31 Nev. 456 | Nev. | 1909
Lead Opinion
The appeal is from a judgment of the district court declaring that it was unsafe for the defendant The State Bank and Trust Company to continue business, ordering the bank into liquidation, enjoining its directors from transacting any of its business, appointing a receiver, and directing the bank examiner to deliver to the receiver all property of the bank. We have presented for consideration the constitutionality of an
Among other things this statute provides that the governor, secretary of state, and state treasurer shall constitute a board of bank commissioners, and this board shall appoint a thoroughly expert bank examiner, and it shall be his duty to examine the accounts and report the condition of all banks throughout the state; to prepare and furnish to every bank, banking firm, corporation, and company doing a banking business a license in the form prescribed by him, authorizing the transaction of a banking business; to furnish on demand to all banks blank forms of statements as may by law be required of them, twice in each year, and as much of tener as in his judgment it may be deemed necessary, and without previous notice to visit and make full examination of all banking corporations. Section 7 provides a penalty for the failure of the bank examiner to report to the bank commissioners the insolvency or unsafe condition of any banking corporation. Section 8 provides that no corporation, firm, or individual shall transact a banking business without the requisite license, and section 9 directs that banking corporations, including banks in liquidation or insolvency, whenever required by the bank examiner, shall make a report showing their exact financial condition.
The principal attacks made by the imposing array of counsel are directed against the title, as designated above, and section 10, which provides: "* * * If it shall appear to said examiner that it is unsafe for any such corporation to continue to transact business, it shall be the duty of such examiner to immediately report the condition of such corporation to the bank commissioners; and if the bank commissioners, either from the report of the bank examiner, or from their own knowledge, decide that it is unsafe for any such corporation to continue to transact business they shall authorize the bank examiner to take such control of such corporation, and
It is claimed that this act is in violation of section 17, article IV, of our State Constitution, in that the subject of the act is not expressed in the title; that the statute is invalid because it embraces more than one subject; that the provisions of section 10 are .in violation of section 20, article TV, of the Constitution, which forbids the passage by the legislature of local or special laws regulating the practice of courts of justice; that because the action is brought in the name of the state, on the relation of the bank commissioners, there is no- proper party plaintiff; that section 10 of the statute is voidj in that it attempts to delegate to an executive board judicial functions, in violation of section 1, article III, of the Constitution; and that this section of the act denies appellants equal protection of the laws, and is therefore in conflict with section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The main principles controlling these questions have been well-nigh settled by this and other courts. That section 17, article IV, of the Constitution, providing that "each law
The creation and specification of the duties of the board of bank commissioners, and the definition of their powers, is properly connected with the appointment and duties of the bank examiner, who is appointed by, and reports .to, this board, and the same may be deemed true of the suit which the board is authorized to have brought through the attorney-general against any bank which is not solvent or in a safe condition to do business, and of the appointment of the receiver to whom the bank examiner is directed to surrender the property. We are unable to see that the suit and the appointment of a receiver are not connected with the duties of the board and the bank examiner and their duties in instituting the suit and surrendering the property to the receiver. Under the argument presented it could be claimed that, if the title of the act further provided that it was for the bringing of actions, and of the appointment of receivers against insolvent or unsafe banks, the title related to three or more matters not properly connected; or, if the title simply stated that
The act in California, containing provisions substantially the same as those to which objections are taken here, is entitled " An act creating a board of bank commissioners and prescribing their duties and powers” approved March 24,1903 (Stats. 1903, p. 365, c. 266). It will be perceived that this title is not as comprehensive as, and contains only a part of, the reference embraced in our statute, and yet the court there held that the provisions of the act related to, or were properly connected with, the subject embraced in the title, and that it was not unconstitutional for other reasons, and in People v. Bank of San Luis Obispo, 97 Pac. (Cal.) 307, said: "It is claimed that the act is unconstitutional in so far as it purports to give any authority to the attorney-general to bring or prosecute this action, for the reason that 'the title of the act does not mention duties, authority, or power of the attorney-general, ’ and section 24, article IV, of the Constitution provides that every act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, and that any act shall be void as to any subject embraced therein which is not expressed in its title. The title of the act of March 24, 1903, is the same as that of March 30, 1878 (Stats. 1877-78, p. 740, c. 481). In People v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. 105, 34 Pac. 492, section 11 of the act of 1878, corresponding to section 10 of the act of 1903, providing for such an action by the attorney-general, was assailed on various grounds; one being that the title did not sufficiently express the subject-matter of said section. The court said: 'We think that the title of the act sufficiently expresses the subject of the act, and is sufficiently
The title "An act to provide for the incorporation of mutual fire insurance companies, and defining their powers and duties)’ Avas held sufficient to embrace, Avithout particular mention, provisions for Avinding them up and for the appointment of a receiver. (Wardle v. Townsend, 75 Mich. 385, 42 N. W. 950, 4 L. R. A. 514.) Under the clause of the Kentucky Constitution, providing "no laAV enacted by the general assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title” (Constitution of Kentucky, art. II, sec. 37), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a provision directing the issuance of new bonds Avas germane to, and properly included in, an act authorizing counties’ "to compromise and settle with the holders” of certain indebtedness. (Carter County v. Sinton, 120 U. S. 517, 7 Sup. Ct. 650, 30 L. Ed. 701; Montdair v. Ramsdell, 107 U S. 155, 2 Sup. Ct. 391, 27 L. Ed. 431.) Other cases may be found in the note in 1 L. R. A. 362, and also in People v. Bank, 53 App. Div. 298, 65 N. Y. Supp. 766.
