This is a writ of certiorari to the respondent, as clerk of the village of Elkhorn, to bring before the court the proceedings of the board of review of said village in respect to the assessment of the personal property of the relator for the year 1888. The facts appearing from the petition and return are as follows:
The relator made out the usual verified statement of his taxable personal property for that year, by entering in the column headed “Valuation by owner,” “ Gold and silver watches, 1 in number, $50; ” “ Average amount of moneys in possession or on deposit during year, $200;” “Average amount of notes, bonds, mortgages and other securities for debts due, or to become due, for each and every month during the year ending May 1st, over and above the average amount of bona fide unconditional debts owing for each and every of said months, as determined under sec. 1056, E. S., $3,000; ” “ All other personal' property not including above and not exempt, $300; ” “ Total value of all personal property, $3,500,” — ■ and returned said statement so made out to George ~W. Wylie, the assessor of said district. The assessor entered in said statement, in the column headed “Valuation by assessor,” opposite the $3,000 for notes, bonds, mortgages, etc., which in said statement is marked
On this record the circuit court affirmed the decision of the board of review.
I have been thus particular in stating the facts appearing of record, for a proper understanding of the first two points made by the learned counsel of the appellant: (1) That the notices required by the statute were not given of the meetings of the board; and (2) that the action of the board was not supported by evidence.
1. As to the first point, it may be said, in brief, that inasmuch as the statute has imposed the duty of posting the notices upon the clerk, and not upon the board, 'and the board are required to meet for a review of the assessments as a public and imperative duty, any neglect of the clerk in such particular would not affect the legality of their meeting for such purpose^ or their jurisdiction to hear and decide cases in which parties interested have had act
2. In such a case, we may not examine and wrnigh the testimony as to its preponderance, if there was competent evidence before the board to warrant the decision. State ex rel. Moreland v. Whitford, 54 Wis. 150; Persons v. Burdick, 6 Wis. 63; Dexter v. Cole, 6 Wis. 319; State ex rel. Smith v. Cooper, supra. The assessor and witness Wylie found mortgages of record to the relator of the amount stated, of $5,300. The relator was informed of that fact, and asked if anything had been paid thereon, and he said there had not, and tacitly admitted that he owned and held the same; and he was asked to be sworn and to testify on the subject,
3. The main question presented is whether the sworn statement of the relator was conclusive upon the board of review, as to the item No. 15, of notes, bonds, mortgages, etc. Such statement may be conclusive, so far as the assessor is concerned, by force of the language at the end of sec. 1056, R. S.: “And the average amount of such year, so determined [b_y the sworn statement], shall be assessed for taxation.” But that question is not in the case, for the board ignored the action of the assessor in raising item No. 15 to $5,300, and set the amount back to $3,000, as fixed in the statement, and predicated their action upon the statement alone. If this action of the board and this construction of the law were erroneous, the relator was not injured by it, and has no right to complain. Whether the statement was conclusive upon the board of review is another and different question. If the assessor is bound to take the statement as to item No. 15, and adopt its valuation as his own, he is certainly required to so enter it upon the assessment roll; for his assessment roll must be complete, and as such passes before the board of review and the boards of equalization, and, when so adjusted, becomes the tax roll on which the taxes are collected. By sec. 1036, R. S., the term “personal property” shall mean and include (besides other things) “all debts due from solvent debtors, whether on account, note, contract, bond, mortgage or other security, or whether such debts are. due or to become due.”
We now approach understandingly the jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the board of review, as prescribed in sec. 1061, R. S. By that section, “ the board shall, under their official oaths, carefully review and examine said roll and statement, and all valuations of real and personal propert}1-, and banlc stock, and shall correct any errors,” etc. The bank stock is first valued by the president, cashier, or other officer in charge, in a statement required by the assessor, according to sec. 1051, and may be revalued by the assessor, according to sec. 1057. The statement above referred to is evidently that statement. The board, therefore, reviews and examines the assessment roll of the valuation of bank stock, and the valuation in the statement of the officer of
It is very clear that the review and examination here spoken of is not for the mere purpose of correcting errors in the assessment roll, as contended by the learned counsel of the appellant, but it is also for the purpose of lowering or raising the valuation of any property on the assessment roll according to the testimony of those who shall appear before them. “They shall determine the correct value of any bank stock which has been valued in. his statement thereof by an officer of the bank at one price and by the assessor at a different price.” “ Any person who thinks the aggregate valuation of his personal property by the assessor too high, may appear and state to the board under oath the true aggregate valuation of all personal property upon which he is liable to taxation,” etc. This certainly includes the securities as well as articles of personal property and bank stock, for it is the aggregate of the whole. “ The board of review shall, when satisfied from the evidence taken that the assessor’s valuation is too high or too low, lower or raise the same accordingly, whether the person assessed appear before them or not.” The assessor’s valuation is that which is on the assessment roll; for the assessor has to append to the roll his affidavit “ that the valuation of personal property and bank stock in said roll is as fixed by [him] [unless changed by the board of review]; that each and every valuation of the property made by [him] is the just and equitable value thereof, as [he] verily believes.’’
The only restriction upon the power of the board is that, in raising or lowering the valuation of the personal property of any person on the assessment roll, or as made by the assessor, which is the same thing, the board must act and so decide on evidence tahen before them. There is no exception of any class or kind of personal property in the statute, and no exception can therefore be made by judicial interpretation. It is very clear that the legislature did not intend to except from the review and correction by the board of review that important and valuable kind of personal property known as securities or credits. It is in that form that taxable property can be most easily concealed and protected from taxation. It is the common form and method of evading taxation. Some of the greatest capitalists and wealthiest persons of the state have but little, if any, visible property subject to taxation, and their property consists almost exclusively in money, notes, bonds, mortgages, and other securities, concealed from the assessor, and only known to themselves. They make the statement under oath of an average amount of valuation of such money and securities, deducting their average indebtedness. Is 'that final? If it is, then the statute is a very convenient and impenetrable shield against just and equal taxation. The board can correct or raise the valuation of all other kinds of personal property by evidence. Why not of this most valuable kind ? It is said that the dis
But the language of the statute is clear enough to evince such an intention of the legislature without argument. The cases cited by the learned counsel of the appellant are not applicable to the statute now in force and above considered. The case of State ex rel. Smith v. Cooper, 59 Wis. 666, was one in which the statement to the assessor was not made by the tax-payer, and the 'board of review raised the valuation of his average securities upon evidence similar to that taken in this case, and this court held that the board acted within its powers in doing so. In Shove v. Manitowoc, 57 Wis. 5, the statement to the assessor was made on oath, and the average value of this class of property stated therein. The board of review raised such valuation to a much larger amount, but did it arbitrarily and without evidence. In construing this section of the statute, Mr. Justice Oassoday says: “Thus it appears that the board of review were authorized to increase or lessen the assessment only upon being ‘ satisfied from the evidence taken5 that it was too high or too low.” But the action of the board was held unlawful only because it was not based on evidence taken. To that extent it is authority in this case. It may be that this particular point was not contested, but it is an opinion on the construction of the statute as to the power of the board to raise the average valuation of this class of personal property above what it was valued in the statement under oath of the tax-payer.
It follows that the board of review had the power to
By the Oou/rt.— The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.