State Ex Rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills

ex rel. David North Dakota STATE

SPRYNCZYNATYK, Dakota North Appellee, Engineer, Plaintiff and Betty Mills, MILLS, L. Dako R.

William Corpora

taville, Inc., Dakota a North West,

tion, River Woods Corporation, Defendants Dakota Appellants. No. 940089.

Civ.

Supreme Court of North Dakota. 27, 1994.

Oct. ordinary

Mills owns the land above the of the watermark shore zone. brought declaratory ac- judgment Mills, seeking against tion a determination to ex- that the State’s title the shore zone ordinary high tends to the watermark. The Perry Erling, State claimed (N.D.1965), adjudicate did not Mills, predecessors, or their held title to zone and the shore did bar the State asserting title. from The State also claimed grant Mills that N.D.C.C. 47-01-15 did not to the absolute title low watermark interest, any, and that shore zone Mills’ if zone estate the shore was limited to a surface subject to the State’s was title and public’s right of use. ownership of

Mills claimed the shore zone ordinary low watermark raised and defenses, including several affirmative ad- possession, verse several limita- statutes of tion, judicata Perry res and the effect of counterclaimed, Erling. seeking Mills also quiet just compensa- taken, damages tion for and treble (Racketeer Ch. In- 12.1-06.1 Corrupt Organizations). fluenced and partial summary moved The State for judgment its claims that it to the on held title ordinary high watermark and that Mills’ af- defenses did firmative not bar its action. Atty. M. (argued), Charles Carvell Asst. granted summary partial The district Gen., Bismarck, plaintiff appellee. for State, judgment holding Mills, pro R. William se. ownership high water- “Absolute above (no Sherry appearance), Mills Moore Foss owner, private mark is fee Moore, Bismarck, ap- & defendants complete river bed of the Dakotaville, Betty Mills, pellants L. ordinary high [between watermark on West, River Woods Inc. side] each is in the state of North subject fee owner’s NEUMANN, Justice. over shore zone for access and riparian rights other traditional as such Mills, Mills, R. Betty L. Dakota- William Primarily, be found to exist. ville, Inc., (Mills) West, and River Woods Inc. owner’s are that of access appeal partial summary from a water, right pier build a declaratory judgment the State’s action to water, accretions and the tq parties’ determine the interests certain make reasonable use of the wa- ordinary high land1 between the watermark .... ter (the ordinary low watermark “shore zone”) of the Missouri We River. reverse. n n n n n ifc 1. The described the land as the Missouri River that is located between the 7, 8, ordinary watermark and the low water- "Sections Nl4 West, North, Township Range Burleigh mark.” County, and is all that land the east side of anti-gift provi- holding N.D.C.C. 47-01-15 unconstitu- combination of the “The tional, and statutes should so construed. Dakota State Constitu- be of the North sions See N.D.C.C. 1-02-38.” clearly public trust doctrine tion and the interpretation of N.D.C.C. prohibit The district court issued certification under would create 47-01-15 which 54(b), to N.D.R.Civ.P. allow an immediate zone from the State of North the shore appeal. in this case. Just Dakota to the Defendant primary The in this issue ease involves the legislature had no author- as the territorial interests of Mills and the in the State away property held for ity to trust outlining parties’ argu- zone. Before state, the future neither does the state ments, generally we describe the historical away sovereign have the to its development property of interests private with- property trust to individuals navigable beds of waters.2 consideration, derogation and in of its out Before North Dakota was admitted to the public maintain such lands duty to the Union, the United States held the beds of all citizens of the state. for the benefit of navigable Territory waters the Dakota “The therefore holds Court high high from watermark to watermark in § 47-01-15 constitutes a rule of the future state. Montana v. Unit construction, proper- of and not a rule States, 544, 1245, ed 450 101 U.S. S.Ct. 67 ty.... (1981); Oregon L.Ed.2d 493 v. Corvallis emphasized that “It should be the State Co., 363, Sand & Gravel 429 U.S. 97 S.Ct. North Dakota does not own the shore of 582, (1977); Furlong 50 L.Ed.2d 550 J.P. capacity, proprietary zone in a but sover- Enterprises, Exploration Inc. v. Sun & Production words, eign one. In other (N.D.1988). Co 423 N.W.2d 130 . people for the of all the held benefit Union, Upon admission to the North Dakota use, including navigation, for their recre- sovereign ownership was entitled to of the ation, ecological preservation, and esthetic navigable high of waters from water beds public purposes. and other The high equal mark to watermark under the has the to access the land owner footing Oregon doctrine. v. Corvallis Sand adjacent through the shore zone

