his son occupied a room for several weeks, paying $8 in advance, while the minister was hunting for work. Afterwards, a New York minister sent for him and gave him work there to do. Reverend A and his son, who must have been over eighteen years old in order to occupy a room in relator’s building, have not paid the balance of the rent for said room.
Mr. B came from Kansas City, and stated that he was without funds because of having lost his baggage on the bus. He rented a room from relator for five or six weeks, during which time relator tried to get a settlement from the bus company but failed. Thereupon, Mr. B returned to Kansas City, leaving his room rent for five or six weeks unpaid.
Mr. C was sent to relator by the Travelers’ Aid, coming from Dallas, Texas. After remaining in one of relator’s rooms for approximately a week, some friends took him on to New York. It is stated that he “had considerable problems of a personal nature, with which one of the secretaries tried to help him.” He too failed to pay his room rent.
Mr. D came from Denver, was out of work and relator tried to help him find employment, furnishing him with a room for four or five weeks. He finally left St. Louis and had an opportunity to go to Chicago where work was available. It is stated that the account against him was finally dropped.
Mr. E came from Columbus, Ohio, hoping to find work in St. Louis, but was unable to do so. He was without funds and during the time
Mr. F rented a room from relator for three or four weeks, during which time he was said to be looking for employment and trying to' get on his feet again. He finally decided to go to an annt who lived in another city, hoping to receive aid from her. The account against him was finally cancelled.
Mr. G came from Miami, Florida, being an accountant by profession, and remained at relator’s building three or four weeks. He did secure employment in St. Lotus, but claimed that be did not make enough to pay his room rent. The account against him was finally dropped.
Mr. IT came to St. Louis (from what place is not stated) seeking employment. He undertook to learn a new trade and lived in one of relator’s rooms four or five weeks. Someone finally took him to Springfield, Missouri, to engage in the shoe business. He has never paid for his room.
Mr. I came from the city hospital, having been released from treatment there supposedly for tuberculosis. After occupying a room with relator for about three weeks, he developed an active case of tuberculosis ancl was sent to a sanitarium.
Mr. J was a Chinaman and his home was in Honolulu. He lived in relator’s building almost a year. He was allowed to occupy one of the rooms without payment of rent for twelve weeks, in view of the fact that he was a foreigner and a long way from home. He claimed to have friends in Chicago and finally went to Chicago. ■ His account has not been paid.
The ground belonging to relator is less than one acre, which is. the amount exempted within incorporated cities when the same is used for the purposes enumerated in our Constitution and onr statute. Hence the sole question is this, is relator entitled to. tax exemption on the ground-and buildings erected thereon in yiew of the uses made of said buddings?
I. In approaching this subject, we do so with purely one object in view, the construction of our1 constitutional and statutory tax-exemption provisions, as affecting the. real estate belong-re^a1:0l‘- Certain fundamental rules of taxation must, at all times be borne in mind, and these have been referred to by this court. on former occasions and by eminent text-writers on taxation and municipal law.
“An exemption from taxation must be clear and unambiguous and should not be created by implication.” [Scotland County v. Railroad Co., 65 Mo. l. c. 135; State ex rel. v. Arnold, 136 Mo. l. c. 450.]
“In the construction of laws exempting property from taxation it is a cardinal principle that they must be strictly construed. As a rule all property is liable to taxation, exemption the exception, and it devolves upon the person claiming' that any specific property is exempt to show it beyond a reasonable doubt.
“It is in no ease to be assumed that the law intends to release any particular property from this obligation; and no such exemption can be allowed, except upon clear and unequivocal proof that such release is required by the terms of the statute. If any. doubt arises as to the exemption claimed it must operate most strongly against the. party claiming the exemption.” [Fitterer v. Crawford, 157 Mo. l. c. 58.]
“As the burden of taxation ordinarily should fall upon all persons alike, when one claims an exemption therefrom he must be able to point to the law granting such immunity and it must be clear and unambiguous.” [Exposition Driving Park v. Kansas City, 174 Mo. l. c. 433.]
