10 N.W.2d 645 | Iowa | 1943
The attorney general, pursuant to section 3592, Code, 1939, brought suit in equity in the district court of Hardin county to determine the legal settlement of Ida May and Grace Wessels, feeble-minded girls in the Glenwood State School. The object of the suit was to determine the liability under Code section 3477.1 of Hardin and Keokuk counties, defendants thereto, for the care of the girls. The case was submitted upon stipulated facts to the respondent judge, who held that the legal settlement of the girls was not in either county and consequently neither was in any way liable for their care in the state school. The attorney general seeks to review that decision in this certiorari action.
In the equity suit it was stipulated that: Evert and Anna Wessels were the parents of the twin girls in question, born about April 1934; they were residents of Hardin county on September 10, 1935, when a petition was filed in the district court of that county, as a juvenile court, asking that the parents be deprived of the custody of their six children, including the twin girls; pursuant to notice, a hearing was had on this petition; the court found that the children were not being kept in *867 a fit and proper home; and on September 26, 1935, the twins were committed to the custody of a Mr. and Mrs. Sawin, who lived in Hardin county. The order provided that Hardin county should pay the persons to whom the children were committed a reasonable amount for their care.
On December 16, 1935, the Hardin county director of relief applied to the juvenile court for an order committing the twins to the American Home Finding Association of Ottumwa, Iowa, where they could be placed "at very little expense to Hardin county." On the same day an order to that effect was made. On December 30, 1935, the twins were taken to the orphans' home in Ottumwa, to which they had been committed. Hardin county paid $50 to this home for the care of the twins and a third child of another parent. On January 4, 1936, the girls were placed by the Ottumwa home with a Mr. and Mrs. Wyllie in Keokuk county. The girls continued to live with the Wyllies, and on May 27, 1937, they petitioned the district court of Keokuk county to adopt the girls. Decree of adoption was entered on the same day, the Ottumwa orphans' home having filed its written consent.
On March 12, 1942, the Wyllies filed their petitions in the same Keokuk county court asking to have the adoptions annulled because, unbeknown to the petitioners, the girls were feeble-minded as a result of an injury at birth. (See Code section 10501.7.) On March 26, 1942, decrees were entered under which the adoption of each girl was "annulled, cancelled and rendered of no legal force and effect," and each was placed in the guardianship of the state board of social welfare, at whose request the girls were thereby committed to the Glenwood State School. The Wyllies delivered the girls to the institution at Glenwood on April 2, 1942. It was further stipulated upon the trial in December 1942, that the parents, Evert and Anna Wessels, had been residents of Minnesota for more than a year prior thereto.
The respondent judge held, in effect, that the settlement of minors is the same as that of their father, either natural or adoptive; that these girls did not have a legal settlement in Keokuk county because of the annulment of the adoption, *868 nor in Hardin county because of the residence and presumptive legal settlement in Minnesota of the father.
[1] I. Respondent contends that his decision is not reviewable by certiorari.
"The writ of certiorari may be granted * * * where an inferior tribunal * * * exercising judicial functions is alleged to have exceeded his proper jurisdiction, or is otherwise acting illegally, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy." Code section 12456.
There is no claim that respondent acted in excess of jurisdiction, but it is contended he acted illegally in that the stipulated facts do not justify the legal conclusion arrived at.
Code section 3594 provides that in such an action as the attorney general brought: "Any decision by the court shall be final." We have held this means that no appeal lies from the decision of the lower court in such a case. State ex rel. Fletcher v. Webster County,
We think respondent's decision here, the facts having been stipulated and without dispute, is reviewable by certiorari. The case involved law questions only. If petitioner's contention in the equity case was sound, respondent acted illegally, within the meaning of the certiorari statute, in rejecting it. It was not a mere erroneous ruling made during the course of hearing the case. See Luke v. Civil Service Comm.,
Our conclusion finds support, on principle, in the cases holding that certiorari lies to review a decision on fact *869
questions where there is no competent evidence to support the finding and there is no other adequate remedy. In such event, the question becomes one of law. See City of Des Moines v. Board,
[2] II. By section 2, chapter 135, Acts Forty-ninth General Assembly, Code sections 3477.1 to 3477.7 in chapter 172, "insofar as applicable," apply to chapter 170, entitled "Glenwood State School." Under section 3477.1, as amended by section 2, chapter 135, Forty-ninth General Assembly, cost of support in the Glenwood school:
"* * * shall be paid:
"1. By the county in which the patient [inmate] has a legal settlement provided that for the purpose of this chapter a minor child must have physically resided in the county at least one year for same to be deemed the county of his settlement.