water Co., Keokuk, supra; Barney & v. 94 Gravel watermark and exercise such oth- 324, (1876); 24 224 U.S. L.Ed. Pollard’s Les riparian rights not in conflict er as are (3 How.) 212, 11 Hagan, 44 see v. U.S. L.Ed. public.... with the (1845). Upon entering 565 the Union on States, equal footing “The Court holds that State with the established zone, “rights riparian proprietors North Dakota holds title to the shore or littoral subject riparian rights navigable of the Defen- mark of to the the soil below water dant, riparian rights governed the local laws.” [were] who exercise said waters 1, 40, they Shively Bowlby, v. 152 14 S.Ct. insofar as do not conflict with the U.S. (1894). 548, 563, superior right of the of North Dako- 38 L.Ed. 331 See Montana States, Oregon supra; v. v. Corvallis manage ta to hold and the shore zone for United Co., supra; Barney purposes. & Gravel v. Keo The title of the Defen- Sand kuk, only ordinary supra; Shively Bowlby, supra; v. J.P. dant Mills is absolute watermark, Furlong, supra. principles, those and in the shore Under only riparian right “resign North Dakota could Defendant Mills has belong proprietor rights properly access to the water and such other sovereign capacity,” and was free riparian rights [it] [its] as do not conflict with the property interests in the beds of paramount right of the State. This decla- to allocate ordinary high navigable below the is made in order to avoid waters ration Carvell, (1949); Waterways: parties dispute 330 North Dakota do not the Missouri Right Hogue Bourgois, Questions Recreation and 71 The Public’s Title, River is a river. (1988); Note, (N.D.1955); Loy, 7 North Dako 64 N.D.L.Rev. State v. 74 N.D. (N.D.1945). Determining Century ta Code 47-01-15: 668 See Ozark-Mahon Waters, State, Navigable Dakota’s Interest in the Beds Co. v. 76 N.D. 37 N.W.2d 488 Brace, (1949); N.D.L.Rev. 211 State v. 76 N.D. 36 N.W.2d Keokuk, Barney supra, Note, watermark. 94 N.D.C.C. (1983).” U.S. 338. See N.D.C.C. 47-01-14. Any N.Dak.L.Rev. 211 statements However, totally North Dakota could not ab prior in our decisions that “the owner of private parties dicate its interest to because lands to a stream owns interest, by it held that virtue of its sover the low water mark” are dicta. This eignty, public. in trust for the Illinois Cen presents competing case the issue of the Illinois, tral 146 U.S. Railroad interests of landowners and the (1892); S.Ct. 36 L.Ed. 1018 United the shore zone. v. North Dakota Plainsmen Ass’n State Wa Commission, duty Our is to ascertain the intent

