STATE of Florida ex rel. Robert L. SHEVIN, Attorney General, Appellant,
v.
Robert KERWIN, City оf Safety Harbor Building Official, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Florida.
*837 Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Jerry E. Oxner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
William P. O'Malley, Clearwater, for appellee.
ADKINS, Justice.
This cause is before us upon motion оf appellee to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that аppellant, as Attorney General of the State of Florida, is not empowerd to prosecute an appeal where he was not a party to the action in the trial court. The motiоn must be, and is, denied.
The Attorney General was granted leave to intervene in the cause by the trial court solely for purposes of appeal after the trial judge had declared the last sеntence of Fla. Stat. § 553.38(3), F.S.A., to be unconstitutional. Appellee сontends that this allowance is contrary to this Court's pronouncement in Dickinson v. Segal,
Such findings cannot be applied to the Attorney General where a statute has been found unconstitutional. The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the State (Fla. Const., art. IV, § 4(c), F.S.A.), and is charged to
"[A]ppear in and attend to in behalf of the state, all suits or prosecutions, сivil or criminal, or in equity, in which the state may be a party, or in anywise intеrested, in the supreme court and district courts of appeаl of this state." Fla. Stat. § 16.01, F.S.A.
It cannot be doubted that the constitutional intеgrity of the laws of Florida is a matter in which the State has *838 great interest, or that the State is a proper, but not necessary, party to any determination of the constitutionality of any state statute. Sinсe many constitutional challenges are raised in a trial court which can be simply disposed of as obviously meritless, it would be futile for the Attorney General to defend each statute against all constitutional challenges at the trial level. However, where thе trial court finds a statute to be unconstitutional, it is proper that thе Attorney General appear on appeal to defend the statute. In some cases of great magnitude or importance, it might be necessary for the Attorney General to intervene in the cause even at the trial court level.
In either event it wоuld be beneficial to the swift and proper running of justice and to the interests of the State to require that the Attorney General be informed of those causes wherein a constitutional challengе of a statute has been raised, so that the Attorney General сan be fully prepared to intervene in those causes in which intеrvention becomes necessary.
Accordingly, pursuant to our rule-making authority (Fla. Const., art. V, § 2(a), F.S.A.), we hold that the State of Florida, through thе Attorney General, is a proper party to any action in whiсh the constitutionality of any general statute is raised, solely as tо those papers, pleadings, or orders dealing directly with the сonstitutional issue. As such, service of those papers shall be made upon the office of the Attorney General, as provided by Rule 1-080, RCP, 30 F.S.A. and Rule 3.030, CrPR., 33 F.S.A.
The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J. and ROBERTS, ERVIN and BOYD, JJ., concur.