"2. By the state when such person has no legal settlement in the state or when his settlement is unknown. The residence of any patient [inmate] shall be that existing at the time of admission."
The ultimate question for respondent to decide was whether the legal settlement of the twins was in either Hardin or Keokuk county at the time of their admission to Glenwood.
Code section 3828.088, paragraph 5, provides:
"Legitimate minor children take the settlement of their father, if there be one, if not, then that of the mother."
At the time of the juvenile court proceedings in Hardin county in 1935, the settlement of the Wessels and their children was in that county. When Mr. and Mrs. Wyllie, in Keokuk county, duly adopted the girls, we think their settlement was changed to that of Mr. Wyllie, the father by adoption. This would seem to follow from Code section 10501.6. See Inhabitants of Waldoborough v. Inhabitants of Friendship,
There seems to be little controversy between the parties on the above propositions. However, the parties do not agree as to the effect on the legal settlement of the girls of the order of the juvenile court depriving the Wessels of the custody of their children. Petitioner contends that by reason of this order the father could not thereafter change the girls' settlement. Respondent held that the order did not prevent the father's changing the settlement of the girls by his removal from the state.
In this connection, Code section 3828.089 provides:
"A legal settlement once acquired shall so remain until such person has removed from this state for more than one year or has acquired a legal settlement in some other county or state."
From the stipulated facts it is not clear that the father removed from Iowa more than a year before April 1942, when the twins were committed to Glenwood. The fair inference from the stipulation is merely that such removal occurred more than a year before the trial in December 1942. Assuming, however, that at the time of such commitment the father had lost his settlement in Hardin county, under section 3828.089, by removal from the state for more than a year, we think the girls' settlement was not thereby changed but that it remained in Hardin county. It is clear that no act of these feeble-minded infants, who were virtual wards of the juvenile court, could affect their settlement. Kennan on Residence and Domicile, 597, section 326; id. 600, section 329.
By the order of the juvenile court in September 1935, the father and mother were deprived of the right to custody and *871
control of their children. If the girls had then been committed to the Glenwood school, clearly no subsequent act of the father could have changed the existing settlement of the girls in Hardin county, because such commitment would have deprived the father of the custody and control of the girls and broken the family unity. But these results were as clearly and effectively accomplished by the order of the juvenile court based on the finding that the home of the parents was unfit for their children. The rule of section 3828.088, paragraph 5, that minors take the settlement of their father had its origin in the accepted theory of the family relation. Polk County v. Clarke County,
Our holding that a father who has been legally deprived of the custody of his children can no longer control their settlement finds support in decisions that the settlement of a wife who has been confined in an asylum or abandoned by her husband remains unchanged by any subsequent act of the husband. Breaking the family unity destroys the premise that the settlement of the father or husband controls that of members of the family who have been legally separated from him. Polk County v. Clarke County,
It has been held that when parents are divorced and the custody of children awarded to the mother, the legal settlement of the mother, not the father, controls that of the children. Board of Commissioners of Summit County v. Board of Commissioners of Trumbull County,
Our holding also finds support in the rule that the domicile *872
of a father who has been legally deprived of the custody of his child does not control the child's domicile. The general rule that the domicile of an infant is that of his father rests upon the idea of parental custody of the infant, and when the reason for the rule fails the rule is not applied. Jensen v. Sorenson,
The respondent should have held that the settlement of the girls remained in Hardin county. He is directed to enter judgment accordingly. His findings and decree are annulled and the writ of certiorari is sustained. — Writ sustained.
BLISS, OLIVER, HALE, SMITH, and MANTZ, JJ., concur.