ter Conservation 247 N.W.2d (N.D.1976). under our Constitution. E.g., County Stutsman v. State Historical case, that, Mills asserts (N.D.1985). Society, 371 N.W.2d 321 The he owns the N.D.C.C. shore zone Legislature’s sought initially intent must be watermark, subject only to the low to a navi- language from the of the statute. Id. Un gational high servitude to the watermark. less words in a statute are defined in the equal The State asserts that under the foot- code, they according are construed to their doctrines, and it owns the plain, ordinary, commonly and understood shore zone to the watermark. The meaning. Furlong v. Kim-Go J.P. Enter argues that N.D.C.C. 47-01-15 does Inc., prises, (N.D.1990); 460 N.W.2d 694 grant riparian landowners title to the §§ N.D.C.C. 1-02-02 and 1-02-03. Statuto only shore zone and that confirms that ry provisions must be considered aas whole riparian rights landowners have provision harmonized, possible. with each if the shore zone. (N.D.1994). Ryan, v. Stewart 520 N.W.2d 39 47-01-15, N.D.C.C., provides: Section Statutory provisions that substantially are Boundary “Banks and beds of streams — previously existing the same as statutes are ownership. Except when the — construed as continuations thereof. which the land is held indicates a different 1-02-25; Sargent N.D.C.C. County v. Coo intent, upland, the owner of the when it 281, per, (1915); 29 N.D. 150 N.W. 878 Wells stream, navigable borders on a lake or County McHenry, 246, v. 7 N.D. 74 N.W. 241 edge takes to the lake stream at (1898). possible, Whenever we construe stat navigable low watermark. All rivers shall harmony utes in with the constitution to remain and highways. be deemed avoid constitutional E.g., City infirmities. opposite In all cases when the banks of (N.D. Bismarck v. 449 N.W.2d 789 Nassif navigable belong stream not to different 1989); 1-02-38(1). N.D.C.C. persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall become common to both.” 47-01-15, N.D.C.C., says This court has “[ejxcept said that “the owner of when the under which the navigable lands to a intent,” stream owns land is held indicates a different title to Hogue the low water mark.” upland v. edge owner “takes” to the Bourgois, 47, (N.D.1955), citing lake or stream at low watermark. Green, 268, Gardner 67 N.D. many N.W. 775 “Takes” meaning has shades of (1937), Loy, 182, and depend 74 N.D. on the circumstances in which it is (1945). However, used, although those deci- meaning one includes: “To interpret sions did not acquire estate; N.D.C.C. 47-01-15 the title to an to receive or be competing the context of the interests of entitled to an estate in lands from another the State and a person by landowner in species virtue of some of title.” Furlong Enterprises, (6th shore zone. In J.P. Dictionary, p. Black’s Law 1453-1454 ed. Co., 1991). Exploration Inc. v. C.J.S., Sun & Production See 83 Take 938 explicitly 423 N.W.2d at 132 n. precise meaning “takes,” we ob- type “[wjhether served that North Dakota has upland interest the owner “takes” to the low limited its title to the area below the low ambig watermark is unclear. If a statute is uous, watermark has not aids, been decided. See we resort to extrinsic includ- it. water lake. Part of the store was background, to construe ing historical Inc., supra,; Furlong Enterprises, Coun- situated between and low water- J.P. (the zone”), Stutsman, supra. part marks ty “shore below the low watermark of the lake. McCol- 47-01-14,3 statute, A related Webb, conveyed parcel lum of land to but regulate “own- authorizes excepted plain- reserved and the store. The ordinary high watermark ership” below the parcel by tiffs obtained title to land Keokuk, Barney v. navigable waters. See Later, conveyances mesne from Webb. Shively Bowlby, supra. Sections supra; grants plaintiffs land office issued 47-01-15, N.D.C.C., de- adjacent the lands under lake and §§ of the 1865 Civil rived from 169 and 267 plain- land the store where was located. The (Field Code).4 of New York Code of the State tiffs claimed