State ex rel. Robinson-Bond v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of ElectionsState ex rel. Robinson-Bond v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Elections
Case Information
*1
[Cite as
State ex rel. Robinson-Bond v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Elections
,
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, ex rel., ALICE ROBINSON-BOND
Relator
v.
CHAMPAIGN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS
Respondent
:Appellate Case No. 2011-CA-21
DECISION AND FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY; WRIT OF MANDAMUS October 6th , 2011
PER CURIAM: This matter is before the court on the verified Complaint for Writ of Mandamus or
Alternate Writ of Prohibition filed by Alice Robinson-Bond on September 13, 2011. On September 1, 2011, the Champaign County Board of Elections (the “Board”),
acting pursuant to
of mandamus or, alternatively, a writ of prohibition requiring the Board (a) to find that Robinson-Bond is a resident of Champaign County for purposes of voting and (b) to maintain or return her name to the Board’s list of registered electors. Robinson-Bond also requests a peremptory writ granting that relief. An alternative writ commands the respondent to obey the mandate of the writ or
show cause why it should not be obeyed. “When the right to require performance of an act is clear
and it is apparent that no valid excuse can be given for not doing it, a court, in the first instance, may
allow a peremptory mandamus. In all other cases an alternative writ must first be issued to the
allowance of a court or a judge thereof.”
exceeding its jurisdiction, not to prevent errors. Prohibition applies to restrain only the prospective unauthorized exercise of judicial power, and is not available to examine the regularity of an act already performed. State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Court of Common Pleas of Butler Cty. (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 188. The acts of the Board of which Robinson-Bond complains were performed and complete on September 1, 2011. Therefore, prohibition cannot lie. “Mandamus is a writ, issued in the name of the state to an inferior tribunal, a
corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.”
{¶ 7}
Ordinarily, an appeal to the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506
from the decision of a board is an adequate remedy at law. The next election at which
Robinson-Bond might vote as an elector of Champaign County, but for the action of the Board
removing Robinson-Bond’s name from its roll of registered electors, will be held on November 8,
2011. Because that date is in close proximity to the date on which the Board acted, Robinson-Bond
has demonstrated that she lacks a plain and adequate remedy at law. See
State ex rel. Greene v.
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections
,
{¶ 8}
offering to register or vote, shall be governed by the following rules: “(A) That place shall be considered the residence of a person in which the person’s
habitation is fixed and to which, whenever the person is absent, the person has the intention of returning. “(B) A person shall not be considered to have lost the person’s residence who leaves
the person’s home and goes into another state or county of this state, for temporary purposes only, with the intention of returning. “(C) A person shall not be considered to have gained a residence in any county of
this state into which the person comes for temporary purposes only, without the intention of making *4 such county the permanent place of abode.
{¶ 13} “(D) The place where the family of a married person resides shall be considered to be the person’s place of residence; except that when the spouses have separated and live apart, the place where such a spouse resides the length of time required to entitle a person to vote shall be considered to be the spouse’s place of residence.
{¶ 14} “(E) If a person removes to another state with the intention of making such state the person’s residence, the person shall be considered to have lost the person’s residence in this state. “(F) Except as otherwise provided in division (G) of this section, if a person removes from this state and continuously resides outside this state for a period of four years or more, the person shall be considered to have lost the person’s residence in this state, notwithstanding the fact that the person may entertain an intention to return at some future period. “(G) If a person removes from this state to engage in the services of the United States
government, the person shall not be considered to have lost the person’s residence in this state during the period of such service, and likewise should the person enter the employment of the state, the place where such person resided at the time of the person’s removal shall be considered to be the person’s place of residence. “(H) If a person goes into another state and while there exercises the right of a citizen
by voting, the person shall be considered to have lost the person’s residence in this state. “(I) If a person does not have a fixed place of habitation, but has a shelter or other
location at which the person has been a consistent or regular inhabitant and to which the person has the intention of returning, that shelter or other location shall be deemed the person’s residence for the purpose of registering to vote.” *5 The application challenging Robinson-Bond’s right to vote as a registered elector of
Champaign County relied on
name from its list of registered electors. The only evidence offered in support of that action was
that Robinson-Bond’s husband and children live in Franklin County. Absent a finding by the
Board, we necessarily conclude that the Board relied on
judgment for that of a board of elections.