“Such statute and constitutional provisions are construed with strictness and most strongly against those claiming the exemption.” [Beach on Public Corp., par. 1443; Dillon on Munic. Gorp. (3 Ed.) par. 776, and cases cited; 1 Burroughs on Taxation, sec. 70; 1 Destv on Taxation, p. 108; Cooley on Taxation, pp. 204-5.]
And very recently, this court by Wauker, J., said, “The policy of our law, constitutional and statutory, is that no property than that enumerated shall be exempt from taxation,” [State ex rel. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co. v. Gehner, 294 S. W. l. c. 1018.]
“A grant of exemption from taxation is never presumed; on the contrary, in all cases of doubt as to the legislative intention, or as to the inclusion of particular property within the terms of the statute, the presumption is in favor of the taxing power, and the burden is on the claimant to establish clearly his right to exemption.” [37 Cyc. 891; Galloway v. Memphis, 116 Tenn. l. c. 750; Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 218.]
II. The burden therefore is upon relator to show that its property is exempt from taxation. Learned counsel claim that it is engaged in religious, educational and charitable work, and also . . . „ ,, , . ’ „ , Gaim that the meaning of those terms is now extended so as to include various subjects not included in those terms at the time of the adoption of the 1875 Constitution. But the question that we are called upon to decide is the intention of the framers of the Constitution, which document says that certain real estate, and buildings erected thereon, may be exempted from taxation, “when the same are used for religious worship, for schools or for purposes purely charitable.” It may be true that the terms “religion, education and charity” now include many things not included in the general acceptation of those terms at that date. Conceding all that relator claims on that subject to be correct, we are faced with this serious difficulty. The operation by relator of a cafeteria in each building, where the same kind of food is served and the prices charged are the same as those at similar cafeterias in the neighborhood, and where the public may go and pay for such service, cannot be considered either religious worship, education or purely charity. Much of the work that is done by relator is done some distance from its buildings and much of its work is done at night; hence it cannot be said that the operation of the cafeteria in the building, especially when the same is used by the public generally, is a necessary party of religious worship, nor of the educational or charitable features of the work of relator. If relator has the right to operate one cafeteria in its building for pay, it would have the right to use its entire first floor for dining room purposes, and multiply the number of meals served and the anrnmt of money received.
While the evidence is not clear, yet it is stated that relator operates in the Downtown Building a tailor shop, a barber shop and a soda fountain, presumably for pay. These businesses, like that of furnishing meals, reputable though they all are, cannot be considered either religious, educational or charitable work.
We have been referred to decisions of other states, some holding that Y. M. C. A. buildings are subject to taxation and some that they are not; but on account of the difference of the wording in the constitutional or statutory exemptions, such decisions are not strictly in point.
In two cases, the one involving a Masonic Lodge building (Fitterer v. Crawford, 157 Mo. 51) and the other involving a Knights of Py
In one of the leading cases in this State, the Kemper Military School case, State ex rel. v. Johnston, 214 Mo. 656, it was held that the use of certain rooms by the proprietor of a military boarding school and his family as a residence, his wife being in charge of the home, department, did not deprive the school of the exemption accorded to it by our Constitution and statute. With this decision, we are in full accord; but it is not authority in the instant case.
Later, this court had occasion to pass on a case of this relator involving two of its buildings; and after reaffirming the doctrine of the Johnston ease, supra, held that the renting of a part of the Y. M. O. A. buildings for stores took away from relator the religious, educational and charitable exemption it would otherwise have had. Emphasis in that ease was placed on the failure to “ exclusively” use the buildings for the exempted purposes. [State ex rel. v. St. Louis Y. M. C. A., 259 Mo. l. c. 238.]