the land office included Furlong Enterprises, See J.P. part store that was between the 135-37, They nn. 23 and 24. N.W.2d at low watermarks. originally enacted in the Dakota Terri- were 169, 267, §§ tory Code of Civil appeal, parties’ On the issue was the inter- Revised Codes amended the 1877 were store. That est issue involved the Code, §§ Territory of Civil 266.5 exception extent of McCollum’s and reserva- 136-37, nn. 23 and 24. The corre- Id. conveyance tion of the store the 1844 provision Field Code sponding New York depended on whether the watermark or edge the of the lake annotates the “takes to boundary the low watermark was the of the predecessor of the at low water mark” clause bordering land on the lake. The court held 47-01-15, with a citation to to N.D.C.C. proprietors that “the the borders Lake Champlain Lawrence Rail Road and St. Champlain must be deemed the owners to Valentine, (N.YApp.Div. 19 Barb. 484 Co. mark, by low water unless otherwise limited 1853), may construing which we consider grants.” Champlain, the terms their su- Furlong Enterprises, our statute. See J.P. that, pra, at 492. The concluded the 135, n. 423 N.W.2d at Webb, conveyed parcel time he land ejectment part that of the store above Champlain was an action to re- McCollum owned watermark, par- holding that possession of a store located on a the low those cover adjoining Champlain, through him entitled to that cel of land Lake a fresh the store were N.D.C.C., mark; water, upon any provides: when it borders other 3. Section of the lake or the owner takes middle "Land, Regulated by below watermark— fed- stream.” ownership of land below eral or state law.—The ordinary high watermark and of land below Dakota, Territory 5. 1877 Revised Codes Civil navigable is the water of a lake or stream provided: Code by regulated the laws of the United States or thereof, authority by such laws as under ownership ordinary high "The of land below legislative assembly enact.” mark, water of a water and of land below the stream, regulated by lake or is pro- Field 4. Section 169 of the New York Code as, by laws laws of the United States or such vided: thereof, authority legislative assem- land, territory bly may is the owner of is the all below enact. The "The state owner of water; mark, lawfully appropriated bordering upon property all or dedicated water tide of all use; property of which to its own and of all land below the water of a lake or stream which state; boundary other owner.” constitutes an exterior of the there is no Dakota, Territory property lawfully appropriated by Civil it to its 1877 Revised Codes of all state, use; provided: property Code own of all dedicated to the “Except grant property where the under which land all of which there is no other and of intent, a the owner is held indicates different owner." upon naviga- pro- upland a when it borders Section 267 of the New York Field Code stream, edge takes to the of the lake ble lake or vided: mark, tide-water, upon upon at low-water and all or or stream "When land borders public high- boundary rivers shall remain and be deemed water which constitutes an exterior state, ways. opposite upland where the banks of takes to In all cases the owner of streams, mark; navigable, belong upon to different high-water when it borders a nav- tide, persons, shall igable the stream and the bed thereof lake where there is no the owner edge common to both." of the lake at low-water become takes recognized part contemporaneous provision, of the store. The court also Section 159 of building Code, is an obstruction “[i]f the Field the 1865 Dakota Territorial by Code, annoyance passage to the common the Civil and the 1877 Revised Codes Ter- navigation, may public Dakota, a ritory Code, and to be Civil defined “owner- nuisance. But is matter between ship” “right persons as the of one or more maintaining public.” those it there and the possess [property] and use to the exclusion of Id. others.” See N.D.C.C. 47-01-01. The specific employed terms in the territorial Champlain The effect of the