This is an action instituted in the Circuit Court of Pettis County, whereby the prosecuting attorney of that county sought to enjoin the judge of the - Thirtieth Judicial Circuit, comprising, said county, from approving the monthly salary voucher of his official court reporter in an amount exceeding the rate of $2,000' per annum. Hon. Robert M. Reynolds, regular judge of an adjoining circuit, was called in as special judge and tried the case. J'udgment went for defendant denying such injunction, and plaintiff was granted an appeal to this court.
An agreed statement of facts was filed in the trial court as follows:
*669 ‘ ‘It i& stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto:
“That plaintiff is the duly elected, qualified and acting’ Prosecuting’ Attorney of Pettis County, Missouri.
“That defendant is the duly elected, qualified and acting Judge of the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, and that defendant has been judge of said circuit since the 1st day of January, 1923.
‘ ‘ That the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit of Missouri consists of the County of Pettis.
“That the population of the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, as disclosed by the Federal decennial census of 1920, is 35,813. /
‘ ‘ That there were cast at the last general election in Pettis County, Missouri, more than 15,000 votes.
‘ ‘ That Roy Snyder was duly appointed by Hon. Dim-mitt Hoffman, Judge, as- the official Court Reporter of the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, in January, 1923.
‘ ‘ That, since the appointment of said Roy Snyder as official Court Reporter of said circuit, Hon. Dimmitt Hoffman, Jtidge, has been issuing certificates each month as said judge, directing the Treasurer of Pettis County, Missouri, to pay the said Roy Snyder, as his salary as official reporter of said circuit, the sum of $208.33 monthly, or on the basis of an annual salary of $2,500.
“That Hon. Dimmitt Hoffman, Judge, has continued to issue certificates each month, as said judge, directing the Treasurer of Pettis County, Missouri, to pay the said Roy Snyder, as his salary as official reporter of said court, the sum of $208.33 monthly since the institution of this suit; and that, unless restrained from so doing, the Hon. Dimmitt Hoffman, Judge, will continue to issue said certificates in the sum of $208.33 each month.”
Although neither appellant nor respondent has challenged our appellate jurisdiction in this case, it is our duty to determine that question for ourselves. [Bennett v. Bennett, 243 S. W. (Mo. Sup.) 769; In re Letcher,
*670 The appellate jurisdiction of this court is limited to the classes of cases specified in Articles VI, Section 12, of the Constitution. In all other cases where ap: peals are taken from judgments of circuit courts, appellate jurisdiction is lodged in the court of appeals. The only possible ground upon which we could retain appellate jurisdiction of the case now before us is to hold that respondent judge of the circuit court is a state officer within the meaning of said Article VI, Section 12.
In State ex rel. Holmes v. Dillon,
This ruling has ever since been consistently approved and followed by this court in a number of decisions, although in none of them was a circuit judge a party to the suit. [See State ex rel. Bender v. Spencer,
In State ex rel. v. Higgins, supra, the members of the Board of Election Commissioners of the City of St. Louis Were parties. The case came here on appeal, and we transferred same to the St. Louis Court of Appeals because the members of that board were not state officers within the-meaning of Article VI, Section 12. The members of that board were appointed by state authority, and in that sense were' state officers to the same extent as circuit judges are.
The only case we have found where the circuit judge was held to be a state officer under Article VI, Section 12, is State ex rel. Albers v. Horner,
The case of State ex rel. Albers v. Horner,
In one sense circuit judges are state officers. Most of them are elected from circuits comprising two or more counties. They receive their compensation as judges from the State Treasury. But their jurisdiction is confined to holding court in the counties comprising their respective circuits. Their jurisdiction, official duties and .functions are not co-extensive with the boundaries of the State. Under some circumstances process may be issued out of a given circuit court which may be executed in any county of the state to which such process is directed, but the judge of such court has no duties, functions or jurisdiction in the counties • outside of his circuit. He may even, under some circumstances, be called to sit as judge *672 ill any otter circuit; but when be so acts, be occupies tlie status of sucb other circuit judges and not tbe status of judge of bis own circuit. He bas no duties or functions as sucb judge wbicb are co-extensive with tbe boundaries of the State.
Our conclusion is that, when a circuit judge in his official capacity is made a party to a suit in tbe circuit court and an appeal is taken in sucb case and no other constitutional grounds giving this court appellate jurisdiction under Article YI, Section 12, exist, sucb judge cannot be regarded as a state officer within tbe meaning of said section of tbe Constitution and appellate jurisdiction in suoli case is vested in tbe appropriate court of appeals.
It is therefore ordered that this case be transferred to tbe Kansas City Court of Appeals. ,