Aud still later this court held that the building of the Elks Lodge was not used for purposes purely charitable, as the lodge hall ivas used for various entertainments and bedrooms were rented to its members; this, too, in spite of the fact that the money derived from the renting of the hall and the renting of the rooms ivas used for charitable purposes after paying the expenses of the operation of such building. [B. P. O. E. v. Koeln, 262 Mo. l. c. 448.]
This same doctrine is recognized in the appellate court decisions from other states.
Tn New York, the Y. M. C. A. building had in it a public hall or theatre, which it leased from time to time at fixed rates for theatrical performances and public entertainments of various kinds and the rentals derived therefrom were applied to the benevolent and religious purposes of the association. But it ivas held that such use deprived the association of tax exemption. [People ex rel. v. Sayles, 32 App. Div. (N. Y.) 197; also 157 N. Y. 677; 51 N. E. 1093.]
And another Y. M. C. A. building in that state, was held subject to taxation because it was not used exclusively for the purposes exempted by statute. [Y. M. C. A. v. Mayor of N. Y., 113 N. Y. 187.]
And in a case where the Y. M. C. A. building contained an auditorium in which free lectures, concerts and entertainments were given, a parlor for games and social intercourse, and reading room and a library, but. had a bowling alley, open to and used by the public at a fixed price per game, and the auditorium ivas occasionally rented on terms satisfactory to the trustees, the court held that the property
The Pennsylvania court held that an institution of purely public charity is not, as such, exempt from taxation on property used by it in carrying on a book store in which are sold, in addition to all its own publications, other standard works, in order to aid it in making its business self-supporting, although the whole profit therefrom was devoted to charity purposes of the institution. [Amer. Sunday School Union v. Taylor, 161 Pa. 307, 29 Atl. 26.]
And the Louisiana court said that the property of an orphan’s school which rvas no part of the institution but was held for revenue, the revenue derived therefrom being applied to the support of the school, was not exempt, under a constitutional provision exempting all charitable institutions. [State ex rel. Cunningham v. Board of Assessors, 52 La. Ann. 223, 26 So. 872.]
A camp meeting was incorporated for religious, moral, charitable and benevolent purposes, but it kept a stock of groceries for sale without restriction or limitation to persons desiring to buy the same; hence it was held not exempt from taxation, although the profits of all sales were strictly applied toward the support of the camp meeting association. [Alton Bay Camp Meeting Association v. Alton, 69 N. H. 311, 45 Atl. 95.]
In a case similar to the Missouri Y. M. C. A. Building case the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that even though that association had for its object the “improvement of the spiritual, mental, social and physical condition of young men,” and even though its building would be exempt when used for such purposes, yet the leasing of parts of the building to’ various tenants for profit subjected the building to taxation. [People ex rel. Gore v. Y. M. C. A., 157 Ill. 403, 41 N. E. 557.]
The exclusive use of a building for literary and scientific purposes in order to secure tax exemption was emphasized by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, when it held that the keeping of a dormitory and boarding house for students in such a building was not a part of the literary or scientific work and, therefore, the building was subject to taxation. [Phi Beta Epsilon Corp. v. Boston, 182 Mass. 457, 65 N. E. 824.]
And this exclusive use of a building for religious purposes wajj further emphasized by the same court, when it held that one religious organization could not rent exempted property to another religious corporation without destroying such exemption. [Evangelical Baptist Missionary Society v. Boston, 204 Mass. 28, 90 N. E. 572.]
In the case of a camp meeting association, which owned ground that was exempt from taxation, when a piece of the ground was leased
The Methodist Episcopal Church OAvned and operated Baker University, which property consisted of certain real estate and buildings and AA’as by laAv made exempt from taxation. One of the ministers of that church donated to the university a dwelling house and lot situated some distance aAvay. It Avas claimed that this dwelling while rented and the rents used to aid Baker University, was exempt from taxation; but the Supreme Court of Kansas.decided that even though the rents Avent. into the funds of that institution, the property Avas subject to taxation. [Stahl v. Kansas Educational Assn. of M. E. Church, 54 Kan. l. c. 547-8.]
