*1 weight of admissible might upon bear suggestions thing. These admissibility of a withdrawn they no relation have evidence, ’’ plea. confession; extra-judicial an was not the defendant The offer felony, compromise, of a negotiation for a not attempted it was an charged The inflicted. defendant punishment to be but of the gallows. in His capital offense; shadow of he stood with a By he, plea guilty. offer, his with a of not not inconsistent offer was punishment plead guilty that his on condition effect, he would years imprisonment penitentiary, five assessed at would be penalty. the death This he take chance of had rather than right 71 Mo. held “if a Kring, In it was State do. plea consequence guilty case enter a defendant a criminal prosecuting apparently agreement officer, of an with the sanctioned sentence, judge, as to the more severe sentence should not plea be awarded. rather be to withdraw He should his plea guilty guilty, [Syl. file a not if he desires.” compromise If had an offer civil action, been it would have good privileged. why been can see no AYe reason it should not so plead offer guilty considered a criminal action. The should accepted passed upon have it, been sentence or it should have rejected again.” been and “never been prosecut- have heard ing attorney reject should have been allowed the conditional offer afterwards use it the defendant at the trial. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. Eemoood, Davis and CO., concur. PER foregoing opinion CURIAM: —The by IEgree, C., adopted as of the court. All opinion judges concur. The State ex rel. Cleaver Pyle, Administrator of Estate of City University City Pyle, Frank et al., Appellants. (2d)W. S. 73. Two,
Division June *2 Vetsburg respondent.
Karl M. *3 Joseph appellants; Greensfelder, Bosenberger II. & Grand for Grand, of counsel. judgment a rendered to collect 1, 3926, December C. On
DAVIS, plaintiff in the Circuit tort, on a filed City based University against an writ of County petition for alternative a St. Louis of Court mandamus writ of alternative of execution. in aid mandamus mayor, aldermen, City, University its issued, directed appellants’ motion to overruled The court treasurer. collector standing plead refusing appellants thereon quash writ, issued, writ' of mandamus Thereupon further. judgment quash, in arrest of appellants filed a motion which Upon appellants application were trial court overruled. which the appeal here. an Pyle received, injuries Frank died as develops It the result negligence April University City. 12, 1922, On caused County against of St. filed in the Circuit Court Louis said suit damages February administrator to recover his therefor. On cause, jury on a 2, 1.924, trial returned a verdict favor against city. plaintiff May $7500 sum of On ground court sustained a for new motion trial on the of er th.e appealed instructions. Plaintiff roneous to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which court sustaining reversed order motion for trial new remanded the cause to the trial court with directions verdict reinstate accordingly. [Pyle render University City, On July 26, 1926, the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, compliance with the mandate of appellate court, verdict, reinstated the and entered plaintiff $7500 the sum of but disallowed in *4 computed February terest 2, 1924, July 26, to 3926, due to the verbiage of mandate, neglected the which to order judgment the original reinstated as of the date. execution, The judg issued on the July ment 26, entered 1926, was returned milla by bona the sheriff. August On 26, 1926, city said filed its motion to stay set aside judgment, and to recall execution. September On 25, 1926, the Cir- cuit Court of St. County Louis overruled the motion, and on said city the. date said filed a motion for trial, a new which said motion was, September 25, 1926, submitted and overruled. Thereupon said filed its affidavit of appeal, deposited a docket fee of ten dollars, application and made for an appeal, application which was denied on 4, October
On 3, December 1926, plaintiff filed an application for an alterna- tive writ of mandamus to compel defendant, proper its officers, levy to the tax necessary pay to the judgment. aforesaid
455 City to University filed a motion city of 11, 1926, the On December was, quash motion to which of mandamus, writ alternative quash the declining plead further, to The 11, 1926, overruled. on December 1926, 11, on December mandamus was issued writ peremptory 1926, County. 16, On December Louis St. by Circuit Court of the judgment and to motion in arrest their said defendants filed said motion was over- mandamus, which writ of quash the 1927, January 7, 1926. On December 20, the the court on ruled pursuant for which the appeal, affidavit said defendants filed their being prosecuted. in Such other facts as present appeal cause is this appear opinion. if pertinent, any, are will the question court, initial jurisdiction I. relates to The the dispute only, amount, the amount in involves which costs, seventy-five must exclusive of the sum of exceed jurisdiction hundred to vest in this dollars court. in aid of of mandamus execution was the writ for petition
The
sought
aid of the court to
1, 1926. It
the
constrain
December
filed
satisfy
judg
taxes
to assess
collect
its officers
city and
city for
Frank
death of
due
Pyle,
ment recovered
July
judgment
26,
rendered
negligence. The
its
entry
concomitantly
per
its
it
drew six
From
cent
$7500.
