53 Tenn. 186 | Tenn. | 1871
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a motion against the administrator of Samuel Burnett, deceased, in the Circuit Court of Roane county, made in the name of the State, for the use of Roane county, to recover the amount of the State taxes for 1864 collected by Samuel Burnett, deceased, as tax collector for said county. The motion was made by the District Attorney-General, in pursuance of an act of the General Assembly passed on the 19th
The chairman gave the notice to the administrator to furnish the schedule, but he failed to do so. Thereupon, the District Attorney-General moved for judgment, as provided for in the statute referred to, for $2,000. The administrator appeared and admitted that he had not furnished the required schedule.
It is insisted, for defendants, that the act of February 19th, 1868, under which the motion was made, is unconstitutional, and hence that the motion was correctly disallowed by the Circuit Judge.
It appears that on the 8th of June, 1865, the Legislature passed an act releasing the people of the State from the payment of the State taxes for the years of 1862, 1863, and 1864; provided, that nothing in the act was to be construed to refund to the people any taxes already collected for those years.
This was a general law applicable to all the counties, and was therefore obnoxious to no constitutional objection. By this law the State taxes already collected were not to be refunded to those who paid them, but continued to constitute part of the revenue of the State subject to be collected from the several collectors in pursuance of the existing provisions of the laws on this subject.
But by the Act of February 19, 1868, the county of Roane is singled out, and the amount of the State revenue in the hands of the representatives of the collector for that county is directed to be diverted from the State into the county treasury, and then to be refunded to those from whom it was collected. It is provided, in s. 8, art. 11 of the Constitution, that “the Legislature, shall have no power to suspend any general law for the benefit of any particular individual, nor to pass any law for the benefit of indi
But, in the next place, it is insisted that the other provisions of the act by which it is directed that the Chairman of the County Court- shall call the administrator to a settlement, and, on his failure, shall move for judgment in the name of the State for the use of the county, are alike unconstitutional, because in violation not only of the 8th section, art. 11, of the Constitution, but of s. 8 of art. 1, which declares that no man shall be deprived of his property but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. It is settled by a long train of decisions in our State, that the “law of the land” is “a general and public law, equally binding upon every member of the community.” It is too clear to- require argument that the act of February 19th, 1868, ss. 30, 31, 32, 33 & 34, can- not be regarded, as the law of the land.