2006 Ohio 592 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2006
{¶ 2} Relator Rittner was convicted in the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas, the court in which respondent Judge Barber sits, of two counts of rape, felonies of the first degree, and was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of six to 25 years incarceration, with six years of actual incarceration. On October 3, 2002, Rittner filed a motion for a new trial and a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In State v. Rittner, 6th Dist. No. F-02-034, 2003-Ohio-5201, this court dismissed his appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial; however, we reversed the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea for failure to hold an evidentiary hearing.
{¶ 3} The trial court, respondent presiding, completed evidentiary hearings on December 27, 2004, and in an order journalized December 30, 2004, denied Rittner's motion for a new trial. In the same judgment entry, respondent ruled on motions Rittner had filed requesting public records. The trial court (respondent presiding) entered an order, journalized December 30, 2004, regarding the following: Rittner's (1) motion to withdraw his guilty plea; (2) motion for a new trial; (3) motion for an injunctive order (allegations of substandard medical care); and (4) motions for disclosure and release of public records. The trial court denied all of Rittner's requests for public documents. The order contained the language "THIS IS A FINAL, APPEALABLE ORDER."
{¶ 4} Rittner appealed the December 30, 2004 order, and filed assignments of error regarding the denial of his motion for a new trial and his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We decided that appeal on the merits on December 9, 2005. State v. Rittner, 6th Dist. No. F-05-003, 2005-Ohio-6526 ("Rittner II"). Rittner didnot file any assignments of error regarding the trial court's (respondent's) denial of his motions requesting public records. Instead, Rittner filed this action in mandamus to compel respondent to order the release of those documents alleged to be public records.
{¶ 5} In his petition, Rittner asserts that the following are public records to which he is entitled:
{¶ 6} Audio tapes, which, Rittner asserts, are "in the court of respondent Barber": tapes of proceedings in State v.Rittner, Case No. 92-CRA-0263 [sic]; tapes of proceedings inState v. Rittner, Case No. 92-CR-118; tapes of proceedings inState v. Kruizenga, Case. No. 92-CR-26; tapes of proceedings inState v. Melissa Nicole McGuire, Case No. 99-CR-0061;
{¶ 7} Psychiatric/psychological evaluations: Copy of the evaluation ordered and filed Sept. 22, 1999, in State v. MelissaNicole McGuire, for the purpose of determining competency to stand trial; "[A]ny other psychiatric evaluation conducted on Melissa Nicole McGuire regarding the cases of Rittner andKruizenga; "[D]iscovery or for purpose of psychiatric evaluation (reasoning unknown) as so ordered by Barber filed on 10-14-04. This order directed to Director Kenneth Caldwell, Fulton County Dept. of Jobs and Family Services, Children's Protective Services, `regarding the criminal incident occurring between Defendant Daniel Rittner and Melissa McGuire, as well as all relevant and collateral records regarding Ms. McGuire, as well as all relevant and collateral records regarding Ms. McGuire and Mr. Rittner should and ought to be disclosed, * * *'";
{¶ 8} Witness statements: "Names of witnesses unknown to this relator" in the cases Rittner, Kruizenga, and McGuire; "[S]tatements made by any witness regarding a Leslie Aletha Schmidt in Rittner" and "all related documents regarding or containing the name of Leslie Aletha Schmidt"; "All witness statements made to Job and Family Services, Children Protective Services regarding Rittner and Kruizenga."
{¶ 9} Relator's petition and respondent's motion to dismiss are now ripe for disposition.
{¶ 11} In order for respondent to prevail on his motion to dismiss, it must appear beyond doubt that Rittner could prove no set of facts warranting relief, after all factual allegations of the complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in his favor. State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v.Schroeder (1996),
{¶ 13} "A public office or person responsible for public records is not required to permit a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a criminal conviction or a juvenile adjudication to inspect or to obtain a copy of any public record concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution or concerning what would be a criminal investigation or prosecution if the subject of the investigation or prosecution were an adult, unless the request to inspect or to obtain a copy of the record is for the purpose of acquiring information that is subject to release as a public record under this section and the judge who imposed the sentence or made the adjudication with respect to the person, or the judge's successor in office, finds that the information sought in the public record is necessary to support what appears to be a justiciable claim of the person." R.C.