The Masonic Lodge erected a, three-story building, known as “Masonic.Temple,” used the rooms on the third floor for its meeting and committee rooms, and rented the rooms on the first and second floors, using the -rentals thereof to aid in the charitable work of the lodge. The court held, hoAvever, that as portions of the property had been leased for purposes of profit, it was subject to taxation. [Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, Royal Arch Masons, 68 Texas, 698, 5 S. W. 519.]
In a similar case, Avhcre the Odd Fellows Lodge erected a two-story building, used a part thereof for its lodge room and rented a part thereof for a ‘ store and dental office, the court held that the building was subject to taxation. The folloiving language concludes the opinion in that case: “The property is used for profit, and not for charity, and so cannot be exempt. It is said in argument that the income is used for charity, and that makes it the same in effect as if the property itself was used for charity. But that is not the letter of the law, nor its spirit.” [Odd Fellows v. Redus, 78 Miss. l. c. 355.]
The Fifteenth Ward Belief Society was a charitable organization, ministering' to the poor, sick and destitute members of the community. Jt. owned a. two-story building, the upper floor of which Avas used continuously by its members in the furtherance of its charitable purposes; but the loAA'er floor contained íavo store rooms, which Avere rented out and the money used for charitable purposes. After citing numerous authorities in support of its position the Utah Supreme Court said: “Only such of the society’s property,, therefore, as is occupied and used ‘exclusively’ for charitable purposes is exempt from taxation. The exemption does not extend to that portion not appropriated by the society to its own use, but held as a source of roA-enue.” [Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah, l. c. 339.]
A library association owned a building, one floor of which was used for its books and historical collections, one floor for. store rooms
And in the ease of the Georgia Female Seminary, the same being a charitable institution, but having a house and lot that was rented and the rent used, to aid in the charitable work of the institution, the court held the property subject to taxation, and said, “As we have seen, it is the use made of the property, and not the use made of the income, from which its taxability or non-taxability must be determined.” [Mundy v. Van Hoose, 104 Ga. l. c. 300.]
The Hibernian Benevolent Society was a charitable organization for the benefit of sons of Irishmen. It owned a three-story building in the city of Portland, one floor occupied for its charitable purposes and the other two stories rented, the rentals being used for charitable purposes of the association. The court held that the property was not exempt from taxation because it came in competition with other rented property. [Hibernian Benevolent Society v. Kelly, 28 Ore. l. c. 193.]
The Young Men’s Society was a literary and scientific organization, conducted a library,- and maintained a hall in which debates were conducted. It had a three-storv building, the upper stories of which were used for its benevolent purposes, but the basement was-leased for business purposes. The court held that on account of the use of the basement rooms, the same being commercial, the building was subject to taxation. [Detroit Young Men’s Society v. Mayor, 3 Mich. 172.]
Following the Missouri ease of Fitterer v. Crawford, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that while a school was an educational and charitable organization and was exempt from taxation, yet a dwelling owned by it and, used as a boarding house was not exempt. The court said: “The fact that the profits of a commercial enterprise are either in whole or in part devoted to charity does not operate to-render the business itself a' charity.” [Congregational Pub. Society v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. l. c. 115.]
The Odd Fellows conducted an organization for charitable purposes and raised a fund-to aid in such purposes. The money was used to purchase a business block in Des Moines, and the income therefrom used to aid widows and orphans of deceased members of said lodge. In holding that the property, was subject to taxation,
The Masonic Lodge owed a building in which was situated the Masonic Hall and concert hall and a room that was rented, the rents being used in behalf of the numerous charities of that worthy organization. The court held that the use of the parts of the building that were leased subjected the building to taxation. [City of Indianapolis v. Grand Lodge, 25 Ind. l. c. 522.]
