Thе first question before us in this case is whether relator St. Louis County has the authority to enact an ordinance submitting to the voters cf St. Louis County at the next general election, a proposal calling for the nonpartisan appointment and retention of circuit judges and probate judges in said county, pursuant to the provisions of Art. V, § 29(а)-(g), 1945 Constitution, V.A. M.S., and another ordinance with the same proposal as to magistrate judges. The Board of Election Commissioners refused to place the two proposals on the ballot. The county, joined by intervenоr Sommers, a registered and qualified voter of the county, petitioned the circuit court of St. Louis County for a writ оf mandamus requiring the Election Board to submit the proposals to the voters. The circuit court, after a heаring, entered an order issuing a peremptory writ, and respondent Board of Election Commissioners has appealed. The trial court, on October 25, 1966, found the failure of the General Assembly to provide for the submission to thе voters of St. Louis County of the question of adoption of the nonpartisan court plan was a denial to in-tеrvenor Sommers of equal protection and due process of law; that the two ordinances were part of an orderly procedure for the submission of the propositions contained so as to guarantee equal protection and due process to the intervenor and others similarly situated, and ordered rеspondents to submit the two propositions at the next general election after the November 8, 1966 eleсtion.
The county contends that by virtue of its charter provision authorizing it to exercise all powers of legislation conferred on counties by the constitution and the holding in Heilman v. St. Louis County (Mo.Sup.)
If St. Louis County, which is a county of the first class operating under a home rule county charter, originally adopted by its voters in 1950, has any authority to enact such ordinances, it must be found in Art. VI, § 18, of the 1945 Constitution. Our construction of the section is that it does not give St. Louis County any such authority. Therefore, the two ordinances are not valid and the judgment must be reversed, State on Information of Dalton, ex rel. Shepley
While it is true Art. VI, § 18(b), requires a county home rule charter provide for certain matters, including the “ * * * manner of selection * * * оf the county officers * * * ”, this, in our opinion, does not give the St. Louis County Council the right to submit proposals as to the manner of selection of circuit, probate, and magistrate judges. “Circuit judges are judges of the State of Missouri аnd not merely judges of the circuit in which they are elected or appointed”, Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville,
In fact, until the present attempt St. Louis County apparently has madе no effort to legislate in the field of the manner of selection of judges. Its charter, Art. II, § 3, does not include circuit, probate, or magistrate judges as elective county officers and the charter does not purpоrt to provide for their selection or election. It is evident the county itself has not heretofore construed the constitution or charter as giving it such power.
Having concluded the St. Louis County Council has no authority under thе 1945 Constitution and its charter adopted thereunder to submit the proposals in question to the voters of the county, there is no need to reach other matters discussed in the briefs which necessarily fall out of the case if the county has no authority to act in the first place.
The judgment is reversed and petition for writ of mandamus orderеd dismissed.
Notes
. This was a case which held St. Louis County had authority to enter into certain contracts with appraisal companies for the appraisal of real estate in the county.