¶ 1. Siu Wing Lеung appeals from a judgment of the circuit court dismissing his complaint of a violation of the open meetings law as barred by the two-year statute of limitations, Wis. Stat. § 893.93(2)(a) (2001-02). 1 He argues that he sought relief in equity and that there is no statute of limitations in equity; and that if a statute of limitations does *677 apрly, it is one of six years rather than two. He also argues that the discovery rule should apply. We hоld that the applicable statute is § 893.93(2) and so affirm.
¶ 2. Leung filed a complaint on January 3, 2002, alleging violation(s) of the open meetings law by the City of Lake Geneva, Cathleen M. Ahlgren and Anthony Saia on or before June 14, 1999. The complaint requested judgment:
a) For monetary penalties against the Defendants Ahl-gren and Saia pursuant to § 19.96, Wis. Stats.
b) For a declaratory judgment determining and adjudicating the action of the Lake Geneva City Council on June 14, 1999, denying the proposed transfer of the liquоr license from D'Agostino's on the Lake, Inc. to Su Wings Corporation to be void pursuant to § 19.97(3) and (4), Wis. Stats.
c) For the costs of prosecution of this action, including reasonable attorney's fees, uрon the failure of the District Attorney to so prosecute.
d) For such other and further relief as thе Court deems just and equitable.
¶ 3. This case presents a very narrow legal issue: what statute of limitatiоns applies to actions claiming a violation of the open meetings law? Becausе this is an issue of statutory interpretation, our standard of review is de novo.
State v. Isaac J.R.,
*678
¶ 4. The first quеstion is whether Leung has brought either an equity action or a declaratory judgment action. Leung claims that he is bringing this action as a "private attorney general" under Wis. Stat. § 19.97(4), and that as such he cаn seek equitable relief under § 19.97(2). However, merely mentioning the word "equity" or a variant thereof is not sufficient to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the court. The appellant must at least alert the court as to what form of equitable relief (injunction, mandamus, etc.) he or she is seeking. The court must libеrally construe pleadings,
United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Bartolotta's Fireworks Co.,
¶ 5. Leung requests declaratory relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.04, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held deсlaratory judgment to be reserved for those without other adequate recourse availаble.
See State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta,
¶ 6. The second question is whether Wis. Stat. § 893.93(2) is applicable to viоlations of the open meetings law. Section 893.93(2)(a) provides:
*679 The following actions shall be commenced within 2 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred:
(a) An action by a private party upon a statute penalty, or forfeiture when the action is givеn to the party prosecuting therefor and the state, except when the statute imposing it рrovides a different limitation.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the two-year statute of limitations applies where the action by a private party upon a statute penalty is for thе benefit of the public, while the six-year statute of limitations applies when private individuals seek private relief.
See Erdman
v.
Jovoco, Inc.,
¶ 7. Finally, Leung аrgues that the discovery rule should apply to violations of the open meetings law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has declined to extend the discovery rule to causes of action not sоunding in tort.
State v. Chrysler Outboard Corp.,
*680 ¶ 8. Because Leung brought this action as a private attorney general under Wis. Stat. § 19.97, and therefore acted on behalf of the public, the applicable statute of limitations is Wis. Stat. § 893.93(2). We affirm.
By the Court — Judgment affirmed.
Notes
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted.