67 Mo. 529 | Mo. | 1878
— The defendant, Barnabas Sappington, was elected treasurer of Saline county in 1868, gave bond in the sum of $20,000, and, no successor having -been elected and qualified, continued in office until January 1st, 1874, when he resigned, and a successor was appointed by the county court, who was duly qualified. On the 4th of April, 1871, the county, court, for what reason does not appear from the record, required him to give additional bonds as such treasurer, in the sum of $10,000 for school funds and $10,000 for county funds; the bond, which is the foundation of the present action, recites that it was given in pursuance of the foregoing order. It is dated April 7th, 1871, is for the sum of $10,000, and concludes as follows: “ Now if the said Barnabas' Sappington, treasurer as aforesaid, shall well and truly perform all the duties of said office, until his successor is duly elected and qualified, and pay over to him the amount in his hands by order of the county court, then this bond to be void, otherwise to remain in full force.” On a final settlement made by Sappington in January, 1874, it appeared that he was, at that time, chargeable, as treasurer, with the sum of $2,827.14 which he was ordered to pay over to his successor in office. With this order he failed to comply. The testimony tended to show that a.deficit in his accounts occurred after the bond in suit was given. The following instruction was given by the court at the instance of the plaintiff: “If the court finds from the evidence, that at the time of the filing and approval of the writing obligatory sued on hy the county court, if defendant Sapping-ton was the treasurer of Saline county ; that prior to said
The following instructions asked by the defendants were refused : “ The court declares the law to be that the only authority given by statute to the county court, which would warraut the said court in accepting a new bond, or any additional bond, from a county treasurer who has given the bond required by law, must operate as a discharge of the securities in the old bond; and, in order to do this, must be in strict conformity to the statutes, and unless the former sureties are released, the new or additional bond is void.” “ The court declares the law to be that no money can be drawn out of the county treasurer’s hands, except by warrants drawn by order of the county court, and it devolves upon the plaintiff to show that the treasurer, Sappington, has refused to pay such warrants before she can recover against the securities in this action.” “ The court declares the law to be that the county court is created by statute, and its powers confined to the authority given it by statute, and had, under the law, no power either to require or accept from defendants
It is now contended on behalf of the sureties on the bond here sued on, that it was not given in conformity to the statute, which authorizes the county court in certain specified cases to require county officers to give additional security, nor was it so intended; that the sureties on the bond for $20,000 originally given by the defendant, Sappington, were not released by the execution of the second bond; and that the sureties on the second bond, are only liable in the event the default of the treasurer shall exceed $20,000, the amount of the penalty of the first bond.
The sections of the statute (Wag. Stat., 1306, Sees. 23, 24 and 25), which authorize the county court to require
There is nothing on the face of the bond exempting them from liability in the event the default of their principal should not exceed the sum of $20,000; nothing from which such restricted liability may be implied. There is nothing in the use of the word, “ additional bond,” contained in the recitals of the order of the court, which would authorize such an inference. These identical words are employed in the statute with reference to a bond which shall entirely supersede a previous bond; and if they are
The question of contribution between the sureties on the several bonds, which was argued before us, is not involved in the present controversy, and we shall refrain from expressing any opinion upon that subject. We perceive no error in the rulings of the circuit court, and its judgment will be affirmed.
Aeeirmed.