{¶ 14} Thus, although any member of the public may file a mandamus to compel, for example, a county clerk, to release public records, an inmate must first obtain a "finding" from his or her sentencing judge that the documents are "necessary to support a justiciable claim or defense" before making the request to the public official or office, who must then refuse, before the inmate may file a mandamus. Inmates who file mandamus petitions demanding alleged public records have their petitions routinely dismissed due to their failure to obtain the required finding from their sentencing judge. This is understandable in cases where the inmate seeks a mandamus to compel a county clerk or other governmental office to act, without first obtaining permission from the sentencing judge. See, Watson v. Foley, 2d Dist. No. CA20970,
{¶ 15} What is not so understandable, however, is the dismissal of inmate's mandamus petitions where the respondentis the inmate's sentencing judge; the stated grounds for dismissing these petitions is the inmate's failure to obtain that judge's permission to access the records. These cases warrant close inspection. In State ex rel. Brown v. Glickman, 8th Dist. No. 81537, 2002-Ohio-4593, the inmate's petition naming the sentencing judge as the respondent was dismissed; the inmate had filed a motion requesting alleged public records and upon the judge's denial of the motion, filed a mandamus. The grounds upon which the motion was dismissed are unspecified; the decision merely summarily rejects the inmate's petition for failure to demonstrate a clear right to relief due to the lack of the sentencing judge's permission for the records. In Breeden v.Mitrovich, 11th Dist. No. 2005-L-055,
{¶ 16} Mitrovich followed what seems to be a seminal appellate case on this point, Holder v. Chester Twp, 11th Dist. No. 2002-G-2461, 2002-Ohio-7168. In Holder, the court concluded that an inmate's mandamus petition seeking public records will always be dismissed when the inmate has failed to secure permission: "a mandamus petition before an appellate court will be subject to dismissal when an inmate has not alleged: (1) she has filed a request for the records with the trial judge who sentenced her in the underlying case; and (2) the trial judge has issued a decision stating that access to the public records is necessary for the relator to support a justiciable claim. Pursuant to this case law, R.C.
{¶ 17} Here, Rittner did file a motion for public records, and did receive a determination regarding his document requests. Respondent denied his requests as follows.
{¶ 19} The relevant portion of the December 30, 2004 order reads as follows:
{¶ 20} "[A]nent Defendant's three separate Motions for Disclosure and Release of Public Records, the Court notes Defendant has argued he needs a release of the audio tape of his Plea and Sentencing Hearing, and that certain Records must be released, as they relate to reports maintained by the Ohio State Highway Patrol, a person identified as Ronald A. Kruizenga, one Renee McGuire, one Melissa McGuire, one Brandy McGuire, and others.
{¶ 21} "State has resisted Defendant's Motion by Memorandum and its own Motion to Dismiss, filed December 6, 2004.
{¶ 22} "The Court personally compared the audible portion of the audio tape to the official transcript prepared in this case, and it found no material variances of any kind. The Court further has made the audio tape available to Defendant's Attorney for her individual inspection, comparison, and use.
{¶ 23} "Defendant's Motion for personal disclosure of additional records anent various individuals and agencies is not founded in proper procedure. Some of the records, being of ancient vintage, cannot be located, and presumably have been destroyed. Further, Defendant's Attorney has had full access to such records as are available, as has Dr. Forgac. The Court notes that [defendant's attorney] has devoted a lot of time and effort in reviewing and/or making judgments regarding all of the pertinent and relevant records in this case, presumably to include the records and tape Defendant has required herein. If additional records were needed, [defendant's attorney] had full authority and an ability to access them, up to and including the right to prosecute a mandamus action. Accordingly the Court finds Defendant's Motion, to the extent it has not already been honored, to be not in the interest of justice, and it must be denied. The Court further finds that State's Motion to Dismiss should and ought to be Granted. Now, therefore, IT IS SO ORDERED."
{¶ 24} We now review to what, precisely, petitioner Rittner is entitled upon respondent's order.