State ex rel. Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections
*6
(2000),
County,
Justice Taft wrote, at pp. 343-344: “In making provision for the place where an elector may vote, the General Assembly
has not specified that he may vote only at his place of domicile. Instead the words ‘resident’
Section 4785-30, General Code and ‘residence’ Section 4785-31, General Code have been used. A
man may have more than one residence although he can have only one domicile. See
Grant v. Jones
,
{¶ 27} “The rules which the General Assembly specified were apparently intended to enable an individual in such a situation to select as his residence some place which fairly conformed with one or more of the several rules specified, even though it might not conform with some of the other rules so specified or might not be his domicile.”
{¶ 28}
Even if, pursuant to
find that, at the time it removed Robinson-Bond’s name from the Board’s list of registered electors,
Champaign County is not her voting “residence” for purposes of
Emmons, Sheriff of Champaign County, Ohio, 214 N. Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078.
Pursuant to
Elections, immediately upon service of this Writ, shall restore the name of Relator, Alice Robinson-Bond, to Respondent’s list of registered electors and reinstate Relator’s registration forms as a registered elector of Champaign County.
SO ORDERED.
THOMAS J. GRADY, Presiding Judge
MIKE FAIN, Judge
HALL, J., dissenting: I am troubled by my belief that this is a ”friendly” challenge designed to seek a pre-emptive ruling that disrupts the ordinary burden of proof. Garnett Sue Hess gave the following explanation for her decision to challenge the relator’s voting credentials: “* * * I saw [relator Robinson-Bond] in July and she said[,] [‘]You know, I think I’d really like an answer.[’] And because there was the question, because what if she does run sometime? Right now there’s no openings for anything, but she’s extremely qualified, and I’ve been encouraging her to run. “You know, I think she’s extremely qualified for whatever she would run for. And
so I said, well, you know what? I can challenge that. * * *” (T. 5-6). Thereafter, the challenger presented no documentary evidence. The only factual
statement the challenger made was as follows:
{¶ 37} “* * * [H]er intent is to continue to stay in Mechanicsburg.
{¶ 38} “I know that her mom is there. She’s disabled. She spends a lot of time there. She probably spends more time in her car than she does in her home in Dublin, but she has a residential home with her husband in Dublin and her family. “ * * * “She’s registered here where she grew up, but she is married and her husband and
family live in another county.” (Id. at 8-9). Thus, there is no adverse party. The crucible for truth in our justice system is an
adversarial process that brings to bear available evidence on a disputed issue. In the absence of adversarial parties, it would be improper to allocate the burden of proof to the challenger. When it is clear that a challenge to one’s voting status is actually brought on behalf of the voter, the burden of proof should be on the voter. Perhaps more importantly, the relator has not demonstrated a clear legal right to the
relief she requests. In State ex rel. Klink v. Eyrich (1952), 157 Ohio St. 338, Justice Taft said, "Unless the evidence before the board was such as to require as a matter of law a determination that [the voter’s] voting residence was not as stated in his declaration of candidacy, then the decision of the board must be sustained. In other words, if there was substantial evidence to sustain that decision, the writ requested must be denied. In such an instance where there is no claim of any fraud or corruption on the part of the board, this court cannot say that the board abused its discretion.” Id. at 339 (Taft, J., concurring). I agree. In my view, then, absent an error of law by the Board, our task is to view this similar to an administrative appeal and to determine whether *10 substantial evidence exists to support this 4-0 decision. We then review the decision for an abuse of discretion. We should not be making this decision in the first instance. There is substantial evidence to support the decision of the Board of Elections. The
relator’s evidence, with the Mechanicsburg address of her mother on various documents, was, by
her own admission, largely “created” after the decision in
State ex rel Husted v. Brunner
, 123 Ohio
St. 3d 288,
of Elections had conducted “an administrative investigatory hearing,” not an
elector decides to run for office in Champaign County. Then, and only then, will an opponent, a truly adverse party, have an interest in challenging her residential status. I dissent.
MICHAEL T. HALL, Judge
To The Clerk: Within three (3) days of entering this judgment on the journal, you are
directed to serve on all parties not in default for failure to appear notice of the judgment and the date
of its entry upon the journal, pursuant to
THOMAS J. GRADY, Presiding Judge In witness whereof, I, Penny Underwood, Clerk of the Champaign County Court of Appeals, have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court, this day of October 2011. *12 CLERK, Champaign County Court of Appeals Copies mailed to:
Alice Robinson-Bond, Esq.
Relator, Pro Se
256 West Main Street
Mechanicsburg, OH 43044
Scott D. Schockling, Esq.
Special Asst. Pros. Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
5073 Bixby Road
Groveport, OH 43125