In Ex Parte Pittman, 31 Nev. 43, decided the early part of this year after mature consideration, we held that the prosperity of the country is largely influenced by public confidence
In State v. Exchange Bank of Milligan, 34 Neb. 201, 51 N. W. 766, the court said: "The power of the legislature to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which a corporation or an individual may transact a banking business within this state will not be seriously controverted. The purpose of the act, viz., to protect depositors and insure solvent banking institutions, is not only within the constitutional powers of the legislature, but is certainly a judicious exercise of such power. The legislature has by this act not only prescribed the conditions upon Avhich any corporation, firm, or individual may engage in the business of banking, but has provided that, in case of a violation of its provisions by a failure to comply with the conditions or terms imposed, the state may interfere by means of the agencies provided by law in order to protect those interested, and to prevent a diversion of the funds from the purpose to which they should be applied. Whether the application for a receiver to impound the funds of an insolvent bank
Statutes regulating insurance and other lines of business have often been sustained. In Ivy v. Western Union Tel. Co. (C. C.) 165 Fed. 372, decided last November, considering the objection that because the act applied only to telegraph companies, and not to other corporations, it was class legislation, and violative of the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, the court said: "These objections are clearly untenable, in view of the numerous decisions of the courts. Whatever doubt might have existed at one time on this question has been removed by a uniform line of decisions of all courts, and especially the Supreme Court of the United States. Cases directly in point are: Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 19 Sup. Ct. 609, 43 L. Ed. 909; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404, 19 Sup. Ct. 419, 43 L. Ed. 746; Fidelity Association v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308, 22 Sup. Ct. 662, 46 L. Ed. 922; Farmers’ & Merchants’ Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U. S. 301, 23 Sup. Ct. 565, 47 L. Ed. 821; Missouri Railway Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 24 Sup. Ct. 638, 48 L. Ed. 971; Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 27 Sup. Ct. 126, 51 L. Ed. 168; Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36, 27 Sup. Ct. 243, 51 L. Ed. 357; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 27 Sup. Ct. 289, 51 L. Ed. 499; Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Bank, 207 U. S. 251, 28 Sup. Ct. 89, 52 L. Ed. 195; Heath & Milligan Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 28 Sup. Ct. 114, 52 L. Ed. 236; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed.
It is apparent that the contention that the state is not a proper party plaintiff, and that it has no grievance to be remedied, no property to be recovered, and no beneficial interest in the result of the action, cannot be sustained. The authorities cited, and what we have already stated, indicate that the requirement that the banking business be safely conducted is so essential to the prosperity of the people that it may be regulated, and actions for that purpose may be maintained by, and in the name of, the state.
It is claimed that by section 10 of the act the legislature has attempted to authorize the courts to appoint receivers of banking corporations by special enactments not applicable to other corporations or citizens. This contention is met also by the fact that, as banks are to such a degree connected with, and responsible for, the financial welfare of the state, they are subject to regulation, and therefore laws may be passed pertaining to them which are not applicable to other corporations or citizens generally. It is not necessary that the commissioners and examiner be authorized to investigate the affairs of all others doing business before banks may be examined or regulated. When the proceedings authorized against an insolvent or unsound bank have progressed to the institution of suit, and a showing is made that a receiver is necessary, no good reason appears why one may not be appointed in a special suit to settle and liquidate the affairs of the bank similarly and with the same results as if appointed under the section of the statute relating to the appointment of receivers generally.
