168 N.W. 62 | N.D. | 1918
Lead Opinion
This is an appeal from a judgment denying a peremptory writ of mandamus, which was entered after a demurrer to the answer had been overruled. This opinion is written after rehearing. The question involved is whether the board of trustees of the Soldiers’ Home at Lisbon, North Dakota, must admit to the privileges of the home one who has adequate means of support and to the detriment of others who have not such means; or whether, on the other hand they may make reasonable rules and regulations, which shall prevent the home from being overcrowded, and where, on account of lack of room and facilities, admittance must be denied to some, they may favor those who are most in need. Incidentally there is involved the validity of a rule of the board which limits the use of the home “to veterans not having an annual income of over $400 from all sources, including pensions, rent of houses, farm interest, etc.”
We are satisfied that the trial judge was justified in denying the writ of mandamus, and that the facts which are disclosed by the answer and the truth of which are admitted by the demurrer fully justify the trustees in denying the use of the home to the relator. We do not desire, however, to be understood as unquestionably approving the rule which has been adopted by them and which limits the use of the
Whether this rule would be justified or not would depend upon the circumstances and the demand for the accommodations furnished by the institution. We are satisfied, indeed, that the object of the legislature was to furnish a home for “all honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines,” their wives and widows, who might apply for its aid, and on account of old age or sickness desire its support and companionship or comfort, and this regardless of their financial situation.
We are equally satisfied that, although § 1776, Compiled Laws 1913, states that the object of the Soldiers’ Home shall be to provide a home and sustenance for all honorably discharged soldiers, § 1781, Compiled Laws 1913, which places the general management and control of the institution in the hands of the board of trustees, with the power to make rules and regulations in relation thereto, gave to that board the power to make rules of admission as well as of government, and, when facilities were not at hand to accommodate all, to so manage the institution that those really in need should fix-st be benefited. It is clear, indeed, that the alleviation of distress was the prime purpose of the gift, and it woxxld be absurd to contend that, where two ax’e equally entitled to a benefaction, he who has the right to determine which shall possess it cannot give it to the one most in need.
The Soldiers’' Home at Lisbon was established by the legislature under the provisions of § 216 of article 19 of the Constitution of North Dakota, which provides among other things that:
Section 216. “The following named public institutions are hereby permanently located as hereinafter px-ovided, each to have so much of the x-exnaining grant of one hundred and seventy thousand (170,000) acres of land made by the United States for ‘other educational and charitable institutions’ as is allotted by law, viz.:
“First: A soldiers’ home when located, or such other charitable institution as the legislative assembly may determine, at Lisbon, in the county of Kansom, with a grant of forty thousand (40,000) acres of land.”
The 40,000 acres of land in question were part of the Federal grant,
“Eor the school of mines 40,000 acres; for the reform school 40,000-acres; for the deaf and dumb asylum 40,000 acres; . . . for the-state normal schools 80,000 acres; for public buildings at the capital of said state 50,000 acres; and for such other educational and charitable purposes as the legislature of said state may determine 170,000 acres; in all 500,000 acres.”
Under the sanction of the constitutional provision in question the Soldiers’ Home was located at Lisbon, North Dakota, and by § 1770 of the Compiled Laws' 1913, which originally appeared as chapter 165 of the Laws of 1890, it was provided that “the object of the Soldiers’ Home shall be to provide a home and subsistence for all honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines who have served in the Army or Navy of the United States, and who are disabled by disease, wounds, old age, or otherwise, and their wives and widows.”
Section 1777 also provides that “no applicant shall be admitted to such home who has not been a resident of this state at least one year next preceding his application for admission therein, unless he served in a Dakota regiment or was accredited to the territory of Dakota.”
By the same act the management of the Home was placed in the hands of a board of commissioners, and later, and by §§ 1778, 1779, and 1781 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, was placed in the hands of a board of trustees. These latter acts prescribe the power of the board of trustees and, among other powers, give to them the power to “make rules and regulations not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or of this state for the management and government of such homes, including such rules as it shall deem necessary for the preservation of order, 'enforcing discipline and preserving the health of its inmates.”
It was under the provisions of the above act that the board refused admission to the plaintiff. Its reason for so doing is stated in the answer to the petition, and the facts therein pleaded are admitted by the demurrer.
This answer stated that the relator, although suffering with paralysis and confined to his bed and unable to care for himself, and having a wife who was advanced in years, physically frail and somewhat in
The contention of the relator centers around the word “all,” which is to be found in § 1116 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, and which provides that “the object of the Soldiers’ Home shall be to provide a home and subsistence for all honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines, who have served in the Army or Navy of the United States, and who are disabled by disease, wounds, old age, or otherwise, and their wives and widows.”
He maintains that the word “all” must be given its widest signifi
He maintains that this statute merely relates to the government of the home, and does not include or confer the power to make any rules or regulations on the question of admission or the right of admission, and that there is no other statute which confers this power.
