30 Nev. 409 | Nev. | 1908
Lead Opinion
By the Court,
This is an original proceeding by the state, upon the relation of M. E. Ryan, against M. J. Murphy, respondent, to oust the latter from the office of sheriff of Lander County. The facts essential to a determination of the questions presented in this proceeding are as follows:
Respondent was elected sheriff of said county at the general election in November, 1906, and is still the duly elected, qualified, and acting sheriff, unless relator is entitled to such office by virtue of appointment by the board of county commissioners of Lander County on the 15th day of April, 1908, to fill a vacancy in said office claimed to exist on account of
On the 29th day of February, 1908, respondent sent to the board of county commissioners the following communication: "Austin, Nevada, February 29, 1908. To the Honorable.the Chairman and Board of County Commissioners of Lander County, Nevada — Gentlemen: I hereby withdraw my resignation as sheriff of Lander County, Nevada, tendered you on the 3d day of February, A. D. 1908, said resignation providing that the same take effect April 15, 1908, and I hereby further notify you that I shall continue to exercise the functions of the office of sheriff of Lander County until the expiration of my term, and I hereby request that you return to me my prospective resignation of date the 3d day of February, 1908. Very respectfully yours, M. J. Murphy, Sheriff of Lander County, Nevada.” This communication was received by the board and ordered "filed and laid over.”
On the 31st day of March, 1908, respondent filed with the commissioners an additional communication, the material portions of which reading as follows: "To the Honorable Board of County Commissioners of Lander County, State of Nevada — Gentlemen: On or about the 3d day of February, 1908,1 sent to your honorable board a communication stating my intention of resigning the office of sheriff of Lander County on the 15th day of April, 1908. I have reconsidered
But one main question is presented in this proceeding: Did the respondent have the right to withdraw his resignation after it was filed with the board of county commissioners, and before the time specified in such resignation for it to become effective? Respective counsel have taken opposite views, both as to the proper answer to this question and as to the force of certain expressions found in previous opinions of this court bearing upon the question. In the case of State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 574, in the opinion by Beatty, C. J., the following expression occurs: "When a resignation is sent to take effect at a certain day, the case is different. Then there is no vacancy in the office until the day arrives, and if, in the meantime, the resignation is- withdrawn, the party stands as if he had never written or sent his resignation.” If this expression is the law, then unquestionably the relator has no claim to the office in dispute. We must concede, however, that the contention of relator’s counsel is correct that the expression, in so far as the Clarke case is concerned, is dicta, as no such question.was involved in-that case.
Counsel for respondent contend that, whether dicta or not in the Clarke case, it is a correct statement of the law, and was approved and followed in the case of State ex rel. Williams v. Beck, 24 Nev. 92. In the latter case Beck, who was a commissioner of Washoe County, sent a letter to the governor requesting that he "hold the same” subject to the findings of a judicial investigation which he had requested, the letter further providing that "unless such investigation shall find me blameless, or in ease such investigation shall not be held for a term of sixty days from the date hereof, then
In considering the Beck case, this court, by Massey, J., said: "The act of the governor, in accepting the resignation of the respondent and in refusing to return the same upon demand, is neither material nor important; for it has been settled by this court that a civil officer has the right to resign his office at his own pleasure and will, and the acceptance or rejection of such resignation can in no manner affect such right. (State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566.) The resignation of respondent being conditional, and not to take effect except upon certain contingencies and at a future day, there was no vacancy in the office until the happening of the contingencies and until the arrival of such day. In the meantime the resignation was within the control of the respondent and could be withdrawn at his pleasure, and if such withdrawal was made by the respondent he stands as if he had never written nor sent said resignation. (State ex. rel. Nourse v. Clarke, supra.) The question then is: Did respondent withdraw his resignation before the happening of the contingencies named therein- and within sixty days from the date thereof? We think he did. The letter of resignation was written and transmitted on the 8th day of April, 1897. On the 26th day of May, 1897, before the sixty days elapsed, and before an investigation of the charges had been made .by the grand jury, the respondent transmitted to the governor the letter in which he asked the return of the conditional resignation under date of April 8, 1897. This letter was an absolute withdrawal of- such resignation. At the time the same was written, the resignation was subject to withdrawal and entirely within the control of the respondent.”