decision in is statutes “ownership” and the definition of that, determining as a rule of continuously statutory pro- have remained as boundaries, grants bordering of land on navi- visions in North leg- and evidence a gable convey granted waters interest to islative intent that “takes” was not intended watermark, low unless otherwise limited self-executing grant as a of absolute “owner- grants. the terms of the The court’s ship” to the low watermark. statements about nuisance neverthe- recognize public rights less certain above the We believe the decision in Cham upland low watermark and indicate that the plain and the different terms in those endur owners’ do not authorize them to statutes, coupled introductory with the ownership “take” absolute to the low water- clause in N.D.C.C. 47-01-15 which focuses generally, mark. See 3 Kent’s Commentar- on “the [riparian] under which the land ies, 1892); pp. (Lacey’s 462-69 Edition An- held,” whole, legislative as a evidence a not., Title to Beds of Natural Lakes or ripari intent that that statute did not Ponds, 23 A.L.R. 757 landowner absolute Territory Other Field Code and Dakota agree shore zone. We with the district court provisions support Civil Code that conclusion. that N.D.C.C. ais rule of con 47-01-15, N.D.C.C., originally determining boundary was struction for part an of article of the Field Code and riparian the of land and is not itself an Territory dealing 1865 Dakota grant Civil Code absolute to the low water with “boundaries.” The next section in that mark. interpreting convey As a rule for article, 267, land, ances, § said that riparian grantee “[a]n owner of a “takes” the interest street, presumed granted bounded a road or is conveying to that is in the instrument way, own watermark, to the center of the con- but the to the low boundary which is the added). trary may (Emphasis be shown.” grantee’s interest. We construe See N.D.C.C. 47-01-16. The territorial N.D.C.C. 47-01-15 in that manner to avoid Legislature specified thus that interpretation a landowner that would a presumptively owns to the party gift center of an ad- a anti-gift violation of the clause street, whereas, joining constitution, road or riparian X, a of our state N.D. Const. Art. Treasurer, landowner takes to the low Solberg watermark. A 18.6 See v. State 78 Immediately upon struing admission of North Dakota arguably N.D.C.C. 47-01-15 as a 1889, to the Union in our constitution took effect. anti-gift would not violate the clause. Const., Schedule, § 1889 N.D. 11. Pursuant to However, construing a similar territorial Section 2 of the constitutional schedule for state- parallel law in the context of a constitutional hood, Territory "[a]ll laws now in force in the force,” schedule for laws "in Oklahoma courts repugnant which are not to this Consti- have concluded that the Oklahoma Territorial tution, they expire by shall remain in force until authority did not have to enact a law repealed.” their own limitations or be altered or deprive which would the future state of sover statehood, Legisla- At the time of the territorial eignty over a shore zone. United States v. Mack predecessors ture had enacted the of N.D.C.C. (E.D.Okl.1913), ey, 214 F. 137 rev’d on other §§ provisions and those (8th Cir.1914); grounds, 216 F. 126 State v. No- continuously statutory provi- have remained as 479, (1914). legs, 40 Okl. P. 139 943 See United sions in 2 North Dakota. Section of the constitu- Co., States v. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas 249 F. provides 609 tional schedule for statehood some au- (W.D.Okl.1918), (8th Cir.1920), aff'd, thority predecessor 270 that F. 100 the of N.D.C.C. 47-01- 77, 60, aff'd, simultaneously 260 15 became state U.S. 43 S.Ct. 67 L.Ed. 140 law with the Bustillos, (1922); 449, parte admission of North Dakota to the see also Ex 26 N.M. Union and the constitution, (1920) including restraining effective date of our state 194 P. 886 law [territorial anti-gift analysis, pardon power the clause. that Under con- executive’s was declared unconsti

