THE STATE EX REL. QUALITY STAMPING PRODUCTS, APPELLANT, v. OHIO BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 96-419
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
December 30, 1998
84 Ohio St.3d 259 | 1998-Ohio-325
Submitted November 10, 1998 — Decided December 30, 1998. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 95APD 02-248.
Roetzel & Andress, Robert E. Blackham, Daphne White Huntley and Timothy J. Webster, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Lisa A. Sotos, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Quality Stamping Products (“Quality Stamping“), appellant, seeks a writ of mandamus ordering appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order granting claimant Kajetan J. Koziol‘s application for additional compensation based on the violation of a specific safety requirement (“VSSR“). The Court of Appeals for Franklin County denied the writ, finding that the commission had not abused its discretion in granting the award. We affirm.
{¶ 3} Koziol‘s VSSR application explained the nature and effect of his injury. The application also charged Quality Stamping with having violated “ORC [Chapter] 4109, Employment of Minors,” and various safety regulations. On January 23, 1992, the commission found that Quality Stamping had violated Ohio Adm.Code 4101:9-2-11, which absolutely prohibits minors from operating a power press without automatic feed and ejection features, like the one that crushed Koziol‘s hand. Koziol‘s VSSR application did not specify a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4101:9-2-11.
{¶ 4} Quality Stamping challenged the VSSR award in an earlier mandamus action before the court of appeals. That action was ultimately dismissed without explanation by agreed stipulation. The entry of stipulated dismissal provided:
“Whereas * * * Industrial Commission of Ohio * * * agrees to vacate its order of 1-23-92 and to place the matter on the hearing docket for VSSR claims for consideration only of whether [Quality Stamping] violated the requirements specified in paragraph 6 of claimant‘s application, the parties hereto, through counsel, stipulate that this action is dismissed without prejudice.”
{¶ 5} In compliance, the commission held another hearing on Koziol‘s VSSR application. In the order that underlies this appeal, a commission hearing officer again found VSSR liability, explaining:
“It is * * * the finding of the Staff Hearing Officer that the claimant‘s injury was the result of the employer‘s hiring of a minor without verifying his date of birth or completion of high school, as required by
R.C. [Chapter] 4109 ,R.C. 4109.02 ,R.C. 4109.05 andR.C. 4109.06 .
“It is therefore ordered that an additional award of compensation be granted to the claimant in the amount of 50 per cent of the maximum weekly rate under the rule of ‘State ex rel. Engle v. Industrial Commission‘, 142 Ohio St. 425 [27 O.O. 370, 52 N.E.2d 743]. “Reliance for this decision is placed [on] the sworn statement of employer‘s personnel director Kenneth Nayman wherein he stated that he asked claimant‘s age before hiring him, the claimant provided him with a false date of birth, that he made no effort to verify claimant‘s date of birth, and the * * * form [the] employer uses does not even provide for the verification of employee‘s [sic] ages. Reliance is also placed [on] claimant‘s birth certificate a facsimile whereof is on file.
“Claimant has freely admitted to having lied about his age when seeking employment, and he has further freely admitted to having failed to use safety devices provided by employer. The Legislature, however, has established a public policy of protecting minors from dangerous employment in part out of recognition of the reckless proclivities of youth. The Commission rules employer may not avail itself of the defenses available to employers of adult workers in the same fact situation. The Commission rules that claimant‘s youthful folly proximately caused his industrial injury, and that avoidance of such youthful folly and its consequences, as well as the furtherance of formal education, was the direct objective of the Legislature‘s prohibition.
” * * *
“Claimant‘s Application cites
Chapter 4109 of the Revised Code and specifically recites that the same refers to the ‘employment of minors.’ Employer was on notice of that aspect of this Application.”
Article II, Section 35 of Ohio‘s Constitution specifically empowers the Industrial Commission to enforce safety legislation as well as its own regulations.”
R.C. 4123.89 is not itself a safety requirement. Therefore, it need not be cited with specificity in claimant‘s Application, though articulation of the formula
‘employment of minors’ therein certainly places any literate reader on notice of the gist of claimant‘s allegations. R.C. 4123.89 , however, does specify how the Industrial Commission is to implement enforcement ofR.C. [Chapter] 4109 , its sections, and subsections.”