A dissenting opinion was filed in the case by Bonnifield,
A distinction in principle is sought to be made between the Beck ease and the one at bar, because the Beck case was a conditional as well as a prospective resignation, while respondent’s resignation was prospective only; further, that in the Beck case the governor was. to "hold” the resignation, "subject to the findings of a judicial investigation” and therefore it is claimed there was no delivery as a present resignation. There is nothing in the opinion, as we read it, wherein the court gave this latter proposition any consideration, even though we concede there may be possibly room for a distinction on that point, had it been considered. The court in the Beck case did not attempt to separate the conditional from the prospective.feature of the resignation, and hold, because it was conditional, it could be withdrawn. The ruling of the court, as we view it, was as much to the effect that it could be withdrawn, because it was a prospective resignation, as it was that it was a conditional resignation.
It is very earnestly contended by counsel for relator that' the dictum of the Clarke case is not the law, and that we should so now declare, regardless of the decision in the Beck case, which counsel claim can be distinguished. If the dictum in the Clarke case is clearly not the law, we might be disposed not to follow it in spite of the Beck case, the facts of which are different in some respects from this case, although, as we have before indicated, this court in the Beck case deemed the dictum of the Clarke case to be the law and applied it to the facts of that case. The cases are not numerous in this country where a question like that involved here has come before the courts for decision. By the great weight of authority, however, a prospective resig
"At common law the resignation of a public officer was not complete, so far as the public is concerned, until it was duly accepted by the proper authorities. And this rule prevails in many of the United States, though not in all, and, except where there is a statutory provision to the contrary, is supported by both the weight of reason and authority!’ (Mechem on Public Officers, 414.)
"In England a person elected to a municipal office was obliged to accept it and perform its duties, and be subjected himself to a penalty by refusal. An office was regarded as a burden which the appointee was bound, in the interest of the community and good government, to bear. And from this it followed, of course, that after an office was conferred and assumed it could not be laid down without the consent of the appointing power. * * * In this country, where offices of honor and emolument are commonly more eagerly sought after than shunned, a contrary doctrine with regard to such offices, and in some states with regard to offices in general, may have obtained; but we must assume that the common-law rule prevails unless the contrary be shown. In Michigan we do not find that any contrary rule has been adopted. On the contrary, the common-law rule seems to be confirmed by the statutes of the state, so far as their intent can be gathered from their specific provisions.” (Edwards v. U. S., 103 U. S. 471, 26 L. Ed. 314.)
This court has twice held that the acceptance or rejection of a resignation in no way affects the resignation. In the Beck case, supra, although there had been an acceptance of the resignation, the right to withdraw was recognized. While this court in its former opinions did not refer to the statute of this state, we think they are in consonance therewith.
Section 1814 of the Compiled Laws provides: " Any person who shall receive a commission, or a certificate of his election or appointment, shall be at liberty to resign such
The Supreme Court of Missouri, considering a constitutional provision of that state, the language of which is not nearly as strong as our statutory provisions upon the question, said: "Whatever doubt may exist in some jurisdictions as to .the right of a public officer to resign his office without the concurrence of the officer or body which has the power to act upon it, all doubt is removed in this state by a constitutional recognition of the right. The Constitution (section 5, •art. 14, Ann. St. 1906, p. 313) declares: 'In the absence of any contrary provision, all officers now or hereafter elected or appointed, subject to right of resignation, shall hold office during their official terms, and until their successors shall be duly elected and qualified.’” (State v. Bus, 135 Mo. 325, 36 S. W. 636, 33 L. R. A. 616.) See, also, Gilbert v. Luce, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 91.
It is clear that the common law, at least in so far as acceptance being necessary to constitute a valid resignation, does not prevail in this state. Even without these statutory provisions, we should hesitate to return to the common law, which it would seem was based to some extent at least, if not largely, upon the proposition that "to refuse to serve in a municipal office, when elected or appointed thereto, was a
The case of Rex v. Bower, 1 B. & C. 585, for example, was a case where a person was compelled by mandamus to assume an office, even after he had paid a fine for refusing to fill it. The suggestion that a civil officer in this country may be compelled against his will to hold an office-, and that he is liable commonly for refusal so to do, is not in accord with prevailing American ideas of liberty of action.