sum of
petition
money
for
based on
While
mandamus was
interest.
reality
separate
action.
judgment recovered, it was
had
Interest
due,
judgment, principal
interest,
so that
then become
ex
operated
petition
up
The
for mandamus
not
$7500.
ceeded
merely
judgment,
on the
and interest
on the
united. Thus
petition
dispute,
amount
when the
filed,
mandamus was
united
and interest. We rule that
was the
the amount in
$7500,
jurisdiction
dispute
sum of
to vest
''exceeded the
so as
in this
analogous
court.
facts
are
here stated
the facts found in
Schwyhart
Mo.
Barrett,
456 ordered writs of mandamus
II. The alternative and proceed to make a delay, excuse or appellants, without further satisfy the levies, sufficient levy, or successive interest thereon per and six cent $7500 $169.60, as July 1926, and accrued costs of 26, proceeding, pay and to same mandamus of costs as the well in- attorneys record, judgment, until of herein, or his respondent fully paid. are and costs terest authority that writs appellants exceed of the contention It is phase inquiry in- quashed. One should be and the court of 12, X, 11 and of State of Sections Article construction volves the provides: county, city, for 11 “Taxes town Section Constitution. subjects objects may all taxa- purposes be levied on of and school purposes ion tion; For and town the annual rate . . . having than thou- in cities towns less ten property ... inhabitants, than thousand shall ex- one rate sand and more ” valuation; hundred dollars fifty cents ... Sec- ceed provides part, substance, 12 that no shall tion be allowed to any any purpose manner for become ‘indebted or to an amount exceeding any year provided the income and revenue for such year, without the voting assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof purpose. at an be for that election to held think, It is 11 12 evident, we Sections aforesaid are to together. They comprise integral parts be construed system of a financiering closely subject-matter and are so akin as to their as to be 11 correlated. Section is a limitation tax rate that the munic ipality permitted levy, while Section limits the amount of They closely indebtedness. are so Kentucky related that the State in its Constitution has seen fit unite one section their identical meaning import. through This court, J., in Lamar Barclay, City of Lamar, 128 Mo. l. c. discussing the said: sections, component parts system
“The two sections are financiering of a which experience pointed furnishing out as a safer course than had been previously great objects Two followed. view, were in and each of the sections object treat of one of them. One was to limit the raising rates for taxation the annual required revenue for local purposes; power the other to limit the to incur beyond indebtedness the annual provided income and any year. revenue one Section 11 deals with rates of taxation for annual may ap- revenue which plied by the local ordinary authorities to meet 'the and current ex- penses’ government. local Earl, Mo. [Book Sec- subject tion 12 deals with of indebtedness, its limitations, ’’ ways and means to meet it when assumed.