As to the claim that the act attempts to confer judicial powers upon an executive board, and authorizes it to proceed ex parte without a hearing, the reply is that the appeal is from a decree made by the court after the parties affected had an opportunity to be heard and present their evidence. The taking over of the assets of the bank by the examiner to pre
Holding these views, it is unnecessary to consider the motion to dismiss the appeal of some of the appellants, or the motion to dismiss the motion to dismiss.
The decree of the district court is affirmed.
Rehearing
On Petition for Rehearing
Counsel for appellants have filed a petition for a rehearing, in which it is contended that our former decision in this case is at variance with two recent decisions of this court, viz., Bell v. District Court, 28 Nev. 280, and State v. Gibson, 30 Nev. 353.
To hold that the act involved in this case is constitutional, we do not think has made necessary any different construction of the provisions of section 17 of article IV of the Constitution than that applied in former decisions of this court. Sometimes expressions may occur in an opinion not essentially necessary to its determination, and, taken alone, might be susceptible of too broad or too restricted a construction, but, viewed in the light of the entire decision, cannot be said to modify an established rule. The two cases, swpra, we think are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
The gist of the opinion in Bell v. District Court, supra, is
The case of State v. Gibson involved the constitutionality of section 2 of an act entitled "An act to provide for the appointment of stenographers upon the hearing of preliminary examinations before committing magistrates in this state, and to regulate the compensation therefor” (Stats. 1907, p. 59, c. 32),.which reads: "When such report is made, the same, when transcribed and sworn to as aforesaid, shall be deemed a correct statement of the evidence and proceedings given and had therein, and shall be admissible in evidence on the trial of the case, as prescribed in section 151 of the criminal practice act of the State of Nevada.” In that case we said:- "An examination of the title to the act in question reveals that it has reference only to the appointment of a stenographer and fixing the compensation therefor. Nowhere in the title of the act is there any reference to the testimony being thereafter used as evidence, or at all. Section 2 of said act, therefore, clearly violates section 17 of article IV of the Constitution of our state, because the subject-matter is not embraced in the title of the act, nor can it be said that the subject-matter of section 2 is germane to the subject-matter defined in the title of the act;’ The above section was held, also, to violate other provisions of the Constitution not in question in the case at bar.
The contention of counsel for appellants that in this case we have departed from established precedents is clearly without merit. A few extracts from former decisions of this court will be sufficient answer to this contention.
In the case of State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27, 27 Am. Rep. 454, this court, by Beatty, C. J., said: "But in dealing with this particular objection to parts of statutes, which, as a whole, embrace but one subject of legislation, the courts of the different states have adopted an exceedingly liberal rule of
In the case of State v. Commissioners, 22 Nev. 399, 407, this court, by Bigelow, C. J., said: "We have often held, and still hold, that the Constitution is to be liberally construed, to the end that there shall be no unnecessary hampering of legislation, but there is a wide difference between liberal construction and nullification, which would be the effect of deciding that an act, passed under a title so misleading as this, is, notwithstanding, a valid law. The section might as well be stricken from the Constitution at once as a dead letter. This distinction is well illustrated by cases heretofore decided by this court. Those of State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27, 27 Am. Rep. 454; Ex Parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 287, and State v. Board, of Commissioners of Humboldt County, supra, 21 Nev. 235, of which
See, also, State v. Commissioners, 17 Nev. 96, 102; State v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, 345; State v. Commissioners, 21 Nev. 235, 239.
The case of Brooks v. People, 14 Colo. 413, 24 Pac. 553, cited and quoted from in State v. Gibson, supra, may, and we think does, give a too restricted construction to the constitutional provision in question, and is not in entire harmony with the uniform liberal construction adopted by this and other courts generally. The rule laid down by the Colorado court in the Brooks case supported our contention, but went further and to an extreme which was not necessary to a determination of the G-ibson case, the opinion in which, taken as a whole, is in line with the uniform views expressed by this court. The question presented in the G-ibson case was practically identical with that in State v. Commissioners, 22 Nev. 399, supra.
The petition for rehearing is denied.