543 then, (1952); “What, 806, respective rights 49 Herr v. 58 N.D. (1947). 91, 916 Rudolf, plaintiff 75 25 N.W.2d to the N.D. state as intervening between and low water interpretation, we con With right plaintiff mark? The ac- has intent, that, contrary clude absent waters; cess to and use of such he has the land [riparian] is “grant under which right to accretions and relictions which grantee’s full inter includes a held” shore; may right attach to such he has the necessarily pre in the shore est ways to that may use such shore all he claim absolute owner cludes State’s desire, long as exception so and with the However, the ship watermark.7 prevent with or he does interfere footing public trust doctrines es equal public using having also from or access totally cannot abdicate tablish the State purposes for the same watermark, and that a interest to the its it, viz., public right to navigating, has a use to the low riparian landowner’s interest wa fishing, boating, fowling, public and like is not absolute. Illinois Central termark Ass’n, Railroad, uses. the state supra; United Plainsmen And has no control XI, 3;§ plaintiff’s Const. Art. supra. long See also N.D. or interfere with said use so Note, The Trust in North Public Doctrine plaintiff as does not interfere with said (1977-78). Dakota, 54 N.D.L.Rev. 565 public use.” similar to N.D.C.C. 47- Under statutes Korrer, 623, supra, 148 N.W. 01-15, recognized that other courts have nei Supreme Minnesota Court said: have the State nor landowners ther the title owner in ‘While and that title in the shore zone both absolute extends ordi- have waters parties correlative interests area. Korrer, 60, mark, nary is 127 Minn. 148 N.W. 617 low-water his title not abso- Madson, 457, 152 (1914); Flisrand v. 35 S.D. except ordinary high-water lute mark. (1915). Superior also N.W. See intervening space As to his County, Cal.3d Court Lake qualified by limited or denied, Cal.Rptr. P.2d cert. purpose use the same 325, 70 L.Ed.2d 165 102 S.Ct. U.S. navigation public purpose. or other (1981); Ac Montana Coalition Stream public pur- it for may state use such cess, Curran, Inc. v. 210 Mont. 682 P.2d it pose, during that end reclaim and to water, periods protect from of low use, owner, Flisrand, by riparian even the that supra, In 152 at N.W. present pro- with or Supreme Dakota Court said: would interfere its South argument reject thus was not “in 7. We the State's the 1989 tutional after statehood and adopted]. "sovereign was force” time state constitution in of a definition of lands” enactment Mackey, 61-33-01(3) In the federal court of Okla- district legisla- § indicative of N.D.C.C. is that the Oklahoma Territorial homa concluded Legislature riparian regarding that a tive intent the interest regard- authority legislate had no "takes” under N.D.C.C. 47-01-15. landowner rights bordering owners on of arguably great- That a definition the United States held those lands rivers because er in the shore zone than allowed under interest trust for states. The court concluded in future be 47-01-15 and cannot used to N.D.C.C. rights riparian defining that “the of own- predecessor bootstrap legislative a intent for in the streams is not a ers beds Generally, subsequent of N.D.C.C. 47-01-15. legislation.” rightful subject of territorial Mack- a be considered as amendments to statute cannot ey, supra, F. at 149. The court held that a 214 indicating in the intention of was void and did not a territorial statute become Linington adopting earlier statutes. McLean a law of Oklahoma under similar constitutional (on (N.D.1968) County, petition 161 the statute was schedule for statehood because Brace, rehearing). See 36 N.W.2d at State v. territoiy. Eighth "in The Cir- not force” in ("The adopt legislature may a 332 not retroactive grounds Mackey procedural cuit reversed destroy navigability which would a definition of considering without However, the "in force" rationale. grant, already vested a federal under Nolegs in that rationale was followed property right body a in a transfer to the state approval and was cited with in Brewer-Elliott. previously had been interpretation water or the bed thereof that 47- Because our of N.D.C.C. 01-15, owner.”). acquired by private a we not address this issue. need use, compensation. spective public brought without in the context declaratory judg- of a only by paramount public require- Restricted ment action does not eliminate the right enjoys proprie- controversy. owner ment of actual Id. “‘No tary privileges, among declaratory which is the proceedings action or lie a purposes.” use the land to obtain Act a decision which is merely advisory merely or which determines cases demonstrate that no in Those ” questions.’ citing abstract Id. at West terest shore zone is absolute. Al Fargo School Fargo Public District West though may a claim landowner abso Ass’n, (N.D. Education 259 N.W.2d ownership ordinary lute the land above the 1977). See also Mullins v. Dakota watermark claim Services, Department Human 483 N.W.2d ownership absolute of the land below the (N.D.1992) (“... dispute there is no ordinary via low watermark ...”). review, ripe legal As stated doctrines, equal footing those doctrines C.W., (N.D. Interest 453 N.W.2d contemplate do 1990), give advisory opinions we “should not ownership absolute of the shore zone ei questions on academic where no actual con- party. parties ther Both have correlative troversy needs be determined.” Hystad interests the shore zone. Cf. Commission, Industrial In the claim absence of a or contro (in (N.D.1986) determining spacing units for versy regarding specific use of the shore gas pool, correlative include interde zone, speculate precise we decline to on the pendent rights and of each duties landowner parties’ rights extent of the and interests vis in the source of supply). common Under the However, a-vis the shore zone. to the extent equal footing trust and doctrines the the trial held that the State had abso State has interests the shore which lute only title to the shore zone and Mills had than a navigational involve more servitude. riparian rights, we hold that the trial court Railroad, supra; Illinois Central United party erred. Neither has absolute Ass’n, supra. Plainsmen Under N.D.C.C. Instead, they the shore zone. have coexis owner “takes” more tent, overlapping interests in the area. than the mere access the water. summary reverse judgm We parties’ interests ent.8 overlap, shore zone coexistent but in specific right case no or claim for use of SANDSTROM, JJ., MESCHKE and the shore zone contested. The shore zone concur. presents complex correlative, bundle of conflicting, sometimes WALLE, C.J., and claims VANDE concurs in the which are better suited for determination as result.

