39 Fla. 504 | Fla. | 1897
On February 8, 1897, C. I). Rinehart, of counsel for relator, called up for hearing before respondent the demurrer to a declaration in an action pending in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit for Duval county, wherein relator was plaintiff and the Florida East Coast Railway Company was defendant, and then and there offered to submit to the decision of the court the issues of law raised by said demurrer upon oral argument. The defendant’s counsel, under notice, was present, ready to proceed with the hearing. The respondent declined to hear oral argument upon
“December 23rd, A. D. 1896.
The court met this day as ordered at ten o’ clock A. M. Honorable Rhydon M. Call, Judge, presiding.
Whereupon, it is ordered by the court that the following rules of practice shall be hereinafter followed as to the matter which they relate :
Ho cause standing for argument, whether upon final hearing, or -interlocutory order, in equity cases, or upon pleadings in cases at law, shall be submitted to the court, until the party moving the court shall have furnished the court and the opposite party, a brief abstract of the matter submitted, containing the sub stance of the material pleadings, facts and documents relied on, and the points of law and fact intended to be presented in argument, with a citation of the authorities.
Unpon such presentation, the court may determine whether an extended or other oral discussion of the facts or law shall be allowed and may thereupon designate the time and place and limit for such discussion. The court may also designate the time within which the opposite party shall submit in writing his ■abstract of the cause pending, points of law and facts to be presented in argument with citations of authorities relied on and also the time within which the moving party may reply in waiting. ’ ’
Upon relator’s suggestion, on March 10, 1897, we is•sued an alternative w’rit of mandamus commanding .respondent to consider and decide the issues raised by
It was contemplated by the constitution that the legislature would regulate the practice of courts of justice, and it was, therefore, provided by section 20 of Art. Ill, Constitution of 1885, among other things, that “the legislature shall not pass special or local laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say, * * * regulating the practice of courts of justice, except municipal courts;” and by section 21 it was provided that in all such cases ‘ ‘all laws shall be .general and of uniform operation throughout the State.” These provisions were also embraced in sections 17 and 18 Art. IV constitution of 1868. Under these provisions of the constitution of 1868 the legislature, by section 3 Chap. 1626, act of August 1, 1868, gave to the Supreme Court “power to make, amend, annul or modify any rule of practice of the Supreme, Circuit or County Courts, as they may see fit,” and by section 12 Chap. 1938, act of February 24, 1873, “full power was conferred” on this court “to make any and all rules of practice, pleadings and proceedings to carry out the provisions of this act and to prescribe, regulate and control the practice, pleadings and proceedings in the several courts of this' State.” Under this authority this court on May 26, 1873, adopted 103 rules of practice for the government of the Circuit Courts in Common law actions, and 95 for their gov«ernment in suits in equity, most of which are still in .force, but none of these rules require the presentation
In this connection it may be interesting to note that from the earliest period in the history of this State the • power to make rules for inferior courts have been con
It is contended by respondent that the language of section 1308 Revised Statutes, “to make, amend, annul,, or modify rules of practice of the Supreme, or any other court” recognizes by implication the power of other courts to make rules to so be amended, annulled or modified. We do not think this contention can be sustained by a proper construction of the language used. The power to amend, annul or modify, must be construed in connection with the power to malte rules of any other court, and when so construed it means that this court may amend, annul or modify rules made by it for other courts. The rule under consideration is of that character which this court only has power to adopt} being of a permanent and general nature, and convenient simply, not necessary, to the administration of law by the respondent, and is, therefore, no justification for respondent’s failure to consider and decide the issues of law presented by the demurrer and declaration.
The peremptory writ will be awarded.