State Ex Rel. Schrunk v. BonebrakeState Ex Rel. Schrunk v. Bonebrake
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Carson
The issue in this mandamus proceeding is whether, after a verdict was reached in a trial to the court, but before sentencing and judgment, the trial court erred in dismissing indictments issued by two separate grand juries on the ground that the grand juries consisted of fewer than seven members.
In April 1992, Sue Lane Gifford was indicted in Multnomah County in a 20-count indictment, charging her with unlawfully obtaining public assistance, unsworn falsification, and theft in the first degree. The Multnomah County grand jury that indicted Gifford was comprised of six members, one of its seven original members having been excused for good cause. In June 1992, Gifford was indicted in Washington County for kidnapping in the second degree by a grand jury comprised of seven members. In August 1992, Gifford was indicted for perjury by a Washington County grand jury comprised of six members, one of its seven original members having been excused for good cause. In September 1992, venue for the Multnomah County case was changed to Washington County, and the Multnomah County and Washington County cases were consolidated for trial in Washington County.
Gifford waived her right to a jury trial, and trial was held before defendant judge beginning in November 1992. In December 1992, the trial court found Gifford guilty of all the charged crimes.
In January 1993, after the court reached its verdicts,
1
but before it sentenced Gifford or entered judgment, Gifford filed motions to “quash” the indictments
2
and the
scheduled sentencing and to dismiss the case on the ground that the Oregon Court of Appeals had held in
Goodwin v. State of Oregon,
116 Or App 279, 840 P2d 1372 (1992),
w/drawn & rev’d,
125 Or App 359, 363, 866 P2d 466 (1993), that a grand jury must consist of at least seven grand jurors to return a true bill.
3
In May 1993, defendant judge granted
The state then sought a writ of mandamus ordering defendant judge to vacate the orders of dismissal and to sentence Gifford on all the convictions. In June 1993, this court issued an alternative writ of mandamus. This court then asked the parties to address these three questions:
“(1) Was the defendant’s challenge to the grand jury panels timely? State v. Pratt, 316 Or 561, [853] P2d [827] (1993).
“(2) If the challenge to the grand jury panels was not timely, does the trial court nonetheless have authority to consider and rule upon an untimely challenge? Please answer this question regardless of your position in response to question (1).
“(3) Were the grand jury panels, which returned the indictments that were dismissed without prejudice by the trial court, lawfully constituted? Please answer this question regardless of your response to questions (1) and (2).”
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Gifford’s motions to set aside the indictments were untimely and that defendant judge did not have authority to consider her motions. Therefore, a peremptory writ shall issue directing defendant judge to vacate his orders setting aside the indictments and further directing him to sentence Gifford and to enter judgment in accordance with the verdicts reached in the trial before the court.
In
State v. Pratt,
316 Or 561, 567-68, 853 P2d 827,
cert
den,_US_, 114 S Ct 452, 126 L Ed 2d 384 (1993), this court held that a challenge to an indictment based on a claim that a grand jury consisting of less than seven members is improper under Article VII (amended), section 5(2), of the Oregon Constitution
5
was so similar to the statutory bases for challenging an indictment under
“A motion to set aside the indictment or dismiss the accusatory instrument shall be made and heard at the time of the arraignment or within 10 days thereafter, unless for good cause the court allows additional time. If not so made, the defendant is precluded from afterwards taking the objections to the indictment or accusatory instrument.”
Under the holding in
Pratt,
Gifford was required to make her motions to set aside the indictments within the time limits established by
Defendant judge
7
asserts that Gifford’s motions to set aside were timely because, for good cause, as provided in
Upon examination of
It is the task of this court to determine what the legislature intended when it enacted
The text of
This court has held that “the legislature * * * intended to correlate the appeal of these final orders with a defendant’s right against double jeopardy.”
State v. Hat-tersley,
294 Or 592, 597, 660 P2d 674 (1983).
For the state to have a right to appeal an order setting aside an indictment, the order must be entered before trial. After examining the structure of the statute establishing the state’s right of appeal, it seems unlikely
Although the text and context of
The provision of
When Representative Cole made the motion to insert the provision, he “proposed to insert the same 10 day and good cause conditions written into the former jeopardy section.” Id. When Representative Cole earlier had proposed the corresponding timing clause for former jeopardy challenges, he had said that “the motion for dismissal on the basis of former jeopardy should be allowed at any time prior to trial.” Id. at p 4. (Emphasis added.) Representative Cole wanted to give criminal defendants leeway in challenging their indictments, but only up to the commencement of trial. As his statements indicate, Representative Cole did not intend for his proposed “good cause exception” to extend beyond the commencement of trial.
From the foregoing examination of the text, context, and legislative history of
Defendant judge argues that, to the contrary, he had discretion to consider Gifford’s motions to set aside the indictments after trial began, citing this court’s holding in
State v.
Wimber, 315 Or 103, 843 P2d 424 (1992). In
Wimber,
the trial court, under
“[T]he court indisputably allowed defendant to demur at the beginning of trial, and it indisputably allowed defendant to ‘renew’ the demurrer at the end of trial. In the circumstances, we find that the court allowed defendant to demur at a time other than at the arraignment and that the court did not abuse its discretion thereby. Accordingly, the demurrer was timely.” 315 Or at 112.
