270 Mo. 230 | Mo. | 1917
— This is an original proceeding whereby relator seeks to prohibit respondents from proceeding with a case now pending before Hon. William T. Jones, Judge of Division One of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, wherein William R. Ramsey as plaintiff (one of the respondents herein) seeks to recover from the St. Joseph Lead Company as defendant (relator herein), the sum of $25,000 for injuries alleged by plaintiff to have been by him received through the negligence of the defendant while working. in the employ of the defendant in St. Francois County, Missouri.
To the relator’s petition respondents demur on the ground that the petition and writ do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The facts stated in the petition and thus admitted by the demurrer are substantially as follows:
Suit was instituted, as above mentioned, in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, by William R. Ramsey, a resident of the State of Illinois, against the St. Joseph Lead Company. The cause of action upon which
In due time defendant (relator) appearing specially for that purpose, moved to quash the summons and return, on the ground that the suit was not commenced either in the county where the cause of action accrued, or in the. county in which the defendant corporation had or usually kept an office or agent for the transaction of its usual and customary business. The respondent, William T. Jones, as judge of said court,- entered an order overruling the motion to quash and was about to entertain further proceedings in the case at the time application was made to this court.
I. The question.presented is one of venue and may be stated as follows:
We have reached the conclusion that the above question must be answered in thS negative.
Sections 1751 and 1754, Revised Statutes 1909, the only statutes claimed to deal with this subject, are as follows:
Section 1751: “Suits instituted by summons shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought: First,
The foregoing section,' down to subdivision fifth thereof, was first enacted in its present form in 1855. [See R. S. 1855, p. 1220.] At that revising session of the Legislature, among other changes made in the then existing statute, the words “except as otherwise provided by law” were first inserted.
Section 1754: “ Suits .against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the 'cause of action-accrued, (or in case the corporation defendant is a railroad company owning, controlling or operating a railroad running into or through two or more counties in this State, then in either of such counties), or in any county where such corporations shall have or usually keep an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and customary business.” (Parentheses ours.)
The last above section was also first enacted in 1855 with the portion in parentheses omitted. [See R. S. 1855, p. 377.] The portion? in parentheses was inserted by amendment in 1903.
The first point for determination is: Which of the above sections governs the venue in suits instituted against foreign corporations of the kind and character of relator!
It will be noticed that section 1751, supra, by its express terms, “except as othenvise provided by law” clearly indicates that it was not the legislative intention that said section should prevail over any conflicting statute. In this behalf it is of interest to note that at the same session of the Legislature, to-wit, the revising session of 1855, section 1754 was first enacted providing that suits against corporations should be commenced either in the county where the cause of action accrued or in any county where the corporation has an office or agent for the transaction of its usual or customary business.
The term “corporations” used in section 1754, supra, unless limited by construction or by other statute, is certainly broad enough to cover all corporations, foreign as well as domestic. In this connection, however, respondents contend that since foreign corporations could not be served with summons in this State at the time section 1754 was enacted, it should not be held to apply to foreign corporations. We are unable to see wherein this argument can, in any manner, aid the respondents, for if it can properly be said that section 1754, supra, could not apply because no provision existed at that time for serving summons upon foreign corporations in this State', the same would also have to be said with reference .to the application of section 1751, supra, enacted into its present form (as far as the points here involved are concerned), at the same session and therefore also at a time when no provision existed for serving a foreign corporation in this State. If respondents are correct in the principle of law underlying their argument then we would be in a situation without any provision for instituting suits by summons against such foreign corporations, because said two sections are the only statutes which can be claimed to provide the venue under the present situation.
To the same effect are 2 Lewis’s Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2 Ed.), p. 956; Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 112; State v. Hays, 78 Mo. 600, l. c. 604.
, Since sec. 1754, supra, is sufficient in terms to com-prehend foreign as well as domestic corporations and since in the light of the foregoing rule, it should be held to spring into use and apply to corporations, upon which provision for serving summons ie thereafter made, as well as to corporations which could then be served with summons, it necessarily follows that as to suits against this class of defendants the matter of venue was' “otherwise provided by law” and that the matter of venue as to such defendants falls within the exception, and not the rule., provided by section .1751, and that therefore section 1754 and not section 1751 prescribes the rule on venue in suits against such foreign corporations.
The case of Stone v. Insurance Co., supra, cannot therefore he considered as an authority upon the exact points held in judgment in the case at bar and the same may also be said with refernece to N. Y., L. E. & W. Railroad Co. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 591, which follows the Stone case and applies the rule therein announced to foreign railroad corporations. The Estill case also does not mention section 1754, supra. The remarks in this paragraph are made merely in explanation of our failure to undertake to construe section 1751, supra.
Applying the rule announced in Paragraph One above, it follows that said circuit court is without jurisdiction to proceed with the case and that the preliminary rule of prohibition heretofore issued should be made permanent. It is so ordered.