they Any precise arise. delineation of the Justice, LEVINE, concurring. parties’ rights in this situation would be advi sory. It reversing is well established that I am courts will not sure we are more than give advisory opinions not if there is no holding. semantics the trial court’s controversy actual E.g., to be determined. While the trial have overstated the Bendish, (N.D. Gosbee v. breadth of the State’s in the shore 1994). Merely title,” proceeding because a zone to be “absolute I do not read the IX, Const., argues 8. declaratoiy precludes Mills also that the State’s Art. N.D. claims of precluded by action is several possession against affirma- adverse the State. See Cookv. defenses, including Clark, judicata (N.D.1985). tive the res effect 375 N.W.2d 181 (N.D. Perry 1965), Erling, v. N.D.C.C., N.W.2d 889 ad- requires the State possession, verse statute limitations in forty years to institute an action within after a disagree. We 28-01-01. dispute forty years and not arises within after the Perry Erling, acquires this court declined to decide interest in real and preclude Nagel title to this land also did not decide the therefore does action. issue District, County raised case. in this That is not Water decision res Emmons Resource judicata. (N.D.1991). disagreeing the trial opinion as with majority holding only riparian that Mills has

court’s zone. Whatever those

rights to Mills will have to entitle disclosure, case-by-ease but whatever

await is, context it must be decided duty to the shore zone sovereign hold

State’s I concur public. While dutifully have and I believe we

opinion, pin, we have left angels

counted speculate over what parties in limbo

both probably “correlative”

their pa- impossible dream about

dream rights. of those

rameters

Perry WOLF, Ernest Plaintiff Appellant, DEPARTMENT OF DAKOTA

NORTH

TRANSPORTATION, Defendant Appellee. No. 940075.

Civ. Dakota.

Supreme Court

Oct. Bismarck, Nodland, P.C.,

Irvin B. appellant; argued Nod- plaintiff and Chad land. Atty. (argued), Miller Asst.

Carmen G. Gen., Bismarck, appellee. defendant MESCHKE, Justice. appeals from a district court

Perry Wolf affirming sus- an administrative intoxi- pension his driver’s license due to engine driving. We that excessive cated hold gave suspicion officer noise an reasonable stop, affirm. investigative and we 1:40 September night in near One a.m., Highway Rick Richard was Patrolman

Case Details

Case Name: State Ex Rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills

Court Name: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date Published: Oct 27, 1994

Citation: 523 N.W.2d 537

Docket Number: Civ. 940089

Court Abbreviation: N.D.