Defendant judge argues that there is no qualitative difference between “other time” in
This case is not controlled by
Wimber
for two reasons. First, in Wimber, the parties did not raise the issue whether a demurrer must be made before trial. The focus of the analysis was on
“what conduct
by atrial court is sufficient to show that it ‘allow[ed]’ a defendant to demur at some ‘other time.’ ”
State v. Wimber, supra,
315 Or at 111 (citing
Secondly, the defendant in Wimber first demurred to the indictments before trial. 12 Id. at 106. Because the motion in Wimber was made in a timely manner, even though the trial court delayed its ruling, this court had no reason to consider or address what the consequences would have been if the motion had not been timely. Thus, Wimber is not controlling here.
For the foregoing reasons, Gifford’s motions to set aside the indictments were untimely under
In this case, a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy.
It is ordered that a peremptory writ shall issue directing defendant judge to vacate his orders setting aside the indictments and further directing him to sentence Sue Lane Gifford and to enter judgment in due course upon the verdicts reached after the trial before the court.
Notes
In January 1993, defendant judge issued an order entitled “Findings and Order from Court Trial.” For the purposes of this case, findings of fact issued by the trial judge after a trial to the court have the same effect as a verdict in a jury trial. Cf. ORCP 62 F (“In an action tried without ajury * * * the findings of the court upon the facts shall have the same force and effect, and be equally conclusive, as the verdict of a jury.”). Thus, we refer to the findings of guilt issued by defendant judge as “verdicts” throughout this opinion.
Defendant judge correctly treated Gifford’s motions as motions to set aside the indictments, and so shall we.
See State v. Pratt,
316 Or 561, 567-68, 853 P2d 827,
cert
den,_US_, 114 S Ct 452, 126 L Ed 2d 384 (1993) (
The Court of Appeals held that, “[b]ecause only six grand jurors heard the evidence in petitioner’s case, he was entitled to dismissal of the indictment.” Goodwin v. State of Oregon, 116 Or App 279, 284, 840 P2d 1372 (1992), w/drawn & rev’d, 125 Or App 359, 365, 866 P2d 466 (1993). The Court of Appeals further held that Article VII (amended), section 5(2), which requires that “[a] grand jury shall consist of seven jurors,” mandates that “seven grand jurors hear and consider all of the evidence presented before a valid indictment can be found.” Id. at 283.
On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals withdrew its original opinion and issued a new opinion, holding that, pursuant to State v. Pratt, supra, n 2, any constitutional error in the composition of the grand jury “did not render the judgment void or deprive the trial court of jurisdiction.” Goodwin v. State of Oregon, 125 Or App 359, 363, 866 P2d 466 (1993), w/drawing & reversing 116 Or App 279, 840 P2d 1372 (1992). Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that, even assuming the indictment in Goodwin violated Article VII (amended), section 5(2), the “violation does not result in a void conviction, and does not constitute a basis for post-conviction relief.” Id. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held in a different consolidated reconsideration opinion, decided the same day as the new opinion in Goodwin: “We decline to reconsider the merits of the constitutional argument and expressly adopt and incorporate in this opinion our analysis of that issue that was included in the original Goodwin decision. 116 Or App at 281-84.” State v. Conger, 125 Or App 355, 357, 866 P2d 469 (1993), on recon from 120 Or App 220, 851 P2d 636 (1993) and State v. Daugherty, 116 Or App 665, 841 P2d 704 (1992). (Citation in original.) Thus, the Court of Appeals maintains its position that Article VII (amended), section 5(2), requires that an indictment be returned by seven grand jurors.
Judgment was entered on the remaining kidnapping conviction. That conviction is not at issue in this proceeding.
Article VII (amended), section 5(2), of the Oregon Constitution provides:
“A grand jury shall consist of seven jurors chosen by lot from the whole number of jurors in attendance at the court, five of whom must concur to find an indictment.”
“The indictment shall be set aside by the court upon the motion of the defendant * * *:
“(a) When it is not found, indorsed and presented as prescribed inORS 132.360 ,132.400 to 132.430 and 132.580.”
In these proceedings, defendant judge is represented by the Public Defender pursuant to
This court also has stated that it “endeavors to avoid interpreting a statute in a manner which will produce absurd results.” State v. Garcias, 298 Or 152, 159, 690 P2d 497 (1984). It would be absurd for us to conclude that the legislature intended to allow defendants to make motions to set aside indictments after trial begins and thereby foreclose appellate review of those orders.
Although this case does not involve a demurrer, under
Indeed, the court in State v. Wimber expressly noted that ‘Twle do not wish to be understood as approving of the practice of raising demurrers at trial.” 315 Or 103, 112 n 18, 843 P2d 424 (1992). In support, the court cited State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 597, 789 P2d 1352 (1990), which stated that the proper time for an objection to an indictment was before trial and that an oral demurrer to an indictment made at the end of trial was untimely and was properly denied.
The demurrer in Wimber was based on the defendant’s contention that the offenses charged in the indictment took place outside the statute of limitations. State v. Wimber, supra, 315 Or at 106.
This court has not reached the issue of whether an indictment issued by a grand jury of less than seven members is valid under Article VII (amended), section 5(2), of the Oregon Constitution. See State v. Pratt, supra, 316 Or at 566-68 (constitutional question not reached because challenge was not timely).