29 Wash. 411 | Wash. | 1902
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Petition for writ of mandate. The facts, in substance, as alleged, are: The city of Seattle provided for certain improvements, and by ordinance created local assessment districts, and levied assessment upon the real property therein to pay for such improvements. Thereafter the city entered into a contract ahont the 17th of June, 1900, with the firm of McCauley & Delaney, by the terms of which contract said firm were to undertake, construct, and finish such improvements in accordance with the specifications of the contract. At the sama time the said contractors executed a bond in the penal sum of $64,000, conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract, and the City Trust, Safe Deposit & Surety Company, of Philadelphia, a foreign corporation, executed such boiid as- surety. Thereafter the contractors entered upon the construction of such improver ments, and partially completed the same^ and then defaulted and abandoned the contract The surety company was duly notified by the city that it must perform the contract itself or answer for the breach thereof. The surety company then proceeded to construct and complete the improvements under the terms of the contract, which performance was accepted by the city. By the stipulations of the contract, local assessments were to he collected for the payment of the contractors, and, if sufficient collections on such assessments, were not made within thirty days after the performance of the contract, the remainder due the contractors was to he paid in bonds issued and payable out of the local assessment fund. Upon the performance of the contract the moneys then collected and the bonds issued for the amount remaining due were to he delivered
“It is merely an application of the familiar and necessary rule, so often applied, which governs the- relation of courts of concurrent jurisdiction, where, as is the case here, it concerns those of a state and of the United States, constituted by the authority of distinct governments, though exercising jurisdiction over the same territory. That rule has no> reference to the supremacy of one tribunal over the other, nor to the superiority in rank of. the respective claims, in behalf of which the conflicting jurisdictions are invoked. It simply requires, as a matter of necessity, and, therefore, of comity, that when the object of the action requires the control and dominion of the property involved in the litigation, that court which first acquires possession, or that dominion which is equivalent, draws, to itself the exclusive, right to- dispose of it, for the purposes of its jurisdiction.”
The bill of the trust company was filed in the federal court February 26, 1901. It asserted a, claim to this fund, and disclosed without naming them other probable claimants to rights in the fund. It prayed that the comptroller be restrained from delivering the said fund, or any evidence of right thereto, to any other parties^ The comptroller’s answer disclosed the other claimants who asserted rights to- share in said fund, and thereupon relator was promptly made a party defendant therein. It would seem, the same controversy is pending in the federal and state court. It is true no> immediate physical possession has been taken of the money in the city treasury or of any evidence of right thereto, but equitable protection of the integrity of the fund and any evidence of right thereto was invoked in the complainant’s bill, and process was issued and served upon the officer who must disburse this fund, before relator commenced his action in the state court. Under* recognized authority, and upon principle, the jurisdiction was first obtained by the federal court. The earnest argument presented in the briefs by counsel for relator against the want of equity on the face of the bill filed in the federal court cannot be considered here; the issue is in that jurisdiction.
It is concluded that the order of the superior court- is correct, and the writ is denied.
Anders, Mount, White, Dunbar and Hablet, JJ., concur.