199 P. 752 | Wash. | 1921
Section 1, p. 324, ch.
"Section 1. No taxing district shall for any purpose become indebted in any manner to an amount exceeding one and one-half per centum of the last assessed valuation of the taxable property in such taxing district, *434 without the assent of three-fifths of the voters therein voting at an election to be held for that purpose, nor in cases requiring such assent shall the total indebtedness at any time exceed five per centum of the last assessed valuation of the taxable property in such taxing district: . . ."
Section 4 of the act (Laws of 1917, p. 589) defines the term "taxing district" to mean and embrace "all counties, cities, towns, townships, port districts, school districts, metropolitan park districts or other municipal corporations which now, or may hereafter exist."
Because of the well established rule, for which there is an abundance of authority, we think it must be held that the statute of 1917 superseded that portion of § 1, p. 324, ch.
"That § 4607 of Remington Ballinger's Annotated Codes and Statutes of Washington be amended to read as follows:" Then follows therein, so far as it is material in the present case, a repetition of the words of the former statute to which the amendment is addressed concerning the power of the board of directors of any school district to borrow money and issue negotiable *435 coupon bonds therefor to any amount not to exceed five per cent of the taxable property of such district, as shown by the last assessment roll for county and state purposes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, when authorized by a vote of the district so to do, and there is added in the amendment, inter alia, a proviso, "that from and after July 1, 1919, all bonds is-sued by any school district shall be issued in serial form". And it is argued for the relator that the amendment necessarily repeals and supersedes that portion of the act of 1917 relating to school districts, so that the limit of indebtedness of such districts is now determined upon the basis of the taxable property in the district rather than upon the assessed valuation thereof — that the amendment in the fullness of its text and terms is the law, so far as school districts are concerned, as if the statute of 1917 had never been enacted.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether a section which has been repealed can be amended. 25 R.C.L., p. 905, § 157; 36 Cyc. 1055; Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d. ed.), § 233. The authorities show, however, that "the question usually arises where a section of an act is amended `to read as follows', and is then again amended in the same manner and by the same description, ignoring the first amendment". 25 R.C.L., p. 905, § 157.
We need not, nor do we, take sides in this conflict of opinion, for, in the last analysis, the question here is not if such an amendment can be made, but what is the effect of such an amendment. In considering this precise question it will be noticed: (1) That the original law, 1909, consisted of two important particulars, among others, viz: the issuance of bonds not exceeding five per cent of the taxable property in the district when authorized by a vote of the district, and that the bonds *436 should bear interest at not to exceed six per cent per annum, payable annually or semi-annually, the bonds to mature as designated in the bonds not to exceed twenty years; (2) that the act of 1917, by necessary implication, repealed that part of the 1909 act by which the basis of valuation was changed from the value of the property to the assessed valuation of the property; and (3) that the amendatory act of 1919 repeated the provisions of the act of 1909 relating to the issuance of bonds not exceeding five per cent of the taxable property of the district when authorized by a vote of the district; it repeated the provision with reference to the rate and payment of interest, changed the wording of the old law as to the maturity of bonds, providing a greater length of time therefor, and in districts of the first class, where bonds were issued for certain specified purposes, the bonds should be made payable in semiannual installments beginning the third year over any period not exceeding forty years; and added by further proviso that all bonds issued by any school district shall be issued in serial form. These were new and important changes and extensions in the amendatory act over the terms of the original act, upon particulars altogether foreign to the terms and purpose of the intervening act of 1917. The 1919 act was not a new and in-dependent one, strictly speaking, but it took the form of an amendatory act.
Section 37, art. 2, of the constitution, provides: "No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length". The reasons for this limitation upon the mode or form in which the legislative power to amend a law shall be exercised are elaborately expressed in the case of Spokane Grain FuelCo. v. Lyttaker,
McLaughlin v. Newark,
In the case of Gordon v. People,
"No one would claim for a moment that if § 7569 had been amended as was formerly the custom — not by republishing it as changed, but only by showing for what part the new clause was substituted — any effect would be produced on the remainder of the section. The constitutional provision requiring amendments to be made by setting out the whole section as amended was not intended to make any different rule as to the effect of such amendments. So far as the section is changed it must receive a new operation, but so far as it is not changed it would be dangerous to hold that the merely nominal re-enactment should have the effect of disturbing the whole body of statutes in pari materia which had been passed since its first enactment. There must be something in the nature of the new legislation to show such an intent with reasonable clearness before *439 an implied repeal can be recognized. Repeals by implication should not be established without satisfactory reason to believe such was the legislative will."
It appears in Spokane Grain Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, supra, by a quotation from Warren v. Crosby,
The conclusion is that the amendatory act did not restore the provision of the old act, and that the law of 1917 declaring that the limit of indebtedness that may be authorized by a vote of a taxing district, including a school district, is five per cent of the last assessed valuation of the taxable property in such district remains controlling and unrepealed.
Writ denied.
PARKER, C. J., TOLMAN, and MAIN, JJ., concur.
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