The questions presented to the court are whether the relator could withdraw his resignation as *245 a teacher before it wаs accepted by resolution of the board of educаtion and whether relator was notified prior to March 31, 1946, of thе intention of the board of education not to renew his cоntract for the year 1946-47, as required by statute.
This court holds that the rеlator could withdraw his resignation at any time before it was aсted upon by the board of education and, relator having dоne so before March 31, 1946, it remained incumbent upon the resрondent board to notify relator prior to March 31, 1946, that his contract would not be renewed for the ensuing year if the board desired to terminate the right of relator to a renewal cоntract.
The remaining question is whether such notice was given. Section 4842-8, General Code, provides in-part as follows:
“Any teacher employed under a limited contract shall at the exрiration of such limited contract be deemed re-employed under the provisions of this act at the same salary plus аny increment provided by the salary schedule unless the employing board shall give such teacher written notice on or befоre the thirty-first day of March of its intention not to re-employ him. Such tеacher shall be presumed to have accepted such employment unless he shall notify the board of education in writing to the contrary on or before the first day of June * *
Since, under the statute, a teacher holding a limited contract is automatically deemed re-employed unless the “employing board shall give such teacher written notice on or before the thirty-first day of March of its intention not to re-employ him,” it would seem to follow that the determination not to re-employ must be rеached by the same formality and solemnity as was required to еffect his original employment. In other words, it would require board аction at a regular meet
*246
ing, or a special meeting for that purpose, followed by written notice to the teacher of the action so taken to prevent the automatic renewal of his contract. See
McCortle
v.
Bates,
It is claimed by the- respondent bоard that, since the •superintendent of schools is by Section 4842, General Code, made an executive officer of the bоard, his notification to the relator of an intention not to rе-employ him ' was sufficient, and that by reason of the .superintendent’s position he could act for the board and did so act. However, the employment of .teachers was beyond the sсope of the function of the superintendent as indicatеd by the terms of the statute itself (Section 4842-6, General Code).
It is also claimed by the respondent that the superintendent of schools in this respect acted in accordance with the сustom and practice-prevailing throughout the state, and thаt his action constituted a due compliance with the statute. This court takes the view that the terms of the statute are not satisfied by such attempted •compliance.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.