{¶ 26} In his petition, Rittner asserts that he has a clear legal right to the requested documents, that respondent has a clear legal duty to "perform the requested act" (presumably to allow Rittner access to the documents), and that Rittner has no other plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
{¶ 27} Respondent advances two arguments in support of his motion to dismiss: first, that relator has not met the requirements of R.C.
{¶ 28} Respondent's second argument, that he is not the person responsible for the records pursuant to the public records statute, and that therefore he has no legal duty to allow Rittner access, is only partially correct upon a facial examination. This court has had prior occasion to order respondent to release audio tapes of proceedings pursuant to the public records statute.State ex rel. Swigart v. Barber, Long, Behnfeldt (1997),
{¶ 29} Respondent's first argument, that because he denied petitioner's public records requests, petitioner cannot meet the requirement of R.C.
{¶ 30} We take this opportunity to clarify why, precisely, respondent is only correct in his conclusion, and not in his reasoning, and to rectify the sparse explication appellate courts employ when dismissing similar mandamus petitions upon these grounds. At bottom, respondent's argument is such that if a sentencing judge (respondent, in this case) finds the inmate not entitled to requested records, the inmate has met the "end of the line," of judicial remedies and is left without recourse. If respondent was entirely correct, a sentencing judge's decision to deny an inmate access to public records would escape any further review, by mandamus or otherwise. This conclusion cannot withstand close investigation.
{¶ 31} Sentencing judges have wide discretion when determining whether an inmate seeking public records is entitled to them. Hence the rationale for requiring the inmate'ssentencing judge to determine the matter; he or she will be most familiar with the inmate's case and matters which the inmate may raise. Indeed, judicial discretion formed part of the basis for dismissing the inmate's mandamus petition against his sentencing judge in Glickman, 2002-Ohio-4593, at ¶ 3. Be that as it may, exercises of judicial discretion are neither absolute nor obscured from review for abuses of that discretion. Several rules of procedure require trial judges to demonstrate, upon the record, their exercise of discretion, in order to facilitate appellate review: decisions to grant continuances, State v.Wentworth (1978)
{¶ 32} Due to the necessity of appellate review — even where trial judges exercise considerable discretion — and upon examination of the mandamus mechanism and an inmate's predicament in obtaining public records, we conclude that the proper method for an inmate to obtain such review is directly through the appellate process. Rittner's petition warrants dismissal, not because of respondent's assertions, but because his opportunity for review existed through the process of a direct appeal.
{¶ 33} An order of a court is a final appealable order only if the requirements of both R.C.
{¶ 34} We have found no Ohio case law where an appellate court reviewed a sentencing judge's determination that an inmate was not entitled to requested public records pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 35} The conclusion that a sentencing judge's determination upon an inmate's request pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 36} "(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:
{¶ 37} "* * *
{¶ 38} (2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment."
A "substantial right" is a right which a statute entitles a person to enforce or protect. R.C.
{¶ 39} Obtaining an order thus requires an inmate to properly file a motion with his sentencing judge (or that judge's successor) requesting a determination pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 40} Since relator did not attempt an appeal of respondent's order denying him public records, his mandamus petition is precluded. In order to avail himself of mandamus, a relator must demonstrate that there is no plain and adequate remedy available at law. State ex rel. Howard v. Ferreri,
supra. In the instant case, relator could have appealed respondent's denial of his public records request; indeed, relator did file a pro se appeal of the other rulings contained in the same judgment entry, and could have filed an assignment of error regarding this issue. See Rittner II, supra. Relator's failure to appeal the order containing respondent's denial of the public records precludes mandamus relief as the appellate process was available. A mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal.State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman (1973),
{¶ 42} We decline to address petitioner's additional requested records listed in his "supplement to writ of mandamus," filed December 19, 2005, or petitioner's additional arguments, as moot.
{¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, we find respondent's motion well-taken, and we dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim due to relator's failure to obtain the requisite finding by respondent pursuant to R.C.
MANDAMUS DISMISSED.
Pietrykowski, J., Skow, J., Parish, J. concur.
