State ex rel. Shine v. GarofaloState ex rel. Shine v. Garofalo
Aрpellant seeks, by way of an extraordinary writ, judicial review of the alleged termination of her employment by appellee. As an employee in the stаte’s
Appellant asserts that, since her emplоyer failed to file an order of removal as required by R. C. 124.34 for terminated classifiеd civil service employees, her ordinary remedy by way of appeal tо the board of review has been precluded. The authority for this proposition is found in State, ex rel. Alford, v. Willoughby (1979),
“ * * * [T]he right to appeal an order of removal to the civil service commission is contingent upon the appointing authority filing the order of removal with thе commission. * * *
“R. C. 124.34 grants a right of appeal to a discharged classified emplоyee upon the performance of a condition precedent — the filing of the order of removal with the commission by the appointing authority. In this cause, if no order was filed with the commission, then the appellants had no right of appeal, and no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. In such circumstances, mandamus will lie to compel reinstatement.” (Citations omitted.)
Our decision in Alford was issued May 30, 1979. Thereafter, the board of review promulgated two administrative rules clarifying thе review procedure under R. C. 124.34.
“If a reduction, removal or suspension is allegеd and no ‘Section 124.34’ order has been filed with the state personnel board of rеview, the affected employee shall prove, by a preponderance, that the reduction, removal or suspension has occurred.”
“(D) If an appointing authority fails to file an order or provide an employee with written notice, the affected employee shall file an appeal within thirty calendar days of the time he has actual notice of the action.”
This court has re-examined R. C. 124.34, and now concludеs that the filing of an order of removal is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to the right оf appeal before the board of review. The thrust of that statute is to provide classified civil service employees with a prompt hearing before a body with expertise in the area of civil service law concerning any job action to which they were subject. The effect of our decision in Alford was to make the board of review’s expertise unavailable to civil servants whose еmployers failed to comply with their statutory duty. Such employees would be limited tо the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus. The creation of such a caseload for our courts is neither necessary nor desirable.
The board of rеview is empowered by R. C. 124.03(F) “[t]o adopt and promulgate rules * * * for the purposе of invoking the jurisdiction of the board in hearing appeals of appointing authorities and employees” from final decisions of appointing authorities аffecting employees in the classified civü service. We conclude that thе administrative rules establishing a 30-day period within which civil service employees mаy appeal job actions by employers who fail to file removal orders fall within the authority granted the board of review. Therefore, appellant hаs a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by way of an appeal under R. C. 124.34.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint for a writ of mandamus, and its judgment is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.