58 P.2d 1090 | Kan. | 1936
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action in the name of the state on the relation of the county attorney of Labette county to enjoin the county clerk of that county from extending upon the tax roll a tax levy of two mills for general purposes made by the school board of Joint Rural High School District No. 2 of Crawford, Cherokee, Neosho and Labette counties, on the ground that the organization of the school district was invalid. The county clerk answered admitting formal allegations of the petition, pleaded his lack of knowledge respecting other facts alleged and of the law governing the issues, and prayed for a full hearing on the merits as presented by plaintiff and other defendants, and that the court advise him as to his duties in the premises. The other defendants were the school district and its officers. They answered, setting up the steps taken in the organization of the school district, alleged they were in conformity with law, and denied the illegality of the tax levy. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and rendered judgment for. plaintiff. The defendants, other than the county clerk, have appealed.
The facts disclosed by the record, so far as they are necessary to disclose the legal questions presented, may be stated briefly as follows: The city of McCune in Crawford county is a city of the third class with a population of more than 500. The common school district in which the city is located had built a high-school building, and has endeavored to conduct a high school which has an attendance of about 120 pupils. It found itself embarrassed financially to conduct a grade-A high school. Early in May, 1935, proceedings were inaugurated under R. S. 72-3501 et seq., as amended, for the formation of a joint rural high-school district, the plan being to use the high-school building at McCune. The proposed new rural high-school district comprised parts of four counties and had an area of 77 square miles, in which there was property of the aggregate assessed value of $6,172,858. The approximate area and the assessed value of property in each of the counties being, in Crawford county 50% square miles, $1,302,060; in Cherokee county, 14% square miles, $246,079; in Neosho, 1 square mile, $14,035; and in Labette county, 11 square miles, $4,610,684. Appropriate petitions,
While the record before us exhaustively sets forth each of the steps taken in the organization of the new joint rural high-school district we need not set these out at length, for there is no contention that the steps taken do not conform fully, or at least substantially, with our statutes governing the organization of such a school district. Plaintiff’s contention is that the statutes are unconstitutional
The trial court Jield, as a matter of law, that the proviso of R. S. 1933 Supp. 72-3504, while general legislation in form, is special in its application, in violation of section 17 of article 2 of our constitution, and therefore void. This section reads:
“If the territory comprising the proposed rural high-school district shall contain any incorporated city with a population of more than 500, the election provided for in section 2 of this act, as amended, shall not be called unless petitions shall be presented to the county commissioners signed by two fifths of the legal electors residing in said city and by two fifths of the legal electors residing in said territoiy of the proposed rural high-school district outside of the city; and when such petitions shall be presented, the county commissioners shall call an election as provided in section 2 of this act, and the vote in said city and in the territory outside of said city shall be taken and counted separately; and a rural high-school district shall not be formed in territory containing any incorporated city with a population of more than 500 unless the proposition to form such a high-school district and to establish a high school therein shall be favored by a majority of those voting in said city and by a majority of those voting in the territory of the proposed rural high-school district outside of said city: Provided, That where the territory outside any such city sought to be incorporated in the formation, organization of any such district lies in four or more counties, the provisions for separate petition and separate vote 'of such city and such territory outside such city shall not apply.”
Section 17 of article 2 of our constitution reads:
“All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state; and in all cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted; and whether or not a law enacted is repugnant to this provision of the constitution shall be construed and determined by the coui’ts of this state.”
In support of the ruling of the trial court it is argued by appellee that the statute above- quoted preceding the proviso, when the proposed rural high-school district contains an incorporated city of a population of more than 500, requires the vote upon the organization of the district to be taken separately in the city and in the territory outside the city, while the proviso does away with this separate vote if the proposed district includes territory in as many as four counties. It is stipulated that so far as is known only one other rural high-school district has been formed in the state in which the territory is situated in as many as four counties. It is argued that the district under consideration is perhaps the only other one
The trial court also held R. S. 72-3501 and 72-3502 invalid for the reason that they attempt to delegate legislative power to the state superintendent of public instruction in violation of sections 1 and 21 of article 2 of our constitution. R. S. 72-3501 reads (we italicize the portion held invalid):
“The legal electors residing in territory containing not less than sixteen square miles shall have authority to form a rural high-school district, whose boundaries shall have been approved by the county superintendent of public instruction and by the board of county commissioners of each county in which any part of such proposed district shall be situated, or by the state superintendent of public instruction in case the county superintendents and boards of county commissioners of two or more counties shall fail to agree on the approval of the boundaries of the proposed district, and to establish, locate and maintain therein a rural high school as hereinafter provided.”
R. S. 72-3502, in harmony with the previous section, provides further detailed steps to be taken in the formation of a rural high-school district. Our constitutional provisions the statutes were' held to violate read:
*316 “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a house of representatives and senate.” (Art. 2, § 1.)
“The legislature may confer upon tribunals transacting the county business of the several counties, such powers of local legislation and administration as it shall deem expedient.” (Art. 2, § 21.)
In support of the ruling of the trial court it is argued by appellee that the legislative power of this state must be exercised by our legislature, except that it may confer powers of local legislation on boards of county commissioners; that the state superintendent of public instruction is an executive officer under our constitution (art. 1, § 1); that the legislature cannot confer legislative power upon an executive officer (Oakland State Bank v. Bolin, 141 Kan. 126, 40 P. 2d 437; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. ed. 446); and that the prudence, desirability, or public benefit to be attained by the formation of a subdivision of the state for governmental purposes, such as a city (Ruland v. City of Augusta, 120 Kan. 42, 242 Pac. 456); or a drainage district (Verdigris Conservancy District v. Objectors, 131 Kan. 214, 289 Pac. 966), or a school district (State, ex rel., v. School District, 140 Kan. 171, 174, 24 P. 2d 102), is a legislative question and constitutionally cannot be conferred upon purely judicial or executive officers. Forceful as this argument is, it overlooks article 6 of our constitution dealing specifically with education, the pertinent portions of which read:
“The legislature shall encourage the promotion of intellectual, moral, scientific and agricultural improvement by establishing a uniform system of common schools, and schools of a higher grade, embracing normal, preparatory, collegiate and university departments.” (Art. 6, § 2.)
“The state superintendent of public instruction shall have the general supervision of the . . . educational interests of the state, and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law. . . (Art. 6, § 1.)
By these provisions of the constitution the legislature was required to establish a uniform system of common schools and schools of a higher grade. Realizing that many questions pertaining to educational matters naturally would arise, and which would need the attention of a competent official who could investigate and determine what is best to be done, our constitution gave to the superintendent of public instruction “the general supervision of the . . . educational interests of the state,” and specifically authorized him to “perform such other duties as'may be prescribed by law,” without limiting those duties to such as might be classified as executive or
We agree with appellee that the questions considered by the state superintendent of public instruction, as shown by his testimony, pertain to the prudence or advisability of establishing the joint rural high-school district, with its proposed boundaries, were legislative in character, but they pertained also to the educational interests of the state, and particularly to the educational interests of those who would be immediately affected by the organization of the new school district. However, his action was within the purview of the statutes, above cited, and as we have seen, our constitution authorizes the legislature to impose upon him such duties as it deemed best pertaining to the educational interests of the state.
While much more might be written there is not much else to this lawsuit. The steps taken for the formation of the joint rural high-school district were in harmony with our statutes. There is no serious contention to the contrary. In our view of the law the statutes are valid. It necessarily follows that the tax levy sought to be enjoined was a valid levy.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed with directions-that the court instruct the county clerk of Labette county to extend the levy upon the proper tax rolls of his county. It is so ordered.