This is an action in mandamus by John Raitt and Roy D. Raitt, the highest bidders at a public sale of school land leases, the relators, to compel the Board of Educational Lands and Funds, and the members and officers thereof, the respondents, to execute and deliver to them a school land lease in accordance with the terms of the bid and the provisions of sections 72-233 and 72-234, *680 R. R. S. 1943. The trial court denied the issuance of a writ of mandamus and the relators have appealed.
The record shows that the Board of Educational Lands and Funds caused a school land lease to be executed and delivered to the relators on October 24, 1949, for a period of 12 years. On August 13, 1951, the Board of Educational Lands and Funds declared the léase to be void and of no force and effect under the authority of a decision of this court entitled State ex rel. Ebke v. Board of Educational Lands and Funds,
The state holds, as trustee, the public school lands within the state, including the income therefrom. It is the duty of a trustee to obtain a maximum return to the trust estate from the trust properties under its control, subject to the taking of necessary precautions for the preservation of the trust estate. State ex rel. Ebke v. Board of Educational Lands and Funds,
supra.
In this respect, sections 72-233 and 72-234, R. R. S. 1943, providing for the selling of school land leases at public auction, are not mandatory statutes which require that a school land lease be executed and delivered to the highest bidder under any and all circumstances. The Board of Educational Lands and Funds has the right to exercise its discretion in determining if the sale was fairly conducted and whether the lease sold for a fair and reasonable value. There is no universal test by which directory provisions of a statute may be distinguished from mandatory provisions. Ordinarily, such differences must be determined by the intent of the Legislature as gleaned from the whole statute. But in the present case the Constitution requires that the property be dealt with in a manner consonant with the duties and functions of a trustee acting in a fiduciary capacity. It thus imposes upon the board the duty of obtaining a fair market value for all trust property that it may sell. A fair construction of the statutes, viewed in the light of their constitutional background, requires us to hold that the highest bidder at a public sale of school land leases is not entitled to a lease until it has been approved by the board. The board may properly exercise a reasonable discretion in determining if the sale was fairly held and if the property sold for a fair and reasonable value. In its fiduciary capacity the board is not required to approve a sale that is manifestly detrimental to the trust. Where a statute is dealing with a procedure to be followed, it will ordinarily be
*682
construed as directory only where the matter to which it relates is a proper subject for the exercise of a judicial discretion, notwithstanding the use of imperative terms. We think the rule stated in State ex rel. Rutledge v. Eaton,
The only remaining question is whether or not the Board of Educational Lands and Funds acted within its powers in rejecting the bid of the relators. The record shows that an upset bid of $1,000 was made 1 week after the sale. We think the rule governing upset bids at judicial sales is applicable here. If the sale was fairly conducted and the property sold for a reasonable and fair value under the circumstances, the board would ordinarily be required, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, to approve the sale and make the lease. An upset bid, made after the sale and before the approval and acceptance of the highest bid at the public auction, is relevant only to the extent that it bears upon the fairness of the sale and the adequacy of the highest bid at the public auction. State ex rel. Sorensen v.
*683
Denton State Bank,
Affirmed.