We have, however, as we have before stated, no hesitancy in sustaining the judgment of the district court in the case which is before us, and this, in spite of the fact that the statute under consideration makes use of the word “all” and contains the statement that “the object of the Soldiers’ Home shall be to provide a home and sustenance for all honorably discharged soldiers.” The fact that the object of a grant may be comprehensive does not deny the right and the power, when that object cannot be fully attained, to so use the fund that its real and fundamental purpose can be best subserved. It is well established that “the meaning of general terms may be restrained by the spirit or reason of the statute, and that general language may be construed to admit implied exceptions,” and that “every statute must be construed with reference to the policy intended to be accomplished by it.” 36 Cyc. 1109, 1110; Hare v. McIntire, 82 Me. 240, 8 L.R.A. 451, 17 Am. St. Rep. 476, 19 Atl. 453; Ex parte Voll, 41 Cal. 29; Ford v. State, 42 Neb. 418, 60 N. W. 960; McCoy v. Fahrney, 182 Ill. 60, 55 N. E. 61; 2 Am. & Eng. Law, 143; Phillips v. State, 15 Ga. 518; Hallowell v. Gardiner, 1 Me. 93.
We are of the opinion that the words, “charitable purposes,” which are used in the clause in § 17 of the Enabling Act, which granted to the state the land by which the institution is endowed for “such other educational and charitable purposes as the legislature may determine,” must and should be construed in its broad, and not limited, meaning, and to include acts of public benefaction which are done for public purposes, as well as mere almsgiving or benefaction to the poor, and that as so construed the section authorizes the maintenance of an institution which shall care for all classes of aged and infirm
We are also of the opinion that the legislature of North Dakota, when it enacted § 1776 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, intended that the Home should be open to “all old soldiers, sailors, and marines, who have served in the Army or Navy of the United States, and who are disabled by disease, wounds, old age, or otherwise, and their wives and widows.”
This, however, must necessarily only have been to the extent of the capacity of the building, to the accommodations afforded, and within the limits of the funds provided.
We, in short, entertain no question as to the power of the board to adopt rules of admission as well as of government, and we believe that the power conferred by the statute (§ 1781) to “make rules and regulations not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or of this state for the rnmmgement and government of such homes,'including such rules as it shall deem necessary for the preservation of order, enforcing discipline and preserving the health of its inmates,” is sufficiently comprehensive for the purpose. Surely rules which shall prevent overcrowding relate to the government of the institution to' the preservation of order, and the preservation of the health of its inmates, and surely a rule which prevents overcrowding by rejecting those who have other abundant means of support is not an arbitrary exercise of the power. It is to be remembered that for twenty years or more the control of the Home has been in the hands of a board of trustees made up entirely of old soldiers. And it would be unreasonable to suppose that such a board would not have at heart the best interests of all of their old comrades, or to suppose that they would not have a rational conception of the real purposes for which the Home was instituted.
It is also to be noticed that, although in the past and in many instances the statutes expressly gave to the several boards of trustees the power to make rules for the admission to the various state educational and charitable institutions, no such express pow,er was given to the
Of course, if the legislature definitely prescribes the standards of admission, no board of trustees may depart from its determination, but otherwise the board of trustees must be held to possess the usual powers, which would include the giving of aid where most needed.
Although counsel for appellant contends to the contrary, we are satisfied that the answer sufficiently pleads the fact that the accommodation of the plaintiff would result in denying the use of the Home to others more in need of its comfort and support.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
(specially concurring). The relator sues for a mandamus to compel the defendants to admit him as a member of the Soldiers’ Home at Lisbon. He appeals from an order and judgment denying the suit. By answer, which is admitted, the defendants show that, according to the rules of the Home, no person can be admitted who has an income in excess of $-100 a year; that in his application for admission to the Home the relator swore that his income did not exceed $100 a year, and the same is false and untrue; that he owns 100 acres of land in Ransom county,- North Dakota, free of encumbrances and sixteen lots in Lisbon, on which he has a comfortable home, fitted with electric lights and modem conveniences, and in which he and his family reside; that the land is worth $50 an acre and the lots are worth $2,000. The rents of the land are at least $500 a year and the relator has a pension of $30 a month.
The Home is of limited capacity and the admission of the well to do would crowd out the needy veterans. However, it is the contention of counsel for relator that- all disabled persons who have served in the Army and have been honorably discharged are entitled to the benefits of the Home, regardless of their wealth or the capacity of the Home. The statute reads thus:—
The object of the statute was as far as practicable to provide a home for all of a certain class who need a home, but not for all such as may apply regardless of their needs and the capacity of the home. Regardless of the word “all” or any other word in the statute, it must be given a construction in accord with reason and common sense.
The board of trustees in charge of the Home must of necessity have a right to control it, and to exercise some judgment and discretion in regard to the admission and discharge of inmates. In such cases an appeal to the court for a mandamus does not lie except to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. Comp. Laws, § 8457.
Manifestly the law does not specifically enjoin the trustees of the Soldiers’ Home to admit all applicants to the Home or to admit any person who is well able to help himself and who has no need of the Home.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I cannot agree that the word “all” as used in § 1776 of the Compiled Laws of 1913 has the restrained meaning attached to it by my associates in the majority opinion. The word “all” in said section must be accorded its ordinary and usual signification. The word “all” is defined by Webster’s International Dictionary as follows: “The whole number, quantity, or amount; the entire thing; everything included or concerned; the aggregate; the whole; totality; every thing or person.” In State v. Maine C. R. Co. 68 Me. 510, the court said, defining the word “all:” “ ‘All’ means everything, or the whole number of particulars, — the whole number.”
Section 1776 declares the object of the Soldiers’ Home shall be to provide a home and subsistence for all honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines who have served in the Army or Navy of the United States, and who are disabled by disease, wounds, old age, or otherwise, and their wives and widows.
It is my opinion that any old soldier, sailor, or marine who has