The cases that have applied the common-law rule in matters of- resignation of office do not seem to have given any serious consideration to the difference in which an office is regarded under the common law and under the American theory of government. "At common law offices were incorporeal hereditaments, and one might have an estate in them, either to him and his heirs, or for life, or for a term of years, or during pleasure only. Offices of public trust, especially if they concerned the administration of justice, could not be granted for a term of years, nor could any judicial office be granted in reversion. The nature of offices of modern origin depends upon statutes creating them, and, in the absence of an express provision to that effect, no life estate or irrevocable tenure is conferred. * * * It is well settled in the United States that an office is not the property of the office holder, but is a public trust or agency; that it is not held by contract or grant; that the officer has no vested rights therein; and that, subject to constitutional restrictions, the office may be vacated or abolished, the duties thereof changed, and the term and compensation increased or diminished. The fact that a constitution may forbid the legislature to abolish a public office or diminish the salary thereof does not change the character of the office, nor make it property.” (23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 2d ed. p. 328.)
The whole theory of acceptance being necessary to constitute a valid resignation at common law was due to the fact that in England "a public office was regarded as a public burden, which it is the duty of every good citizen to bear for the public benefit, and which, if he refuses to serve, he may
One of- the earliest and a leading case on the question of the right of withdrawal of a prospective resignation is that of Biddle v. Willard, Governor, 10 Ind. 62. The court in that case said: "To constitute a complete and operative resignation there must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of the office, accompanied by the act of relinquishment. Webster and Richardson define the words 'resign’ and 'resignation’ substantially thus: To. resign is to give back, to give up, in a formal manner, an office; and resignation is the act of giving up.- Bouvier says resignation is the act of an officer by which he declines his office, and renounces the further right to use it. (Aec. Wharton.) Hence, a prospective resignation may, in point of law, amount but to a notice of intention to resign at a future day, or a proposition to so resign; and for the reason that it is not accompanied by the giving up of the office, possession is still retained, and may not necessarily be surrendered till the expiration of the legal term of the office, because the officer may recall his resignation — may withdraw his proposition to resign. He certainly can do this at any time before it is accepted; and after it is accepted he may make the withdrawal by the consent of the authority accepting, where no new rights have intervened.” A part of the above quotation forms a portion of the text of section 417 of Mechem on Public Officers, as also of section 415 of Throop on Public Officers. Throop, .in section 415, says: "But where the resignation is prospective it may be withdrawn, at least with the consent of the appointing power, and according to some cases without such consent,unless some new rights have intervened, such as the appointment of a successor.”
Counsel for petitioner earnestly contends for the correctness of the ruling of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in the recent decision of Murray v. State, 115 Tenn. 303, 89 S. W. 101. The
We are unable to see the force of the argument that the same question of public policy is involved in the withdrawal of a prospective resignation as would exist in the case of an immediate resignation. In the latter ease a vacancy is at once created in the office resigned. In the former case there is no present surrender of the office. The public is only interested in having the office filled by some competent person. If before the vacancy actually exists, the officer, who has been duly elected or appointed, elects to rescind his prospective resignation, it is not clearly apparent where the public is liable to suffer any injury. A public officer should not be permitted to vacate an office, and then assume it again at will, and this he cannot do as a matter of law, independent of any question of public policy.
In the case of Leech v. State, 78 Ind. 570, cited by counsel
We will not attempt to review all the authorities cited by respective counsel. It is enough, we think, to say that there is a great contrariety of opinion, both as to the effect of acceptance of a resignation and as to the limitations upon the right to withdraw a prospective resignation. A very careful examination of the whole subject-matter has failed to convince us that we ought to depart from the rule heretofore expressed by this court.
The demurrer to relator’s petition is sustained. Respondent is entitled to his costs.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
May the resignation of a public office tendered to take effect in the future be withdrawn after it has been accepted
The following comment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Ferguson, 31 N. J. Law, 107, upon this question, was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the United States in Edwards v. U. S., 103 U. S. 477, 26 L. Ed. 314: "It is hardly to be supposed that it was the intention of the judge to apply this remark to the class of officers who are elected by the people, and whose services are absolutely necessary to carry on local government, or that it was the purpose to brush away with a breath the doctrine of the common law, deeply rooted in public policy upon the subject. However true the proposition may be as applied to the facts then before the circuit court, it is clearly inconsistent with all previous decisions, if extended over the class of officers where responsibility is the subject of consideration.”