R.C. 4109.06 provides with specificity the only circumstances under which a minor may be employed on hazardous equipment. It is clear that this claimant‘s situation does not fall under these exceptions.“Employer‘s defense that
R.C. [Chapter] 4109 ‘s criminal sanctions are exclusive and immunize it from administrative liability is fascinating but unsupported by statutory or case law.” * * * It is noted that
Chapter 4109 , likeChapter 4301 of the Revised Code , shifts the burden of proof to the employer once the minority of the injured worker is established.” * * *
“Claimant‘s Application filed November 17, 1989 is GRANTED to the extent of this order.
” * * *
“The finding and order are based on the Investigation Report, Division of Safety and Hygiene, the evidence in file and evidence adduced at hearing.”
{¶ 6} Quality Stamping requested the instant writ after the commission refused its request for rehearing. The court of appeals denied relief, effectively holding that (1) Koziol‘s VSSR application provided Quality Stamping with sufficient notice prior to the commission‘s finding of the
{¶ 7}
“When it is found upon hearing by the industrial commission that an injury, occupational disease, or death of any minor working in employment which is prohibited by any law enacted by the general assembly was directly caused by a hazard of such prohibited employment, the commission shall assess an additional award of one hundred per cent of the maximum award established by law, to the amount of the compensation that may be awarded on account of such injury, occupational disease, or death * * *.” 135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1719.1
{¶ 8} The requirements and proscriptions in
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} Thus, as found by the commission and court of appeals, Quality Stamping violated
{¶ 11} The reference to an entire chapter of law is not enough to place an employer on notice of an alleged VSSR unless coupled with a detailed description of the claimant‘s accident. State ex rel. Bailey v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 23 OBR 127, 129, 491 N.E.2d 308, 310. Koziol‘s application attributed his injury to a power press, see State ex rel. Thompson Bldg. Assoc., Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 199, 201, 522 N.E.2d 545, 547, and recited that
{¶ 13}
“Except [in circumstances not relevant here], no minor of compulsory school age shall be employed by any employer unless the minor presents to the employer a proper age and schooling certificate, as a condition of employment.”
{¶ 14}
“When the section defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in such section, then culpability is not required for the person to be guilty of the offense. When the section neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is sufficient culpability to commit the offense.”
{¶ 15} In forbidding the employment of minors,
{¶ 16} Finally, Quality Stamping maintains that Koziol was injured because he failed to use the available pull-back safety device, not because Quality Stamping employed him as a minor. The court of appeals properly rejected this argument, finding that (1)
{¶ 17} Accordingly, we hold that the commission properly found that
Judgment affirmed.
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissent.
THE STATE EX REL. QUALITY STAMPING PRODUCTS, APPELLANT, v. OHIO BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ET AL., APPELLEES.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.
{¶ 18} I respectfully dissent. I do not believe that
{¶ 19} Here, the claimant admitted that he intentionally misrepresented his age when applying for the job. His job application indicated that he had completed four years of high school. The employer inquired about age and education, and when the claimant said that he had four years of high school and was over the age of eighteen, the employer believed that the claimant was of age to be employed. The employer made a reasonable effort to ascertain the age of the claimant. There is no evidence that the employer had actual or implied knowledge of the claimant‘s true age. The statute does not require any more.
{¶ 20} A VSSR may be found only upon a violation of a specific duty that results in injury.
{¶ 21} In addition, to find a violation of a specific safety requirement, the violation must be the proximate cause of the injury. State ex rel. Bayless v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 148, 552 N.E.2d 939; State ex rel. Haines v. Indus. Comm. (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 15, 58 O.O.2d 70, 278 N.E.2d 24. Here, the employer‘s failure to affirmatively ascertain claimant‘s age was not the proximate cause of the injury. The claimant‘s failure to use a pull-back safety device was the
{¶ 22} Because a VSSR is a penalty, all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of a specific safety requirement must be construed in favor of the employer. State ex rel. Burton v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 172, 545 N.E.2d 1216, 1219. Strictly construing the statute, I do not believe that the employer violated any safety requirement, or, if it did, that proximate cause was established. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and issue a writ.
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.