122 Neb. 502 | Neb. | 1932
' From a judgment of the district court, classifying the claim of intervener against defendant, an insolvent state bank, as a general rather than a preferred claim, intervener has appealed. There is no controverted issue of fact. Only questions of law are involved.
The defendant bank became insolvent and was placed in the hands of a receiver in February, 1930. At the time the bank became insolvent Box Butte county had on deposit in the bank $28,961.67. The bank had secured this deposit by the pledge of $10,000 in liberty bonds and three depository bonds, one of which, for $8,500, was furnished by intervener. The liberty bonds have been sold and applied on the amount of the deposit. Intervener has paid to the county the amount of the bond and has taken from the county an assignment of its deposit account to the extent of $8,500. Intervener filed with the receiver its claim, based on the assignment, asking its allowance as preferred, first, as a trust fund and preferred over claims of depositors, and, in the event the court does not so allow it, that it be classified as a valid preferred depositors’ claim.
Of what value would a deposit be to a bank if it could not use the same and loan money so deposited? By what process of reasoning can it be supposed that any bank would pay interest upon a special deposit which it was not permitted to use but was required to keep separate and apart from other funds of the bank and be liable therefor without any compensation for the safe-keeping of the fund? The question answers itself. Moreover, intervener in its brief makes this statement: “That the interveners, by executing and delivering their depository bonds to Box Butte county, preserved the assets of the defendant bank by causing Box Butte county to keep on deposit in the bank large sums which were vital to the actual continuance of the bank.” How could such funds be vital to the continuance of the bank if it had no use of them? Furthermore, in Shambaugh v. City Bank of Elm Creek, 118 Neb. 817, speaking of the authority of county treasurers to make deposits in banks, it is held: “Under the
Intervener contends that, as assignee of the county, it was subrogated to the latter’s rights and was entitled to have its claim classified as that of a depositor, notwithstanding the provision's of section 8-1,102, Comp. St. 1929. That section, in part, provides: “The claims of depositors, for deposits, not otherwise secured, * * * shall have priority over all other claims, except federal, state, county and municipal taxes, and subject to such taxes, shall at the time of the closing of a bank be a first lien on all the assets of the banking corporation from which they are due and thus under receivership.” Prior to the amendment of the statute in 1925 it read: “The claims of depositors, for deposits, * * * shall have priority,” etc. Intervener makes this contention: “That part of paragraph 8-1,102, Comp. St. Neb. 1929, ‘not otherwise secured’ was intended to cover a situation where a bank has deposited some of its securities as collateral to secure a deposit as distinguished from the depositor having security from an outside source; and also to cover a situation where a bonding company takes collateral from the bank to protect itself, or the assets of the bank are reduced by-the pledging of securities with the bonding company, to induce it to execute a depository bond.” It is argued that the words “not otherwise secured” were intended solely for the protection of the guaranty fund (now the depositors’ final settlement fund)..
We do not think the contention sound. It was the in
An applicable rule is found in 25 R. C. L. 957, sec. 213, which reads: “A statute is not to be read as if open to construction as a matter of course. It is only in the case of ambiguous statutes of uncertain meaning that the rules of construction can have any application. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself.”
Other states having laws for the guaranty of bank deposits have enacted statutes providing that deposits, otherwise secured, are not protected by the guaranty fund; and the phrase “not otherwise secured” has been the subject of judicial discussion in other jurisdictions. Kansas had such a law, and in American State Bank v. Wilson, 110 Kan. 520, decided in 1922, it was determined that any
This court had under consideration the effect to be given this statute in the case of State v. First State Bank, ante, p. 109. It was there held: “A city that exacts from a state bank collateral security for deposits, receives the proceeds of the security after insolvency of the bank and presents to the receiver a claim for excess of deposits over such proceeds, is in the class of depositors 'otherwise secured’ and not entitled to share the assets of the bank on an equality with depositors in the class ‘not otherwise secured,’ within the meaning of the statute providing that depositors and holders of exchange in the latter class shall have the first lien.” We find no reason to depart from or modify this ruling. It follows that if the statute is valid intervener’s claim is not entitled to the same classification as “deposits, not otherwise secured.”
It is argued that if the statute is held to mean what its plain language imports then it is special or class legislation and inhibited by the state Constitution; further, that it denies to intervener the equal protection of the law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution; and that to deny to intervener the same protection as depositors not otherwise secured is inequitable and unjust.
It seems reasonably clear that the legislature was attempting to create a state banking system and to reasonably insure depositors of the safety of funds deposited in state banks, if deposited under certain conditions. The state evidently desired to encourage its citizens to use a state bank and to deposit their funds therein, and, to some extent at least, insure the safety of such deposits if made pursuant to the provisions of the law. It must be observed that no depositor was required to deposit his funds in such a bank, but if he voluntarily did so, in compliance with the law, he would be entitled to the protection; but that, unless he came within the stipulated provisions, he should not be entitled to the same protection.
The rule is well established that “The legislature has power to make reasonable classifications of persons and objects for the purposes of legislation affecting diversely the different classes.” State v. First State Bank, supra. In
In this connection, it may be observed that a brief amici curise has been filed in this case, which contends that where a depositor takes an indemnity bond to secure himself, and pays for the bond, and such bond is not paid for by the bank, nor any assets of the bank pledged, either to the depositor or to the surety on the bond, he is entitled to participate in the lien granted to depositors, not otherwise secured, and to participate in the depositors’ final settlement fund. That question is not involved in this case and is not here decided. In the instant case there were both a pledge of assets by the bank to the depositor and depository bonds furnished and given by the bank to the depositor.
We are unable to perceive wherein the statute violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The surety on the depository bond received a premium from the bank for executing the bond. It was aware of the fact that the county had taken a pledge of some of the bank’s assets for the protection of the county’s deposit, and it also accepted from the bank a depository bond, with intervener as surety. Intervener had the right to demand from the bank a pledge of assets to secure it, or it could have exacted such premium as it
We are constrained to hold that the judgment is not vulnerable to any of the attacks made upon it.
Affirmed.