In State v. Boecker, supra, the clerk filed his resignation to take effect at a future date with the county court, instead of with the governor, who had the power of appointment. Before the day when the resignation was to take effect he
In People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 28, which also was determined by a divided court, no question of the withdrawal of the resignation was presented, and the statement there in this regard is merely dictum. The same is true in Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 574, where there was neither an acceptance nor withdrawal of the resignation as here, and where the case turned upon the holding of the court that under our statute an immediate resignation took effect upon being forwarded to the appointing power, and before acceptance. The inadvertent remarks of Chief Justice Beatty not appertaining to any question in the ease — "When a resignation is sent to take effect at a certain day, the case is different. Then there is no vacancy in the office until that day arrives, and, if in the meantime the resignation is withdrawn, the party stands as if he had never written or sent his resignation” — have been followed too far in Williams v. Beck, and in the present case, contrary to the various decisions involving any such issue, and the common law and our statute adopting it. He did not consider whether such a resignation could be withdrawn
Williams v. Beck is also readily distinguishable from the present proceeding, and it is unnecessary to consider whether, if the conditions were the same, that case ought to be held res adpidieata and conclusive. The resignation here was unconditional, and was to take effect on a specified day which was as sure to arrive as the earth to turn on its axis, and its meaning was clear. Beck’s resignation was subject to two conditions, one that unless a judicial investigation found him blameless, and the other that unless such investigation was held within sixty days, the resignation should be final. If such investigation was held within that period and resulted in finding him blameless, his resignation was not to take effect. Within the specified term of sixty days the grand jury examined into the charges, and in their report to the district court expressed their belief that the board of county commissioners, including Beck, had acted in good faith and for the best interests of the people in taking action to prevent the spread of a dangerous disease, but commended the county auditor for refusing to draw his warrant for the amount of the claim, which had been allowed by the board for the expenses of fumigation and which had occasioned the criticism of Beck. There might be an inference that there was no statute authorizing the payment of the claim, but the investigation at least held Beck blameless of any wrong intentions. If the conditions which were to give the resignation effect did not fail entirely, they so nearly failed when the grand jury found that he acted only with good motives, and for the best interests of the county, that the equities were with Beck. One of the strongest reasons for holding that an unconditional resignation could not be withdrawn was lacking in that case, because the governor was not justified in taking action towards the selection or appointment of
Next to the adoption of the erroneous dictum in the Clarke case, which referred in no way to an acceptance, which controls here and which puts the resignation beyond withdrawal without consent, the greatest fallacy in the Beck ease, not denied in respondent's brief, and in the opinion of the majority of the court now, is the mere assumption that, because the statute gives an officer the right to resign without the consent of the appointing power, as held in the Clarke case, he has the right to withdraw his resignation without consent after it has been accepted.- It is illogical to conclude from the admitted premise that’ because the statute has made the resignation of the officer effective and complete in itself upon' execution and delivery, it is less ■ conclusive and may more readily be withdrawn after it has been filed than at common law. The contrary conclusion, if any, could more readily be drawn. But it is not difficult to distinguish between the right to resign and the right to withdraw a resignation after it has been accepted, nor to see that our statute, which gives the right to resign, but does not give the right to withdraw a resignation nor -mention such withdrawals, cannot properly be construed as giving the right of withdrawal, nor of changing the common-law rule that, after acceptance, a resignation cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the appointing power.
If there be any play upon words, the ones used, including "tender” and "to take effect” at a future day designated, and the resignation and conditions, were similar in Whitney v. Van Buskirk, 40 N. J. Law, 465. There the resignation read: "I respectfully tender my resignation of the office of chief of police of the City of Bayonne, to take effect upon the 1st day of January, 1878.” This resignation was received and accepted by the mayor and the board of councilmen on the 4th of December. Later the chief of police insisted that this neither vacated the office then, nor ascertained the end of his term. The court held that a resignation to take. effect at a future day named or accepted by competent authority was valid and
In Gates v. Delaware County, 12 Iowa, 405, it was held that the tendering of a prospective resignation of a public office, and the filing of the same without objection by the officer authorized to receive it, was equivalent to an acceptance and operated to vacate the office resigned according to the tenor of such resignation. I am unable to' see that the case of Leech v. State, 78 Ind. 570, wherein‘it was determined that when a city school trustee resigns his office, to take effect at a future day, the city council may fill the vacancy before the day fixed for the resignation to take effect, is in any way contradicted or modified by the case of McGee v. State, 103 Ind. 444, 3 N. E. 139, holding that the resignation could not be withdrawn after the time had arrived for it to take effect, and not holding that it could not have been withdrawn sooner, if it had been previously accepted. Also the case of Murray v. State, 115 Tenn. 303, 89 S. W. 101, and the part of the opinion quoted in the decision of this court, stands uncontradicted by any case where it was sought to withdraw an unconditional prospective resignation after it had been accepted.