457 the writs their appellants of that to the contention We advert by the rate fixed in excess of the of taxation scope constrain rate hundred dollars fifty of cents on Constitution, is, in that excess and is limited comprehends 12' Section It is valuation. evident insist, however, that, arising Appellants out to relations of contract. inhibition of tort, is on this based notwithstanding It contract. applies judgments in tort as well as 11 to Section provisions. of constitutional purpose not the clear that they not written and language that were used demonstrates exempt municipalities responsibility from for tortious enacted to thoughtlessness. improvidence We acts, guard as a but due to apply that an indebtedness result only are satisfied the sections ing they not relevant to a from contractual relations and that are tort. It would against municipality pure obtained for a purpose serve no well-considered reasoning rehearse 256, of Conner v. 86 107 Nevada, 148, cases 188 Mo. S. W. Am. St. Menar v. 314, Sanders, (Ky.) 183 S. W. 949. See also State ex 589; Flagstaff rel. v. 183 Springs, (Mo.) Poole Willow Gomez, (Ariz.) 1003; 329; Bloomington Perdue, Pac. 99 Ill. v. Bean, 582; Gray’s Lorence Wash. 50 Pac. Limitations of Taxing Indebtedness, Power and Public Appellants
III. cite Section Revised Statutes as con- trolling. It execution, any reads: an out of “Whenever issued incorporated State, any
court in this record unsatisfied, town or shall be returned in whole in part, levy, or want property whereon to any such subsequent court at the return or term shall, by mandamus, term writ thereof order and officer, trustees, compel proper the chief council other and all of- city town, levy, such or ficers of assess and collect the annual year town taxes in such or year, may as require, occasion limits, within the constitutional and order when same, collected proper officers, paid officer or to be creditor, to the execution agent his assigns, except or may such amount as necessary to pay salary reasonable .the the law mayor, to the council, as- sessor, marshal, attorney constable, police reasonable force of any city.” such town or against municipalities, Suits based on negligence, wrong- involve ful acts, whether of or omission commission. It was said in Conner v. Nevada, supra: “A escape cannot liability from an obligation arising ex delieto on ground that its indebtedness already has reached Again constitutional limit.” it was there said: “Then when again we turn the clause our Constitution which ap- contracting
pellant debts, relies, only it refers we see that torts; liability for it leaves that matter and makes no reference as the law left it.” what then has the statute reference? common To speaks It it from the constitutional is evident cases limits, this and other does not limit the rate of states the Constitution Moreover, municipalities taxation should where a tort is involved. escape responsibility wrongful Any acts. other con- for their *7 might would, struction permit escape, of the them to so and statute if collection purpose of taxes was thwarted. The constitu- tional limitation, held, only arising as we have refers to debts out contractual relations, leaving it at common law. the matter as was
Appellants say that, by further must virtue of Section there excepted be necessary from pay the an amount taxes collected to the salary reasonable police law to the and a officers, to reasonable provision force. This has reference to the taxes levied for the general and expenses ordinary incidental of the business of the which paid, must be if all, at from and the taxes levied collected within the constitutional Consequently, limits. it has no reference to taxes collected pay judgment to a a For based on tort. a debt or a arising matter may relations, municipality contractual not be constrained to beyond assess and collect taxes the constitutional limits; but as the Constitution apply purely does not to claims tortious, right such rights obtains. The judgment of a creditor to enforce the collection judgment, of the negligent based on the acts of a municipality, must expressly or clear inference be denied him. We do not think judgments the statute noted has to reference ex delicto obtained against a municipality, for it does not meet the foregoing requirements. operates only It involving on matters con- tractual relations. Therefore.neither peremp- the alternative nor the tory writ objectionable were regards. in those TV. Appellants say that the alternative writ im- the commanded levy
mediate and tax, collection of a to sufficient pay .judgment, and the the writ or- thirty days. dered the same to be done within under the statutes think, that evident, we It is or immediately not collected be judgment could the pay tax to the levy may could that, It be provide. writs days, as the thirty within take the order- taxes should the collection think made, we be be- tax previously, the levy is made the While 'regular course. ly and January first of each delinquent on and fall in the collectible comes authorizing and suit law in the provision no see then we Until year. au- regard its exceeded this The court -the taxes. collection tobe appellants should command substance, In thority. rate regular addition collect, levy, assess proceed general expenses and incidental of tax assessment for limits, a tax pay judgment within the constitutional sufficient to costs, year year, do so from requires, as occasion judgment until paid, and costs are and that same paid respondent.
Y. From July 26, being rendered alter an appeal by refused court, trial appellants, on December 1926, sued out in this argument court writ error. On sub- mission, court, in dispute because the amount within
its jurisdiction, transferred the cause the St. Louis Appeals for [Pyle Court of its determination. (2d) University W. City, S. Notice that the respondent had been sued out was not served on writ of error or his previous attorneys 21, 1927, they nor until March did have notice reversing remanding it. As we are the cause on ground, we think the issuance of new per- another alternative and emptory postponed should be until a final writs determination of the (2d) in 1 reported However, cause the situation as thus *8 developed any charged respondent. cannot wise be
We therefore reverse the and remand the cause, without prejudice with respondent, directions to set aside recall the quash alternative and writs and them, and, upon the final Pyle University determination of the City, (2d) cause 1 S. W. 799, if affirmed, is to issue new conformity writ's in with opinion.
Higlee Henwoocl, GG., concur.
PER foregoing opinion by Davis, C., CURTAM: —The adopted opinion of the court. All as the judges concur. Mary City
I. Windle and Windle v. of Springfield, Appellant. (2d)
8 S. W. 61. Two,
Division June