A Jewish congregation in New York owned a building consisting of two stories; the upper story was used as a synagogue, and the first story was used by the janitor of the synagogue and his family for living apartments, and also as a bathroom for women and a bathroom for men of the Jewish race, whether members of plaintiff’s congregation or not. A small fee was charged of persons using the bath, which was used to pay the expenses of gas, fuel and. accessories of the hath, and the remainder to assist in paying the janitor for his services. The court held that the building was subject to taxation. [Congregation of Israel v. Mayor, 52 N. Y. (Hun) 507.]
Further emphasizing the fact that the property must be exclusively used for the exempted purpose, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, after quoting the legal maxim, “Expressio unius exelusio aUeriii<t,” and reiterating the doctrine that taxation is the rule and tax exemption the exception, héld that an educational corporation was not entitled to exemption on land that it owned and upon which it intended to erect a school building, as the building had not been erected. [Congregation of United Brethren of Salem v. Commissioners of Forsythe County, 115 N. C. 489.]
The Nebraska court, in a case almost exactly like the instant one, after detailing the numerous activities of the Y. M. C. A. of the citv of Lincoln, which ¿re identical with the activities of relator, and after discussing the operation of a ’cafeteria, barber shop and tailor shop in said building, used this language: “The use of the property is, under our law, the criterion by which to determine whether it is or is not exempt from taxation. Tt is therefore essential to determine, in the first, place, whether the association, not in its aims and purposes alone, but in what it actually does to carry them out, is. religious or charitable, before it can be decided that any of the uses to which the building was put partake of those characteristics.” The court then held that the operation of the cafeteria, barber shop and tailor shop could not be considered either religious, educational or charitable and deprived the association of tax exemption on its building. [Y. M. C. A. v. Lancaster Co., 106 Neb. l. c. 109.]
The by-laws of. relator provide that full membership in the association is required before ope may rent a. room. Yet the record discloses- that this by-law has been- ignored,- for relator has rented its rooms to men from .other.- cities-,/other states and.-other countries, who may well -be termed ■transients in St. Louis, some qf whom paid but others showed no disposition whatever to pay. Before renting a room, relator required the resident to execute a written agreement, in which the terms of the rental, the rights of the occupant, the time of payment and the liability of relator were fully set forth. "We cannot see how the renting of a room -to one not a member of relator and the execution of such an agreement can be termed religious worship, educational or charity. True, some of the occupants of the rooms claimed they were unable to pay and did not pay and doubtless never will pay,, yet, there ivas an obligation to .pay and relator accepted of pay when offered by these parties, some of whom were non-residents of the State.- Relator in each building has helped many persons, many of them worthy, but such commendable acts do not authorize us to attempt to change- either the statute or Constitution for the benefit of relator. The furnishing of meals and rooms free of charge may well be termed charity, but the renting of those rooms to persons not members of relator, the furnishing of meals to persons not members of relator and the operation of a barber shop, tailor shop and soda fountain for all those who cared to patronize them, are business .enterprises; it.cannot be said that a building used for. such purposes is “used exclusively for-religious worship, for schools or for purposes purely charitable. ”
This would be appropriate and possibly persuasive argument if we had it in our power to write the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the exemption of property from taxation; but those provisions have long since been written, written by others authorized to write them, and we cannot change either “one jot or one tittle” thereof. This court has many times been brought face to face with a proposition that has been the subject of constitutional and statutory enactment and been compelled to follow the plain language of the Constitution and of the statute, even though, in the opinion of the court, such provision should have been either broader or narrower. Our duty is to enforce the Constitution and the statute, as we find the same to exist. It does not matter how deserving an organization may be or how much good it has accomplished by the operation of its various activities, its property is subject to taxation if it is used for purposes other than those enumerated in the exemption clauses above referred to. Loath as we may be to decide against such a worthy organization, Avhich counsel have correctly stated has accomplished so much good for so many of our people and Avhich has aided so many deserving ones, we are bound by the Constitution and the statute. We must hold that such business features of relator take from it its tax exemption privileges.
The Avrit of certiorari, heretofore issued, is quashed.