In Bunting v. Willis, 27 Grat. (Va.) 144, 21 Am. Rep. 344, the court said: " That he had a right to resign his federal office, and that such right does not depend upon the consent or acceptance of the government or its agents, seems to be very well settled. That after such resignation becomes complete it cannot be withdrawn by the officer, even with the consent of the government, seems also to be settled, though he may receive a new appointment, which may perhaps be given to him in the form of a withdrawal by consent of his resignation of his former office. But a prospective resignation may be withdrawn at any time before.it is accepted; and, after it is accepted, it may be withdrawn by the consent of the authority accepting, where no new rights have intervened. This was held by the Supreme Court of Indiana (Biddle v. Willard, 10 Ind. 62), and seems to be a reasonable principle. We have seen no case to the contrary, while there are other cases which tend to sustain it.”
In State v. Augustine, 113 Mo. 24, 20 S. W. 651, 35 Am.
I could readily concur in the statements in the opinion that an officer may resign under our statute without the consent of the appointing power, and that, in the absence of a withdrawal, a prospective resignation is conclusive after the time stated for it to take effect, if they were pertinent, or if any such questions were involved, but I especially dissent from the assertions that by the great weight of authority a prospective resignation may be withdrawn before the time prescribed for it to take effect, and that there is a great contrariety of opinion, both as to the effect of acceptance of a resignation and as to the limitations upon the right to withdraw a prospective resignation, if these are intended to apply seriously to a case where there has been an acceptance before the withdrawal of an unconditional resignation to take effect at a future date, as in the present one, because the cases relating to similar conditions uniformly hold that such a resignation cannot be withdrawn after it has been accepted without the consent of the appointing power. Without these decisions the case would still be conclusive in favor of the petitioner, because it is not disputed that at common law a resignation cannot be withdrawn after acceptance without the consent of the appointing power, and the common law including .this rule is adopted in this state-by express legislative enactment. In the Clarke and Beck cases and in the present one this court seemed to be unaware of or to ignore the fact that under the common law as in force in this state, and under the different decisions elsewhere, it is too late to withdraw the resignation after it has - been accepted. The acceptance controls, and makes the resig
The argument that it is better to allow the officer who has been elected to withdraw his resignation, and permit him to hold the office instead of an appointee, is contrary not only to the common law and decisions, but would apply as well to immediate resignations or others after the time for them to take effect had arrived. As this court has already proceeded too far on the wrong road in following the statements of Chief Justice Beatty made forty years ago in a case in which they were not pertinent, and which did not relate to an acceptance, which was not considered by him, and at a period when the authorities were not so accessible, it is time to call a halt. I am unable to agree with the conclusion of my esteemed associates, because it has no support except in dicta and the fallacies indicated, and is opposed by the unanimous opinions of the various judges in all these cases, where the courts had for determination a similar question, or one as to whether an unconditional resignation of a public office, which by its terms was to take effect at a future day, could be withdrawn after it. had been accepted without the consent of the appointing power, and because it is contrary to the common law, to the best public policy, and to the usages and practices most convenient and fair of giving reasonable notice of resignations of persons in public office and private employment. It is better to hold the one resigning to the plain terms of his resignation after it has been accepted and met by the mind of the appointing power, whether the governor or the county commissioners, than to promulgate a rule which will enable persons of vacillating dispositions to trifle with these officials in regard to their acceptance of resignations and appointment of successors, or which does- not give notice and reasonable time for these purposes.
The decision is also contrary to the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Edwards v. U. S., supra, and to People v. Williams, 145 Ill. 577, 33 N. E. 849, 24 L. R. A. 492, 36 Am. St. Rep. 514, holding that the common law in regard
After the acceptance of the resignation, the board of county commissioners properly appointed relator, Ryan, to the office of sheriff in advance for the part of the term remaining after the time, which by its language, as apparent to all who read, it was to take effect, and he ought to be awarded the office accordingly.
As the statute which gives the respondent the right to resign imposes no condition or limitation, there is no reason why he could not make his resignation to take effect to-morrow or at some future date, as conclusive after acceptance as if it had been immediate, nor why a successor appointed in advance is not entitled to the office for the remaining part of the term analogously to officers elected in advance in the fall who are installed at the beginning of the following year. _